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A LICENSE TO BET:  
LIFE INSURANCE AND THE GAMBLING ACT IN THE 
BRITISH COURTS 
 
Timothy Alborn 
 
More directly than any other enterprise apart from slavery, life 
insurance set a price on human life.  As it evolved in Britain during the 
nineteenth century, the insurance industry introduced a dizzying number of 
variations on this theme.  For the individual purchasing an insurance 
policy, the value of life was translated into the sum required to care for 
dependents, loss of access to a wife's inheritance should she die before her 
father, the sum lost to a creditor in the event of death occurring prior to 
repayment, and the loss of livelihood suffered by a tenant whose lease 
ended with the life of a third party.  All these reasons for buying insurance 
established an equivalence between mortality and monetary value—a 
"death nexus" that precisely and morbidly expressed the "cash nexus" 
derided by Thomas Carlyle as the moral failing of British society.   
Insurance companies were fond of reminding people that this sort of 
commodification was often productive of much social and even moral 
good, and it indisputably met a growing economic demand. But since 
nobody knew for certain when they would die, a life insurance policy was 
also, by definition, a wager.  And since wagers occupied a quite different 
category—"intensely selfish in [their] action, and therefore anti-social and 
anti-christian," as one insurance writer called them in 1891—there was 
always at least the potential for the life office to take on the darker colors of 
the gambling den.1   
Lawmakers first became concerned about the slippery slope between 
life insurance and gambling during the third quarter of the eighteenth 
century, when the industry still catered to a relatively small, mostly 
aristocratic market.2  Their concern grew out of a rash of cases in which 
people had taken out policies on the lives of perfect strangers, often 
celebrities, on the morbid chance that they would die prematurely.3  As 
Geoffrey Clark has noted, the Hanoverian gentry preferred this form of 
                                                                                                                 
1. C. Little, Fire Insurance: Is It a Species of Gambling?, NORWICH UNION 
MAGAZINE, 1891, at 2-3. 
2. See GEOFFREY CLARK, BETTING ON LIVES: THE CULTURE OF LIFE INSURANCE IN 
ENGLAND 1965-1775, 49 (Manchester University Press 1999). 
3. Id. at 49-53. 
2 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:1 
 
gambling over nearly all other varieties; a quarter of all bets in one 
gentleman's club in the 1770s was on the death of a third party, compared 
to only 2.5% on horse races.4  Prior to 1750 gambling on human life was 
only condemned on account of accompanying criminal acts, such as 
poisoning a man to collect on his life policy; after that time the wager itself 
came under increased scrutiny.5  Clark has plausibly linked this 
development to growing unease over slavery, since both "threatened to 
shatter the emerging free-market ethos that individuals should have the 
liberty to engage in a commerce of things, but not of each other."6 In the 
event, Parliament intervened much earlier in the former case, with the 
passage of the Gambling Act of 1774.7 
The Gambling Act worked by requiring claimants to have a legitimate 
financial interest in the life of the insured.8  To prevent the "mischievous 
kind of gaming" that had arisen in the previous half-century, it declared all 
other insurances on human life "null and void, to all intents and purposes 
whatsoever."9  After 1774, it was only legal to collect on an insurance 
policy if a person (typically a wife or child) relied on the insured for 
income or was a creditor who stood to lose if the insured died before 
repaying the loan.10 Clark has argued that although the Act "was fairly 
successful at suppressing outright wagers, it could not uniformly segregate 
the prudential motives prompting proper, indemnifying insurance from the 
uninterested passions fueling speculation."11  Even so, this statute remained 
on the books as the official dividing line between life insurance and 
gambling for the next 135 years, leaving judges, customers and life offices 
to make do with its uncertain provisions as best they could.12   
The Gambling Act's ambiguity recurrently threatened to impede the 
expansion of life insurance throughout the nineteenth century.   As Clark 
indicates, the chief problem in this case lay in life insurance's dangerous 
commingling of things and people.13 The challenge for judges and 
insurance companies alike was to keep those two categories as separate as 
                                                                                                                 
4. Id. at 50. 
5. Id. at 51-53. 
6. Id. at 62-63. 
7. See id. at 9. 
8. Id. 
9. DERMOT MORRAH, A HISTORY OF INDUSTRIAL LIFE ASSURANCE 74 (1955). 
10. See Clark, supra note 2, at 9. 
11. Id. at 26. 
12. It was modified in the 1909 Life Assurance Companies Act, which is discussed 
below.   
13. CLARK, supra note 2, at 53. 
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possible without overly hindering the growth of the industry.  Their efforts 
were tolerably successful in the case of upper-class life insurance.14 The 
increasingly impersonal and standardized nature of these transactions 
allowed judges to come to terms with the fact that many life policies, 
though formally instruments of gambling, were largely irrelevant to the 
moral issues raised by the specter of betting on human life.  The result was 
that judges followed companies in adopting a set of principles which 
rendered the Act all but a dead letter after mid-century. 
The case was far different once life insurance spread from the upper-
class market to working-class customers after 1850.  For one thing, the 
primary reason working people bought life insurance—to pay for a 
relative's funeral costs—did not formally qualify as an "insurable interest" 
under the Gambling Act; hence at least half of the tens of millions of such 
policies issued between 1850 and 1909 were technically illegal.15  Adding 
to the problem, judges doubted the companies' ability to deter their 
customers' alleged passion for gambling; company directors doubted their 
ability to prevent salesmen from attracting business by taking bets on 
neighborhood fatalities; and customers soon realized that the formal 
illegality of their policies entitled them to a refund if the life insured failed 
to die soon enough to "pay."16  The result was that companies sporadically 
appealed to the Gambling Act to quash what they saw as egregious cases of 
black-market wagering, while customers increasingly sued for back 
premiums.17  In response, late-Victorian judges wavered between punishing 
working-class "gamblers" for their depravity in treating neighbors like race 
horses, and punishing the companies for encouraging (through their agents) 
such allegedly immoral behavior.18   
This article begins by recounting the relative ease with which 
companies and judges stabilized the meaning of "insurable interest" in the 
case of upper-class insurance, by examining the two leading cases of 
Godsall v. Boldero19  and Dalby v. India and London Life.20  It then turns to 
the more complex case of working-class life insurance, by sampling a 
                                                                                                                 
14. I use the term "upper-class" in this chapter to connote the aristocrats, 
professionals, and merchants who comprised the primary market for life insurance up to the 
1850s, as distinct from the working-class or "industrial" customers discussed below.  
15. See MORRAH, supra note 9, at 75. 
16. See infra notes 81-88 and accompanying text. 
17. See infra notes 70-73 and accompanying text. 
18. See infra notes 87-92 and accompanying text. 
19. (1807) 103 Eng. Rep. 500 (K.B.). 
20. (1854) 139 Eng. Rep. 465 (C.P.). 
4 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:1 
 
succession of trials which exhibited a variety of appeals to the Gambling 
Act.  Finally, it briefly discusses efforts by companies to clarify the Act in 
1909 by lobbying legislators to revise the meaning of "insurable interest" 
for working-class customers, by increasing supervision over agents and 
customers, and by introducing new forms of marketing which sought to 
teach their customers to associate insurance with financial security rather 
than gaming. What was at stake in each of these cases was the 
determination of a boundary between legitimate and illegitimate insurance, 
in an insurance market which appealed to all social classes because of—not 
in spite of—the fact that it often shaded imperceptibly into gambling. 
 
I. GAMBLING AND LIFE INSURANCE, 1807-1854 
 
The branch of upper-class life insurance that did most to expose the 
Gambling Act's ambiguous language concerned policies taken out by 
creditors against the contingency of debtors dying before they could repay 
the loan.  To guarantee the legality of such policies, life offices routinely 
ascertained the fact of the loan; as long as the insurance did not exceed the 
sum of money that was lent, the lender could not be said to be speculating 
on the death of the debtor. Once such policies had been in force a few 
years, however, their legal status became more difficult to determine.  
What happened if a creditor continued to keep up the insurance policy after 
the debt had been repaid?  Or what if the debt was repaid in installments, 
but the creditor kept up the original level of coverage?  Such questions 
raised the distinct possibility that many, perhaps the majority, of such 
policies were technically illegal when the claim was actually paid.  And the 
legality of third-party policies was a major issue in the early nineteenth 
century, when roughly a third of all policies, and probably half of the sums 
assured, were of this variety.21 
Lord Ellenborough clarified these legal questions at King's Bench in 
1807, although he did so in a way that would create intolerable levels of 
                                                                                                                 
21. Between 30% and 47% of clerical, medical & general  policies issued between 
1824 and 1895 were on third parties, as were 34.4% of legal and general policies in force in 
1870.  Renewal Ledgers, Clerical, Medical and General Life Assurance Society 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with Clerical Medical Group Archives, Edinburgh); Life 
Policy Registers, Legal and General Life Assurance Society (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with Guildhall Library, MS 18,473, London).   
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unpredictability for prospective third-party insurers.22  The decisive case, 
Godsall v. Boldero, concerned a seven-year term policy for £500 on the life 
of William Pitt, which was taken out from the Pelican life office as security 
against a debt.23  The Pelican had resisted the claim on the grounds that by 
the time it was ready to pay, the debt had already been canceled by means 
of a special Parliamentary grant which cleared the former Prime Minister's 
outstanding commitments.24  When Godsall sued for his £500, the 
company's lawyer invoked the Gambling Act, arguing that "if this policy 
may be enforced... every creditor may gamble upon the life of his debtor by 
way of insurance, ... and upon his death he would be entitled to double 
satisfaction of his debt."25  He also compared the case to that of a marine 
policyholder who claimed a total loss even though he had already been 
indemnified by means of salvage.26  Godsall's lawyer countered that the 
Pelican should pay the claim since they had been fairly compensated for 
the risk, urging that in such contracts "the premium is not calculated upon 
the risk of the insolvency of the person whose life is insured, but solely on 
the probability of the duration of the life."27  Ellenborough sided with the 
Pelican, ruling that the policy was "in its nature a contract of indemnity, as 
distinguished from a contract by way of gaming or wagering."28  
By restricting third-party life policies to the indemnification of 
remaining sums owed by insured debtors after they died, Ellenborough 
endowed life offices with blanket deniability in the event of such policies 
falling due.  Companies soon discovered that such power was double-
edged, since they threatened to dissuade creditors from taking out policies 
for fear that a company would postpone payment until other means of 
securing the debt had been exhausted.  After the Asylum Life Assurance 
Company successfully appealed to the Gambling Act to dispute a child 
endowment policy in 1830, insurers "received applications for written 
acknowledgments that the Directors will not avail themselves of any such 
advantage, in cases which bear a great analogy to that which has just been 
decided against the public."29  A typical company response to this sort of 
                                                                                                                 
22. This was in keeping with Ellenborough's wider pattern of decisions which "barred 
the way repeatedly to attempts to modernize the law." P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF 
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 422 (1979). 
23. (1807) 103 Eng. Rep. 500 (K.B.). 
24. Id. at 500-02. 
25. Id. at 503. 
26. Id. at 502-03. 
27. Id. at 502. 
28. Id. at 504. 
29. H.B. & Co., To our Subscribers, 94 CIRCULAR TO BANKERS 329, 330 (1830).  
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fear was by the Alliance, which spent a decade pondering the proper course 
to take when "the Assured has a shifting interest in the Life" after first 
learning in 1827 that it could challenge any policy that failed 
Ellenborough's strict standard.30  Eventually its board decided that it was 
not worth the trouble to determine the technical legality of the insurance 
beyond its initial issue.31  Other offices followed a similar trajectory, first 
disputing claims in isolated cases, then eventually guaranteeing customers 
that Godsall would have no impact on their decision to meet an initial 
obligation.  
In Dalby v. India and London Life Assurance Company (1854), the 
Court of Common Pleas caught up with the life offices' practice, deciding 
(in the words of Justice Parke) that a "much more reasonable construction" 
of the Gambling Act was "that, if there is an interest at the time of the 
policy, it is not a wagering policy, and that the true value of that interest 
may be recovered, in exact conformity with the words of the contract 
itself."32  The case involved an attempt by the India and London to deny 
payment on a policy which it had originally accepted as a reinsurance from 
the Anchor life office, but which had subsequently been taken over by an 
Anchor director who kept the policy in force.33  In ordering the India and 
London to pay, Parke appealed both the customer's right to know the exact 
value of his purchase and to the fact that Godsall had been "universally 
disregarded" by nearly all life offices.34  The lawyer who argued the 
Anchor's case, George Bramwell, repeated the earlier claim in Godsall's 
defense that a life policy was "a simple and absolute contract to pay a given 
sum of money on the death of the life," and hence did not qualify as an 
indemnity.35 He added that Ellenborough had bestowed powers on life 
offices that they had, in practice, been unwilling to exercise: for instance, 
the right "to demand the money back, if the debtor's executors,—say, ten 
years after his death,—become possessed of funds wherewith to pay the 
debt."36  
                                                                                                                 
30. Id. 
31. Alliance Assurance Company board minutes (May 23, 1827, Feb 22, 1837 and 
July 10, 1839), unpublished manuscript, on file with Guildhall Library, MS 12, 162, 
London). 
32. (1854) 139 Eng. Rep. 465, 476 (C.P). 
33. Id. at 466-69. 
34. Id. at 473-76. 
35. Id. at 469. Bramwell went on to be a leading architect of "freedom of contract" 
doctrine in English law.  See ATIYAH, supra note 22, at 374-80. 
36. Dalby, 139 Eng. Rep. at 469-70. 
2008] A LICENSE TO BET 7 
 
Parke's decision in Dalby, closely following Bramwell's arguments, 
firmly established that the payment of a life claim was not the same as an 
indemnification for a loss.  To this extent, his reasoning was sound.37  What 
his ruling overlooked, however, was the fact that any insurance policy that 
professed to do more than indemnify against a contingent loss is, by 
definition, equivalent to a wager.  This had been Ellenborough's point when 
he implied that life insurance was either "a contract of indemnity" or  "a 
contract by way of gaming or wagering."38  Judges in the Dalby case 
claimed that their decision left the Gambling Act intact as a secure 
protection against "colourable insurances" such as when a "man might lend 
another 5l., to enable him to insure for 10,000l."39  But this example was no 
different from lending a man £10,000 for a few weeks, then keeping all but 
£5 of that sum in force as a life policy—which is exactly what 
Dalby legalized.  Parke's contrary claim notwithstanding, it was illogical to 
assert that an insurable interest at the outset necessarily meant that it was 
"not a wagering policy."40  
The fact of the matter was that few people by the mid-nineteenth 
century were concerned about the possibility that life insurance might 
qualify as a subset of "wagering."  Hence the mathematician Augustus De 
Morgan, in an 1838 critique of Godsall, argued that "the contract of 
insurance, be it gambling, or be it not, rests entirely upon the permission 
given by the law to consider a high chance of a small sum as good 
consideration for a low chance of a large sum."41  A half-century later, 
industry spokesmen were even more brazen in their identification of life 
insurance and gambling, as when the Law Union's medical officer urged 
that his line of work was "a very moral thing, and is very charitable; but 
there is no doubt it is a form of gambling... and we all go to the office, and 
                                                                                                                 
37. See VIVIANA A. ROTMAN ZELIZER, MORALS AND MARKETS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
LIFE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 71-72 (1979) (describing the influence of the 
insurable interest doctrine on the relationship between pecuniary loss and emotional loss). 
38. Godsall v. Boldero, (1807) 103 Eng. Rep. 500, 504 (K.B.). 
39. Dalby,139 Eng. Rep. at 473. 
40. On the Godsall and Dalby cases, and their impact on American life insurance 
practice.  See Sharon Ann Murphy, "Security in an Uncertain World: Life Insurance and the 
Emergence of Modern America" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia), 145-159 
(2005). 
41. AUGUSTUS DE MORGAN, AN ESSAY ON PROBABILITIES, AND ON THEIR APPLICATION 
TO LIFE CONTINGENCIES AND INSURANCE OFFICES 247 (London: Longman, Orme, Brown, 
Green, and Longmans, 1838). 
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back lives instead of horses."42  One reason for this departure from earlier 
efforts to segregate insurance and gambling into two distinct categories is 
that late-Victorians had started to distinguish between different sorts of 
gambling, some of which were apparently good for society.  Viviana 
Zelizer's comments regarding American life insurance in the late-
nineteenth century are just as relevant to British opinion at the time: "as 
risk increasingly became an integral part of the... economic system, certain 
forms of risk taking and speculation assumed new respectability.  Rational 
speculation that dealt with already existent risks was differentiated from 
pure gambling which created artificial risk."43 
Alongside such shifts in perception had evolved changes in the practice 
of life insurance, which erased many of its earlier overlaps with "pure 
gambling."  One of these was a new willingness by most offices after 1850 
to offer standardized "surrender values" to parties who wanted to drop their 
policies—a category of people which included many creditors whose debts 
had been repaid.44  This practice superseded the previous course taken by 
customers in such cases, which was to auction off the policy to the highest 
bidder, who would continue to pay the premiums then collect the claim 
when the insured party died.45  Hence a precisely calculable, private and 
wholly impersonal transaction took the place of an unseemly public 
spectacle, one which the insurance reformer Elizur Wright pointedly 
compared to slavery.46  Once such changes were underway, upper-class 
customers and companies benefited equally from the predictable playing 
field which was achieved by pretending that the Gambling Act did not 
apply to them, and neither side had an incentive to take the other to court as 
a means of resolving their grievances.    
   
                                                                                                                 
42. R. Hingston Fox, "The Assurance of Impaired Lives, Chiefly with Reference to 
Special Forms of Assurance," Clinical Journal 6 (1895), 258. 
43. Zelizer, supra note 3, 86. See also G.R. SEARLE, MORALITY AND THE MARKET IN 
VICTORIAN BRITAIN 78-86 (1998). 
44. ECONOMIST, June 18, 1892 at 789. 
45. Until the Insurance Policies Act of 1867 officially legalized such purchases 
(assuming the title to the policy was properly assigned to the purchaser), such auctions were 
technically illegal under the Gambling Act.  But, as in the case of creditors collecting claims 
despite the cancellation of the debt, the Act was seldom applied to them.  See  CORNELIUS 
WALFORD, INSURANCE CYCLOPEDIA 203 (London, Layton) (1871). 
46. William Clendenin, A Brief Sketch of the Life and Works of Elizur Wright, in THE 
BIBLE OF LIFE INSURANCE 66, 67 (1932). 
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II. THE GRAY MARKET IN WORKING-CLASS LIFE 
INSURANCE 
 
When companies started to extend life insurance to a working-class 
market after 1860, they opened the way for a whole new crop of technically 
illegal third-party policies.  The main contingency which these "industrial" 
offices guarded against, in exchange for weekly premiums of several 
pence, was the cost associated with providing a "proper" burial for a family 
member.47  Unlike third-party policies involving loans, however, which 
were at least legal at the outset of the contract, the Gambling Act did not 
recognise liability to pay funeral expenses as an "insurable interest" in 
another person's life.  The only exception was when the family member 
was an adult male who took out the policy in his own name, since the 
benefit (usually between £10 and £50) could be said to be used to support 
the man's dependents.  No such "interest" existed in the millions of cases in 
which husbands wanted to take policies out on their wives, parents on their 
children, and on through the family tree to grandchildren, cousins and in-
laws.48   Most of these people could usually find a company willing to sell 
them a policy on someone else's life, but until 1909 they could not find a 
statute declaring its legality.49 
Beyond buying policies that were merely technically illegal, many 
working-class policyholders broke the spirit as well as the letter of the 
Gambling Act—although the extent to which this happened is difficult to 
determine.  At the very least, reported cases indicate that conditions existed 
for this sort of street betting to flourish.50  When a Bradford poor law 
guardian told of a man suffering from "cancer in the mouth" who died with 
twelve policies on his life, the guardian observed that "[t]he agent insured 
the man without ever seeing him, but his friends knowing that it was 
cancer, knew it would be fatal in the end."51  Many court cases similarly 
told of people dying prematurely with several policies on their lives, 
implying that customers took advantage of their superior knowledge of 
                                                                                                                 
47. LAURIE DENNETT, A SENSE OF SECURITY: 150 YEARS OF PRUDENTIAL 5-9 (1998). 
48. MORRAH, supra note 9, at 74-76.  Partial legal recognition of the widespread 
practice of insuring children’s lives was achieved in the 1875 Friendly Society Act.  This 
Act allowed families to insure up to £6 per child.  While this formally extended only to 
mutual “collecting societies,” the courts soon extended this provision to joint-stock 
companies under common law.  See Sidney Webb, The Working of the Insurance Act, NEW 
STATESMAN 2 (1914 & Supp.). 
49. See MORRAH, supra note 9, at 74-75. 
50. Id. at 74. 
51. SELECT COMMITTEE ON CHILDREN’S LIFE INSURANCE BILL, REPORT, 1890, H.L. 70. 
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sickly neighbors to profit at the distant office's expense.  The agents who 
sold such policies were either assumed to be overly lax (as in the Bradford 
case) or complicitous.52  Companies were usually willing to fight such 
claims in court, often with a successful outcome, although even here they 
needed to keep one eye fixed on the tender subject of public relations. 
Hence when Sophie Haberschitz of the East End was found burned to death 
in 1909 with ten policies on her life, the implicated offices decided to pay 
the claims on the grounds that "it was undesirable lest the world know that 
such a thing was possible."53 
If industrial life offices were sometimes reluctant to challenge claims 
that they assumed to be guilty of criminal intent, they were even less likely 
to resist "legitimate" claims on third-party policies just because the 
Gambling Act said they could.  Although any office might, in theory, cart 
out the Act whenever a claim by a nephew or grand-daughter involved it in 
a loss, they did no such thing, for the same reason that upper-class offices 
ignored Godsall:  it would have driven away half their business.  
Unfortunately for the companies, the same reasoning did not work in 
reverse.  The Gambling Act enabled people who held "legitimate" but 
illegal policies to exercise an especially brutal form of selection against 
industrial offices, by suing for a refund when their premiums had exceeded 
the value of the claim.  The associated legal costs were enough to restrict 
the number of such cases until around 1900, but after this time lawyers 
started to appear on the scene who were willing to try them on a 
contingency basis.54  These lawyers, Edwardian cousins of the ambulance 
chaser, naturally earned the wrath of industrial insurance managers, as 
when Alfred Henri of the Liverpool Victoria railed against, "solicitors of a 
certain type . . . who were willing to take up these cases for what they 
might get out of them."55  Their reputation was substantially higher among 
the large number of working-class policyholders who were stuck in what 
had become an unprofitable contract. Yet even customers who won their 
suits learned that illegal insurance economics came with troubling fine 
                                                                                                                 
52. See, e.g., 19 ASSURANCE AGENT’S REVIEW 42-43 (1906).  
53. Industrial Life Offices Association Minute Book (July 13, 1909) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with Guildhall Library, MS 29,802, London).  
54. Officially, Edwardian lawyers were barred from charging contingency fees.  The 
legal challenges described below, however, would only have been feasible on such a basis; 
hence it seems likely that lawyers informally accomplished this, for instance by voluntarily 
foregoing their fee in the event of a negative verdict.  I am grateful to Joshua Getzler for 
pointing out this problem.   
55. Industrial Life Offices Association Minutes Book (unpublished manuscript on file 
with Guildhall Library, London) MS 29,802.   
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print: legal fees could run nearly as high as the claim, once lawyers 
averaged in their time from cases they lost.56  
As Dalby demonstrates, the prevalence of business-friendly, judge-
made law often allowed Victorian markets to operate quite efficiently 
despite statutory obstacles.57  Yet no judge delivered a Dalby-style ruling in 
the late-nineteenth century which clearly stated that working-class "life-of-
another" policies were not equivalent to wagers.  There are several reasons 
for this, relating to distinctive traits of industrial insurance, popular 
assumptions about working-class gambling, and conflicting views held by 
different judges.  First, the large scale and unpopular reputation of 
industrial insurance companies, affected both sides of the blurry line 
separating "pure gambling" from "rational speculation."  The three largest 
industrial offices, the Prudential, Refuge, and Pearl, dominated their 
competitors, and each were writing millions of new policies a year by 
1910.58  The companies' size and central organization rendered them 
vulnerable to losses to parties whose local knowledge was an advantage in 
insurance wagers; but it also made them more capable of surviving an 
expensive court battle if they chose to resist payment. The companies' 
unpopular reputation, especially that of their salesmen, gave customers a 
fighting chance to convince a judge that they had been hoodwinked into 
buying an illegal policy and deserved to get a refund.  Part of this 
reputation was derived from the assumption that burial insurance qualified 
as illicit "gambling" on the deaths of neighbors and relatives; but much of it 
also stemmed from the assumption that even the "bona fide" service offered 
by the companies—financial security against the cost of burial—
encouraged needlessly lavish funerals among the poor.59   
Assuming that burial insurance did qualify as gambling, people who 
bought it, and companies that sold it, were far more likely than upper-class 
customers to be viewed by the rest of society to be practicing "pure 
gambling" instead of "rational speculation."  Gambling of any variety 
appeared darker to Victorians whenever the gamblers were poor people.60  
                                                                                                                 
56. DENNETT, supra note 47, at 403 n.15. 
57. See Dalby v. India & London Life Assurance Co., 15 C.B. 365 (1854). 
58. Timothy Alborn, Senses of Belonging: The Politics of Working-Class Insurance in 
Britain, 1880-1914, 73 J. MOD. HIST.  561, 576 (2001). 
59. Alborn, supra note 58, at 579. 
60. This may very well be due to the fact that "already existent risks"—for instance, a 
joint-stock company's financial future—were off limits to working-class gamblers, who 
lacked the requisite capital to become shareholders.  They did, in contrast, have access to 
"artificial risks" such as the outcome of card games, lotteries, or horseraces.  See SEARLE, 
supra note 43, at 232. 
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The Gaming Act of 1845, as distinct from the Gambling Act which only 
applied to insurance, was mainly enforced among the poor.61 Hence, 
private clubs and racetracks remained effectively legal, while off-course 
betting did not.62  This double standard reflected the middle classes' 
"paternalistic care for the poor who might be led astray by the machinations 
of bookmakers;" a sentiment that stood in clear tension with the contrary 
middle-class, "drive to cash in on the demand for gambling."63  The result 
was that working-class gambling "inhabited a twilight world" in late-
Victorian legal and moral discourse, not unlike that which enveloped 
industrial insurance at the same time.64  
The scale and reputation of industrial insurance helps to explain why 
companies and their customers took so many cases to court between 1880 
and 1909.65  But, it does not explain why judges had so much trouble 
discovering a "reasonable construction" of the Gambling Act that would 
settle the cases.66  The problem was not that judges lacked opinions where 
industrial insurance was concerned; law’s " hortatory aspect " was as much 
on display in this realm of insurance law as in any other.67  The problem 
was that judges could not decide exactly what or whom they should be 
exhorting. To add to the confusion, a clear split developed after 1900 
between the higher courts and the county courts.  The higher courts became 
increasingly concerned with establishing "principles" that would allow the 
companies to get on with their business, and the county courts tended to 
ignore the higher courts rulings in order to "get at the agents" by forcing 
                                                                                                                 
61. See SEARLE, supra note 43, at 232 (mentioning the “widely held view that the 
operation of the law was being grossley distorted by class bias”).  See also CLARK, supra 
note 2, at 22 (explaining that “The Gambling Act . . . introduced the first appreciable 
regulation of life insurance . . . ”). 
62. See Roger Munting, Betting and Business; the Commercialisation of Gambling in 
Britain, 31 Bus. Hist. 67, 68 (1989).  See also SEARLE supra note 43, at 232.   
63. See Munting, supra note 62, at 68.  
64. SEARLE, supra note 43, at 232.  See also MORRAH, supra note 9, at 27-29 
(discussing industrial insurance of the same time period, and comparing the advances made 
in mathematical and psychological analysis to the difficulties of the early companies). 
65. See MORRAH, supra note 9 at 31 (talking about the difficulties with industrial 
insurance during this time period, and the increase in contracts issued). 
66. See CLARK, supra note 2 at 26 (noting the “intractable problems that courts 
encountered in meaningfully distinguishing a legitimate insurable interest from an 
illegitimate gamble . . . ”). 
67. ATIYAH, supra note 22, at 395 (talking about the “hortatory aspect” of law); see 
also MORRAH, supra note 9 at 24 (discussing the Select Committee being favorable towards 
industrial insurance). 
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companies to pay.68  The result was a patently uncertain legal framework, 
which industrial life offices ultimately found to be intolerable.   
 
III. THE GAMBLING ACT ON TRIAL 
 
In their respective battles to stack the deck in their favor, working-class 
customers and companies told stories at trial in order to convince judges 
that the Gambling Act entitled them to gain at the other's expense.  When 
policyholders sued for a return of premiums, they presented themselves as 
victims of the insurance agent's misleading claim that such policies were 
legal.  In their defense, depending on the circumstances of the case, life 
offices tried to shift blame back onto the policyholder or the agent.  The 
insurance agent, who received so much of the blame in these trials, was the 
least likely to be asked to testify, lest he refute the other parties' professions 
of innocence.   
When a Liverpool woman sued the Refuge in 1903 after paying £82 on 
two policies worth £72, she argued that the agent had told her "'it would be 
all right—she could draw the money'."69  The judge agreed that this was  
tantamount to fraud on the company's part, and awarded her £34—ruling 
that the rest of the payment lay outside the statute of limitations.70  Alice 
Crosty used the same argument to win £53 back from the Scottish 
Temperance life office in 1909, on a policy she had taken out on her aunt's 
life.71  With less success, Johanna Butt of Swansea tried to claim that 
"people came and asked her to pay premiums" in a case where she was 
accused of taking out fifteen policies on the same man's life.72  For the most 
part, the fact that all these allegations of misrepresentation were made by 
women simply reflects the economic reality that buying insurance—like 
pawning, food shopping, and rent payment—qualified as "women's work" 
                                                                                                                 
68. See PATRICK POLDEN, A HISTORY OF THE COUNTY COURT, 1846-1971, 68-69, 94 
(1999) (discussing the difference in treatment of creditors and debtors between the two 
courts, and how the county court judges sought to “impose a paternalist regime on the 
improvident and incompetent”).  This work also discusses the relationship between county 
courts and high courts in the late nineteenth century. 
69. Industrial Life Offices Association Minute Book (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with Guildhall Library, MS 29,802, London).  In this and subsequent cases, monetary sums 
are rounded to the nearest pound.  
70. Id.  
71. 47 Ins. Rec. pg. #, 529 (1909).   
72. Id. at 336.   
14 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:1 
 
in the working-class division of household labor.73  Yet probably it also 
indicated a conscious strategy by such women and their lawyers to 
capitalize on the middle-class assumption, shared by many working men, 
that insurance salesmen habitually took advantage of their female 
customers' naiveté as they made their way from the doorstep into the front 
room.74 
Life offices tried to counter such claims by insisting that their 
customers, far from being innocent victims, were seasoned veterans at the 
"game" of demanding back premiums when the life they had "gambled" on 
refused to die in a timely fashion.  When two Walworth women sued the 
Liverpool Victoria in 1909 for £26 in back premiums after their father died, 
claiming "misrepresentation of one of their agents," the society's lawyer 
countered that it had offered the women the £10 due at the death, "but it 
had been refused by them because their father lived longer than they 
expected, and the transaction had been unprofitable to them."75  Although 
successful in the Liverpool Victoria case, such reasoning proved to be a 
risky legal strategy since companies could all too easily incriminate 
themselves along with their customers.  Hence, a judge found against the 
Royal Liver in 1903 when it refused to refund Mary Wilson of Padiham 
£36 in premiums paid on a policy on her father-in-law's life, despite its 
lawyer's argument that she "had been speculating in insurance for a 
considerable time, and... was prepared to take the risk."  The judge was not 
impressed by the society's efforts to counter Wilson's charge of 
misrepresentation with the claim that "many insurance companies took and 
honoured those wagering policies, as the Royal Liver was prepared to do in 
the case."76  
In responding to these stories, late-Victorian judges sent a decidedly 
mixed set of messages to customers and companies alike.  Some, especially 
at the county level, blamed the companies for making a mockery of the 
Gambling Act and punished them by requiring them to return the premiums 
paid for illegal policies.77  Others did not accuse the directors of 
                                                                                                                 
73. See ELLEN ROSS, LOVE AND TOIL: MOTHERHOOD IN OUTCAST LONDON, 1870-1918 
193(1993). 
74. See, e.g., the Trades Union Congressional resolution from 1909 which states that 
"[u]nfair advantage is often taken [by insurance salesmen] of the womankind when the 
husband is away": reprinted in Industrial Life Offices Association Minute Book 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with Guildhall Library, MS 29,802, London).  
75. 47 INS. REC. 25 (1909). 
76. 41 INS. REC., 509 (1903).  
77. 8 ASSURANCE AGENTS’ REV. 147 (1895); 9 ASSURANCE AGENTS’ REV. 62 (1896).  
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encouraging gambling, but did fault their agents. For example, a Swansea 
judge forced the Royal Counties Friendly Society to refund a collier's 
premiums with costs in 1902.  Although the judge claimed that he "would 
not think of blaming the directors," he did feel the need to "warn people 
about this, so that they will not enter into these contracts," and he 
concluded: "These agents behave so badly.  I should like to hit some of 
these societies through their agents."78  Another judge allowed the 
Liverpool Victoria to deny five claims on the short life of a girl who died of 
tuberculosis in 1906, but required it to pay £20 in costs, arguing that "[s]o 
long as there are agents who lend themselves to this trafficking... there will 
always be found people weak enough or greedy enough to listen to the 
tempters."79  A third set of judges similarly blamed the agents, but had 
ample suspicion left over for the policyholders as well.  Hence the judge in 
the Walworth case admitted that "canvassers for insurance companies were 
apt to misstate things," but also offered this taunt to the allegedly 
victimized sisters: "The whole mischief is that your father lived too long.  
Is that not it?"80   A Bristol judge similarly denied £25 in back premiums 
for a £19 policy against the death of "an elderly man called Mark Barnes," 
appending to his ruling the wry observation that "[o]wing to Mr. Barnes's 
perversity in continuing to live, poor Mr. Tilley had overpaid."81   
Harse v. Pearl (1904) held that policyholders should be assumed to be 
parties to illegal insurances unless fraud on the part of the agent could be 
proven.82  In that case, the Court of Appeals did make some strides towards 
stabilizing the meaning of the Gambling Act in application to working-
class insurance.83  Lord Mathew, expressly grounded his ruling in Harse on 
the principle that life offices were, "entitled to the administration of the law 
on fixed principles."84  The Court arrived at these "fixed principles" in 
Harse by invoking the legal fiction that insurance salesmen could not be 
expected to understand how the Gambling Act had defined insurable 
interest; and hence could not be guilty of misrepresentation.85  That case 
                                                                                                                 
78. 40 INS. REC. 174 (1902).  
79. 19 ASSURANCE AGENTS’ REV. 42-43 (1906).          
80. 47 INS. REC. 25 (1909);  70 POST MAG. 53 (1909).  
81. 47 INS. REC. 593 (1909).  
82. Harse v. Pearl, (1904) 1 Eng. Rep. 558, 560-61 (K.B.). 
83. See id. at 560, 564.  See also 70 Post Mag. 207 (1909). In a second ruling, 
Griffiths v. Fleming, the court was able to accomplish greater levels of certainty for the 
narrower category of husbands taking out policies on their wives.  See Griffiths v. Fleming, 
(1909) I Eng. Rep. 805, 808 (K.B.). 
84. 70 POST MAG. 207 (1909).  
85. Harse, 1 Eng. Rep. at 560-61. 
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was a typical one: Harse had taken out policies on his parents' lives and 
then demanded back premiums from the Pearl once his payments had 
exceeded his claim.86  The trial jury had found for the Pearl on the grounds 
that the Agent represented that the Policy would be valid and did not know 
that what he was saying was untrue.87  The Court of Appeals confirmed this 
verdict, on the assumption that salesmen's claims regarding the validity of 
third-party policies were statements of the general law of the land in 
relation to insurance, which were made innocently to a person who was 
most desirous of entering into an illegal Contract.88  
In reaching its verdict, the judges offered a unique twist on the usual 
brand of moralizing about dodgy agents preying on innocent, or even not-
so-innocent, working-class victims.89  The court argued that most industrial 
insurance salesmen were cut from the same cloth as their customers, and 
hence were unlikely to be in a position to lead their customers too far 
astray.90  This corresponded with the socioeconomic reality of most 
insurance salesmen at the time, and it certainly corresponded with the 
agents' self-ascribed mission to put themselves, "on a level with all the 
policy-holders, no matter how humble their position in life may be."91   
From this premise, the judges concluded that customers and agents were 
similarly ignorant of the Gambling Act—hence relieving insurance 
salesmen of any "greater obligation to know the law than the persons they 
approach for the purpose of effecting policies."  Since the Pearl was not "in 
any way bound to appoint Agents with some special knowledge of law," it 
stood to reason that caveat emptor, not the Gambling Act, was the relevant 
"general principle" in such cases.92 
Unfortunately for the life offices, Harse was only partially successful 
at putting an end to the rising tide of litigation that had been such a problem 
since 1900.  This was especially the case in county courts,93 where judges 
were often determined to punish the industrial offices by assuming fraud on 
                                                                                                                 
86. See id. at 558. 
87. See id. at 559. 
88. See id. at 563-64. See also Industrial Life Offices Association Minutes Book, Law 
Reports (unpublished manuscript, on file with Guildhall Library, MS 29,802, London).   
89. Industrial Life Offices Association Minutes Book, Law Reports (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with Guildhall Library, MS 29,802, London).   
90. Harse, 1 Eng. Rep. at 564. 
91. FREDERICK H. GISBOURNE, HOW TO CONDUCT AN AGENCY 5 (1895).   
92. Industrial Life Offices Association Munutes Book, Law Reports (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with Guildhall Library, MS 29,802, London).   
93. See POLDEN, supra note 68, at 94 (stating that cases heard by judges in the county 
court rose from 1,046 in 1900 to 5,289 in 1913). 
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the part of their agents.  Hence when Hannah Brown sued the Britannic life 
office in 1907 in the Preston County Court to recover premiums for a 
policy on her mother's life, the office failed in its attempt "to prove that 
both the Company and the assured were in pari delicto, as in the Harse 
case."94  Instead, the judge sternly insisted that the Britannic was 
responsible for its agents' actions: "The policy was signed by five officials, 
including two directors, yet not a single one thought it incumbent upon him 
to consider whether the insurable interest was valid under an Act 125 years 
old."95   Although Brown was subsequently reversed on appeal, as were a 
number of similar lower court rulings, the trickle of such rulings grew to a 
flood in 1909.96  A November 1909 editorial in the Insurance Record 
entitled "Trouble in the Industrial Assurance World" cited the case of a 
Welsh district in which "one company alone has had no fewer than one 
hundred and forty County Court actions brought against it in about two 
months, for the return of premiums on alleged illegal assurances."97  It was 
the Edwardian equivalent of a class-action suit: "In several districts during 
the past six weeks circulars confidently believed to emanate from a firm of 
solicitors, have been distributed, inviting policyholders to take proceedings 
for the recovery of premiums; and in Lancashire certain solicitors, have 
called and addressed public meetings with the same object."98 As with 
many modern class-action suits, new legislation soon followed to prevent 
the recurrence of such alarming disruptions to business as usual. 
 
After 1909: From Judgment to Surveillance 
  
The new law in question was the Assurance Companies Act of 190999, 
most of which had to do with upper-class life insurance business.100  As the 
Act was making its way through Parliament, the industrial offices lobbied 
strenuously to include a provision that would prevent customers from being 
able to cite "the old Act of George III" in order to recover their premiums. 
                                                                                                                 
94. Industrial Life Offices Association Munites Book, Law Reports (unpublished 
manuscript on file with Guidhall Library, MS 29,802, London).   
95. 45 INS. REC. 564 (1907).   
96. 70 POST MAG. 53-54 (1909).   
97. INS. REC. (1909).   
98. 47 INS. REC. 567 (1909).   
99. 9 Edw. 7, c. 49 (Eng.). 
100. MORRAH, supra note 9, at 73 (1955) (emphasizing that “[t]he main purpose of the 
Act was to strengthen the statutory guarantees for the security of the insuring public” and 
similarly to “the Act of 1870 life assurance did not begin until the insurers had deposited 
£20,000 … with no power of withdrawal,”). 
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Their preferred solution, endorsed in section 37 of the Act, was to legalize 
retroactively all existing "bona fide" third-party policies, "having regard to 
the change in the social condition of the people, and to the obligation which 
the law has placed upon the children and grandchildren since 1774."101  A 
different clause dealt with future insurances by legalizing "life of another" 
policies on parents, grandparents, grandchildren, brothers and sisters.102  
These modifications left some legal uncertainty intact, mainly because they 
defined the amount of a "bona fide" policy (whether issued before or after 
1909) as the sum which "the relative reasonably might expect" to pay for a 
funeral.  "Reasonable" funeral expenses remained a bone of contention, 
with some trial judges setting the bar as low as £10 and companies issuing 
policies up to £25, and nobody was too sure what to do about people who 
took out several policies from different offices.103  Furthermore, the new 
law's extended definition of legitimate kinship still excluded thousands of 
step-children, half-siblings, and cousins who continued to buy third-party 
policies after 1909, and hence continued to provide fodder which 
enterprising attorneys could use to initiate new litigation.104 
To prevent these remaining issues from becoming a commercial 
liability, life insurance offices began to pay more attention to their agents' 
methods of attracting business.  Sidney Webb reported in 1915 that they 
had started to "scrutinize closely all policies purporting to be on the 'life of 
another,'" to require signatures from lives insured, and to fine agents who 
exceeded the cap on policy size  although he doubted that this was enough 
to rein in agents' bad behavior.105  More significant than these partial 
concessions to the spirit of the 1909 Act was the  increasing tendency after 
1918 to extend middle-class marketing devices to their customers.106  
Although "surrender values" for such policies continued to be rare, owing 
to the fees involved, companies like the Prudential began awarding "free 
policies" and bonuses to customers after several years.107  They also started 
                                                                                                                 
101. Industrial Life Offices Association Minute Book, unpublished manuscript, on 
file with Guildhall Library, MS 29,802, London.   
102. The Assurance Companies Act, 1909, 9 Edw. 7, c. 49, § 36 (Eng.). 
103. Webb, supra note 48, at 28. See, e.g., Tofts v. Pearl Life Assurance Co.  (1913) 
110 LT 190; aff’d [1915] 1 KB 189 (rejecting Pearl's claim that £40 covering the deaths of 
Tofts' mother and father constituted, "an unreasonable amount for mourning.").    
104. MORRAH, supra note 9, at 75-76. 
105. Webb, supra note 48.    
106. PAUL JOHNSON, SAVINGS AND SPENDING: THE WORKING-CLASS ECONOMY IN 
BRITAIN, 1870 – 1939 39-43 (1985). 
107. ARNOLD WILSON & HERMANN LEVY, INDUSTRIAL ASSURANCE: AN HISTORICAL 
AND CRITICAL STUDY 191-93 (1937). 
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to offer endowment insurances, which had already replaced whole-life 
coverage as the most popular middle-class policy around 1900.108  
Endowment insurance provided term coverage for ten to twenty years, then 
converted to an annuity if the policyholder was still alive to collect.109  
Industrial offices went from issuing 3.5 million endowment policies in 
1912 to thirteen million in 1931, comprising a quarter of their sales.110  By 
offering free policies, and by combining life insurance with an old age 
pension, the companies gave customers a reason to hold onto their policies 
even after they survived their predicted time of death. 
Legislative and administrative reforms solved most of the strictly 
economic problems that the Gambling Act had once put in the way of 
industrial insurance.  The 1909 revisions greatly reduced the number of 
people who could claim that their policy was illegal, and the companies' 
new marketing methods greatly reduced their customers' incentive to sue.111  
Hence from the industrial insurance industry's perspective, it made sense to 
pretend, as their upper-class counterparts had been doing for a century, that 
"gambling" no longer had anything to do with their business.  As J.A. 
Jefferson of the Britannic confidently assured Sir Benjamin Cohen's 
parliamentary committee on industrial insurance in 1931, "[t]he British 
working classes of to-day are not gambling and thinking only of having a 
bit on the old man";112 the fact that nearly 80% of his company's business 
was comprised of "life of another" policies—all of which would have been 
technically illegal under the Gambling Act—was "all part and parcel of the 
assurance."113    
Many social critics were not as willing to let the matter rest.  In his 
1915 Fabian Society report on industrial insurance, Webb scolded the 
companies for having gotten Section 37, "smuggled into the Life Assurance 
Companies Act almost without discussion," and called the companies' high 
caps on funeral expenses, "an abuse which calls for a remedy."114   Cohen 
accused the 1909 Act of giving “‘a right . . . to the poor man and not to the 
rich’" and the Cohen Committee berated the companies for encouraging, if 
                                                                                                                 
108. JOHNSON, supra note 106, at 41. 
109. ROBERT T. GREEN, LIFE INSURANCE BLINDNESS 132 (1929). 
110. JOHNSON, supra note 106, at 41. 
111. See DENNETT, supra note 47, at 173-74. 
112. DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO 
INDUSTRIAL ASSURANCE, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, 1931, H.M.S.O. 233, 249.   
113. Id. 
114. Sidney Webb, The Special Supplement on The Working of the Insurance Act, 
THE NEW STATESMAN, Mar. 1914, at 27-28.   
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not gambling per se, "‘economic waste on expenses of every kind in 
connection with death in working-class homes.’"115   Once Parliament had 
solved the "gambling" problem to their own satisfaction, however, the 
industrial offices were just as successful at keeping these continuing 
"collectivist" criticisms at bay.  Two interwar inquiries produced no 
significant new laws, and a further attempt to nationalize industrial 
insurance in 1950 came to nothing.116  One reason why companies were 
able to resist such reforms for as long as they did was because they had 
figured out when to move their problem out of the courts and back into the 
market, where "collectivist" judges could rarely touch them.  
 
 
                                                                                                                 
115. Wilson & Levy, supra note 107, at 141-42. 
116. See Dennett, supra note 47, at 260-62, 294-99. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The typical, and traditional, model of professional responsibility 
assumes one client and one lawyer.  Within this binary model, which is 
largely governed by notions of agency law,1 the lawyer’s course of conduct 
is governed by a basic duty of loyalty.2  Because there is only a single focus 
or object of the duty, the lawyer’s ability to be loyal is usually not 
complicated.  Indeed, the concerns here are more frequently directed 
toward excessive zeal rather than misdirected zeal.3 
Many legal relationships do not, however, fit nicely into this binary 
model.  Consider, for example, a scenario that is replayed hundreds if not 
thousands of times a day in the United States.  A policyholder is involved 
in an automobile accident and is sued by the other driver (“claimant”) for 
personal injuries.  The policyholder is insured under a standard automobile 
liability insurance policy issued by an insurer.  The policyholder requests 
that the insurer provide a defense as promised by the terms of the policy.4  
                                                                                                                 
1. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1316 (7th  
Cir. 1978). See generally L. RAY PATTERSON, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY §2.01 (1989).  See infra note 30, which states that under the law of agency, 
the lawyer may be characterized as either an agent or an independent contractor depending 
on the situation.  Neither the Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers nor Agency Law 
identifies the lawyer-client relationship as specifically one of agency or independent 
contracting.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §14 (2000); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF AGENCY LAW §1.01 (2006). 
2. CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODEL LEGAL ETHICS §4.1 (1986); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §16 cmts. b, e (2000); Flatt v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 950, 
957 (Cal. 1994) (describing lawyer’s duty of loyalty to an existing client as “inviolate”). 
3. See Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. 
RTS Q.1 (1975) (noting that lawyer’s professional independence and the adversary culture 
encourages a “zealous” advocacy that is often socially disruptive).  Wasserstrom’s paper is 
enormously controversial, but nonetheless, the increased attention given to sanctions rules, 
such as Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and civility codes supports a general 
agreement that advocacy can be, and often is, excessive.  See WOLFRAM, MODEL LEGAL 
ETHICS §10.3, supra note 2, at 578-82. 
4. Under the standard liability insurance policy, the insurer promises: 
 
We will pay damages for “bodily injury” or “property 
damage” for which any “insured” becomes legally 
responsible because of an auto accident.  Damages include 
pre-judgment interest awarded against the “insured.”  We 
will settle or defend, as we consider appropriate, any  claim 
or suit asking for these damages.  In addition to our limit of 
liability, we will pay all defense costs we incur.  Our duty 
to settle or defend ends when. our limit of liability for this 
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The insurer agrees and retains “defense counsel” to represent the 
policyholder in the litigation with the claimant. 
The insurance model does not fit into the traditional binary model.  The 
insurance model creates a multilateral relationship between the involved 
parties and this is reflected in the use of terms to describe it, such as 
triangular, tripartite, trilateral, or three cornered.5  The following schematic 
is frequently used to illustrate the parties’ relationship: 
                                                                                                                          
coverage has been exhausted.  We have no duty to defend 
any suit or settle any claim for “bodily injury” or “property 
damage” not covered under this policy. 
 
ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL 
PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES, 1216 (Practitioner’s ed. 
1988).  Similar obligations are found in other forms of liability insurance coverage, such as 
commercial general liability insurance, Id. at 1243, and homeowner’s insurance, Id. at 1227. 
5. Articles and papers on the insurance model are legion.  See Aviva Abramovsky, The 
Enterprise Model of Managing Conflicts of Interest in the Tripartite Insurance Defense 
Relationship, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 193 (2005); Charles Silver and Kent Syverud, The 
Professional Responsibilities of Insurance Defense Lawyers, 45 DUKE L.J. 255 (1995); 
Symposium: Liability Insurance Conflicts and Professional Responsibilities, 4 CONN. INS. 
L. J. 1 (1997).  See also John Larkin, ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR ATTORNEYS ACTING AS 
INSURANCE DEFENSE COUNSEL, 518 PLI/Lit. 381 (Feb.-March 1995); Michael A. Berch & 
Rebecca White Berch, Will the Real Counsel for the Insured Please Rise? 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
27 (1987); Karen O. Bowdre, Conflict of Interest Between Insurer and Insured: Ethical 
Traps for The Unsuspecting Defense Counsel, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 101 (1993); John A. 
Edginton, Ethics at Sea: Ethics Issues for Maritime Lawyers and Insurers, 70 TUL. L. REV. 
415 (1995); Robert B. Gilbreath, Caught in a Crossfire Preventing and Handling Conflicts 
of Interest: Guidelines for Texas Insurance Defense Counsel, 27 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 139 
(1996); Eric Mills Holmes, A Conflict-of-Interest Roadmap for Insurance Defense Counsel: 
Walking an Ethical Tightrope Without a Net, 26 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 1 (1989); Ronald 
Mallen, A New Definition of Insurance Defense Counsel, 1986 INS. COUNS. J. 108; John K. 
Morris, Conflicts of Interest in Defending Under Liability Insurance Policies: A Proposed 
Solution, 1981 UTAH L. REV. 457 (1981); Thomas V. Murray & Diane M. Bringus, 
Insurance Defense Counsel: Conflicts of Interest, FED’N INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 283 
(1991); Richard L. Neumeier, Serving Two Masters: Problems Facing Insurance Defense 
Counsel and Some Proposed Solutions, 77 MASS. L. REV. 66 (1992); Robert E. O’Malley, 
Ethics Principles for the Insurer, the Insured, and Defense Counsel: The Eternal Triangle 
Reformed, 66 TUL. L. REV. 511 (1991); Douglas R. Richmond, Lost in the Eternal Triangle 
of Insurance Defense Ethics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 475 (1996); Mark Saxson, Conflicts of 
Interest: Insurers Expanding Duty to Defend and the Impact of “Cumis Counsel,” 23 IDAHO 
L. REV. 351 (1987); Debra A. Winiarski, Walking the Fine Line: A Defense Counsel’s 
Perspective, 28 TORT & INS. L.J. 596 (1993); Brooke Wunnicke, The Eternal Triangle: 
Standards of Ethical Representation by the Insurance Defense Lawyer, For the Def., Feb. 
1989.  
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            B           C 
 
Policyholder                     Insurer 
 
The relationship illustrated by line BC is created by the insurance contract; 
the relationships AB and AC arise out of the insurance contract but are not 
created by it.  The insurance contract is necessary to the formation of the 
subsequent professional relationships because it creates the legal obligation 
on the insurer’s part to defend and indemnify the policyholder from claims 
within the coverage promised by the policy.  Pursuant to the insurance 
contract the insurer will retain defense counsel to represent the 
policyholder.  However, before a client-lawyer relationship in fact exists 
the policyholder will have to request a defense, the insurer will have to 
accede to the request, and counsel will have to agree to represent the 
policyholder.  The relationships AB and AC involve a lawyer whose 
relationships also implicate professional codes and the rules and principles 
that govern a lawyer’s relationship with a client.  Problems arise when the 
binary model of the professional codes must be integrated into the 
multilateral world created by the insurance contract.  There is a tendency to 
see the problem in terms that suggests a zero-sum bargaining process, i.e., 
gains for one of the parties at one point of the triangle must necessarily 
result in a loss to one of the other parties at another point of the triangle.6 
Not surprisingly lawyers tend to see the proper resolution of the 
conflict through the lens of professional duty to the client while insurers 
see it through the rights conveyed to the insurer by the insurance contract.  
These polar opposites are usually advanced with a “take no prisoners” 
                                                                                                                 
6. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Triangular Lawyer Relationships: An Exploratory 
Analysis, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 15 (1987); see also John Leubsdorf, PLURALIZING THE 
LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 825 (1992).  Both articles address the 
complications introduced to the bipolar relationship assumed by professional codes when 
third parties with whom the client also has a relationship affect the lawyer’s relationship 
with the client. 
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approach.7  Perhaps no issue so animates the legal profession today as the 
prospect of non-lawyers intruding into the domain and rules of lawyer 
professional conduct and deportment.  As a consequence, the use of harsh 
terms to characterize the relationship is not unknown.8  Much of the 
decisional law dealing with the triangular relationship is written against a 
backdrop that evidences significant mistrust that defense counsel will act in 
a professionally proper manner.9  That attitude becomes dominant and 
                                                                                                                 
7. See Tennessee Supreme Court Board of Prof. Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-F-143 
(June 14, 1999) (concluding that an insurer may not control a policyholder’s defense to the 
extent it would undermine the lawyer’s professional duties to the client-policyholder); 
Stephen L. Pepper, Applying the Fundamentals of Lawyer’s Ethics to Insurance Defense 
Practice, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 27, 51 (1997) (arguing that the preferred model is that defense 
counsel’s duties are owed exclusively to the policyholder). 
8. See Longo v. Am. Policyholder’s Ins. Co., 436 A.2d 577, 579-80 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Law Div. 1981) (noting that the relationship is “fraught with real and potential conflicts of 
interest,” that the relationship is “delicate,” and that problems that inhere in the relationship 
are “particularly acute”); Rose Med. Ctr. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 903 P.2d 15, 17 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (noting the “inherent tension” in the relationship).  Analysis here 
tends towards metaphor.  Thus the triangular relationship is analogized to “The Bermuda 
Triangle” or is characterized as a “tightrope”, “crossfire”, etc.  See supra note 5.   
9. See CHI of Alaska, Inc. v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 844 P.2d 1113, 1116-17 
(Alaska 1993): Where there is a conflict between insurer and insured, appointed counsel 
may tend to favor the interests of the insurer primarily because of the prospect of future 
employment.  United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Louis A. Roser Co., 585 F.2d 932, 938 
n.5 (8th Cir. 1978) (“Even the most optimistic view of human nature requires us to realize 
that an attorney employed by an insurance company will slant his efforts, perhaps 
unconsciously, in the interest of his real client—the one who is paying his fee and from 
whom he hopes to receive future business—the insurance company.”); San Diego Navy Fed. 
Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc’y, Inc., 162 Cal. App.3d 358, 208 Cal. Rptr. 494, 498 
(1984) (“A lawyer who does not look out for the insurer’s best interest may soon find 
himself out of work.” (quoting the trial court); Michael A. Berch & Rebecca W. Berch, Will 
the Real Counsel for the Insured Please Rise?, 19 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 27, 29-30 (1987). (A[T]he 
attorney’s economic interests weigh heavily in favor of the insurer, which, after all, may 
retain his services in other cases; yet the rules of professional responsibility tip the scales 
toward the insured.”); Arthur P. Berg, Losing Control of the Defense – The Insured’s Right 
to Select His Own Counsel, 26 FOR THE DEFENSE 10, 15 (July 1984) (“Although [some] 
courts seems to trust the insurer and the attorney to act in the best interests of the insured, 
the more common view is that the longstanding ties that defense counsel has with the 
insurer will inevitably influence his conduct of the case.”); Sampson A. Brown and John L. 
Romaker, Cumis, Conflicts and the Civil Code: Section 2860 Changes Little, 25 CAL. W. L. 
REV. 45, 54 (1988) (“The attorney, wishing to maintain the insurer’s business, does not want 
to aggravate the company.”); Mark A. Saxon, Conflicts of Interest: Insurers’ Expanding 
Duty to Defend and the Impact of “Cumis” Counsel, 23 IDAHO L. REV. 351, 353 (1987) 
(“Insurance counsel’s relationship with the insurer is contractual, usually ongoing, 
supported by strong financial interests, and often strengthened by sincere friendships.”). 
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controlling if the tendency is indulged in, as it often is, to focus upon 
relationships in isolation or to argue that one of the legs of the triangle 
should be preferred.10  The approach suggested in this paper is more 
contextual.  Identifying a lawyer’s duties within the triangular relationship 
requires that the whole “triangular” relationship be considered, not just in 
terms of the obligation imposed by the bilateral, professional model or by 
the insurance contract.  This paper’s central theme is that the basic, 
underlying relationships intended by the parties to the insurance contract is 
improperly devalued and as a consequence too much emphasis is placed 
upon the professional code’s binary model to determine how defense 
counsel should identify her duties and responsibilities within the triangular 
relationship.  By the same token, the insurance contract cannot be seen as 
the sole, conclusive determiner of the lawyer-client relationship.  The 
insurer, having contracted to provide the policyholder with a lawyer, must 
accept that its promise may be subject to the rules that govern the lawyer’s 
behavior.  The task is to find a workable reconciliation of the two themes.   
I shall concede at the outset that many of the approaches I suggest in 
this paper are counter to the law as it now is, or at least as it is interpreted 
to be.  But this paper’s approach, which places greater emphasis on the 
allocation of responsibility encompassed by the parties’ relationship and 
joint goals, is preferable to a model which looks exclusively to the 
professional codes or to the insurance contract to resolve issues arising out 
of the triangular relationship. 
The approach urged in this paper is that the law should, in a pragmatic, 
functional manner, integrate the insurance contract and professional 
obligations to enable counsel to interact with the insurer and the 
policyholder in a way consistent with the rights, duties, goals and 
obligations the parties envisioned and accepted in all the agreements that 
define their relationship.  The current, most widely accepted model holds 
                                                                                                                          
Id.  This mistrust is shared by some of the commentators.  See Abramovsky, supra note 
5, at 199 (comparing retained defense counsel to “house counsel” for criminal organizations 
and suggesting that the strict scrutiny applied to lawyer representation of members of the 
latter for conflicts of interest should be likewise applied to lawyer representation provided 
by insurers because in both cases the lawyer’s financial interest are aligned with the fees 
payer rather than the client). 
10. See Pepper, supra note 7, 27, 28-29 (1997) (criticizing commentators who argue 
that the policyholder-insurer leg of the triangle is dominant and arguing that policyholder-
defense counsel leg is dominant).  I do not mean to diminish by exclusion the insurer-
defense counsel leg of the triangle; however, the focus of attention on this leg has been the 
relationship between these parties, i.e., is the insurer a client of defense counsel.  See infra 
Part IV A-B. 
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that in the face of counsel’s inability ex post to achieve an informed, 
consensual reconciliation of conflicting interests, as between all of the 
parties to the triangular relationship, defense counsel, policyholder, and 
insurer, defense counsel should withdraw from the relationship.11  
Conflicting interests can be broadly construed to involve any situation 
when defense counsel’s general duty of loyalty to the client (the 
policyholder) may be compromised by counsel’s wish to please the insurer, 
which is the party who selected counsel, pays the counsel’s fees, and may 
be the source of future business for the counsel.12  As a result, defense 
counsel is regularly confronted with situations, which, under the 
professional codes, are deemed to give rise to conflicts of interest pitting 
the lawyer’s duty of loyalty against the lawyer’s financial self-interest.13   
The withdrawal approach has largely captured the attention of 
academics and practitioners but it is not a realistic option when the conflict 
is inherent to the relationship and reflects a recurrent problem that affects a 
significant number of the total cases.  One practitioner observed the current 
approach has, “a ton of baggage associated with it,” and should be replaced 
by an approach that identifies and spells out defense counsel’s duties.14  
“The fundamental question is who is entitled to what and why.”15  That is a 
fair question.  The short answer is that the lawyer, in representing the 
policyholder, should, as the policy holder’s designee accept direction from 
the insurer, for the claim’s defense to the extent the insurer is responsible 
for the consequences, such as when the claim is likely to be resolved within 
the policy’s limits.16   While I do not argue that counsel owes a duty of 
                                                                                                                 
11. ROBERT H. JERRY & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 
114 at 892-93 (4th ed. 2007) (However, the section goes on to note that there is some 
“disagreement among courts and commentators” as to the level of withdrawal necessary). 
12. See CHI of Alaska, Inc. 844 P.2d at 1116-17 (explaining these concepts through 
citation of various cases and sources). 
13. Pepper, supra note 7, at 46 (giving the general example of the attorney being 
pulled between the economic dependence on “much larger insurance companies” and the 
“unsophisticated insured,” and explaining the relation to Rules 1.7, 1.4(b), and 1.2(c)). 
14. See Keeping an Eye on ALI, 3 INS. LITIG. REP. (BNA) at 19 (July 5, 1996). 
15. Id. 
16. See Davenport v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 927, 931, 933 (5th Cir. 
1992) (noting that standard policy language gives the insurer the right to control the defense 
to the exclusion of the policyholder and that this right includes the selection of defense 
counsel); Crist v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 529 F. Supp. 601, 603 (D. Utah 1982) (“The insurer’s 
duty to defend corresponds to the insured’s duty to relinquish control of the defense, and 
one cannot arise without the other”); see N. Y. State Urban Dev. Corp. v. VSL Corp., 738 
F.2d 61, 65-66 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that the court will recognize the right of insurers to 
select defense counsel as necessarily incident to the right to control the defense); cf. In re 
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loyalty to the insurer, counsel’s duty of loyalty to the policyholder-client 
must be measured by three considerations: the policyholder’s gain and 
surrender of rights by entering into the contract with the insurer; the 
contract with the insurer; and the policyholder’s request that the insurer 
provide a defense as required by the insurance contract.  The longer answer 
follows.   
One important limit on the scope of this paper is the assumption that 
the insurer has accepted the tender of the defense by the policyholder 
“without reservation.” This means that the insurer accepts that the claim is 
covered by the insurance contract.  I do not address in this paper the rights 
of the parties when the insurer indicates that it is contesting overage, i.e., 
accepts the tender of the defense under a “reservation of rights.”   
I also do not address whether an excess of limits exposure creates a 
conflict of interest.17  I assume for purposes of this paper that the claim will 
be resolved within policy limits. 
 
II. THE STANDARD POSITION REGARDING THE  
TRIANGULAR RELATIONSHIP 
 
The standard position regarding the insurer’s defense obligations under 
standard liability insurance policies is well known.  Insurers contractually 
have the right to control the litigation, and this includes the selection of 
defense counsel to represent the policyholder.18  When the rights of the 
                                                                                                                          
Preferred Acc. Ins. Co. of New York, 78 NYS.2d 674, 675 (N.Y. App. Div. 1948) (by 
tendering claim, policyholders impliedly authorized the insurer to select counsel to defend 
the policyholders in the action involving the tendered claim); see generally 7C JOHN ALAN 
APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE WITH FORMS ' 4681 (WALTER F. BERDAL rev. 
vol. 1979). 
17. The general view appears to be that it does not.  See Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. 
v. Foster, 528 So.2d 255, 269-70 (Miss. 1986). Yet, a damage claim beyond policy limits in 
and of itself presents no ethical problem to the lawyer employed to defend the case, because 
his employment is for one of two purposes: either win the case outright, or keep the 
damages as low as possible.  Everything he does in fulfillment of either objective must of 
necessity benefit both clients.  The lawsuit must be defended forthwith, professional 
decisions and actions must be timely made.  
Id.  (citation omitted). See generally Dale E. Hausman, Conflict Issues in the Tripartite 
Relationship, in H-741 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, INSURANCE LAW 2006: UNDERSTANDING 
THE ABC’S 197, 207-08 (2006). 
18. See Davenport v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 978 F2d 927, 931-32 (5th Cir. 
1992) (discussing the right of the insurer “to assume control of the defense of an action 
against the insured to the exclusion of the latter” and “the same right that an insurer 
exercises in its settlement negotiations is exercisable by it in its choice of counsel.”). 
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policyholder and insurer are in conflict, the courts consistently hold that 
counsel’s duties to the policyholder trump counsel’s obligations or desire to 
accommodate the insurer.19  Trumping occurs even when both the insurer 
and policyholder are deemed to be “clients” of defense counsel.20 
One difficulty with the “standard position” is that courts have not 
carefully distinguished cases where the “rights” of the insurer and the 
policyholder are in conflict from cases where only their “interests” 
diverge.21  What does it mean to say that the policyholder’s interests should 
be preferred or deemed primary?  If the policyholder is the sole client, then 
the statement states the obvious; if the policyholder and the insurer are both 
clients, the statement is inconsistent with the normal rules of joint 
representation.22  Courts have been unwilling to confront the issue directly.   
                                                                                                                          
19. See John A. Edginton, Ethics At Sea: Ethical Issues For Maritime Lawyers and 
Insurers, 70 TUL. L. REV. 415, 439-40 (1995): There is little doubt under any of the ethical 
systems in place in the United States that the lawyer’s primary duty is to the insured in the 
tripartite relationship.  In a typical insurance defense relationship the lawyer’s ties with the 
insurer often are longer-standing and closer than the relationship with the insurer client.  
The lawyer most often relies on the insurer rather than the insured client for future work.  
Whether under such circumstances the lawyer realistically can respect the primary duty 
concept as well as the absolute loyalty requirement is more than questionable. 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  See also Prevratil v. Mohr, 678 A.2d 243, 250 (N.J. 1996) 
(“Plainly stated, in any litigation, counsel for an insurer must put the insured’s interests 
ahead of the insurer’s.”); Purdy v. Pacific Auto Ins. Co., 203 Cal. Rptr. 524, 533-34 (noting 
that lawyer retained by insurer for policyholder has primary duty to, “further the best 
interests of the insured”); see JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 11, at 892 (noting view that 
when conflict is such that counsel can equally represent interests of both the policyholder 
and insurer, counsel, “assumes a duty of undivided loyalty to the [policyholder].”).  
 
20. Purdy v. Pacific Auto Ins. Co., 203 Cal. Rptr. 524 (Cal. App. 1984): In the case at 
bench, however, there were in fact two clients, the insurance carrier and the insured.  We 
recognize that traditionally, where an insurance carrier is called upon to defend its insured, 
the attorney retained by the carrier for this purpose owes the same fiduciary duty to the 
insured as he or she would had the insured made the selection of counsel.  The attorney’s 
primary duty has been said to be to further the best interests of the insured. Id. at 533 
(citations omitted). 
21. See, e.g., id.  at 534  (stating that, “[i]t has long been the law in [California] that 
when a conflict [of interest] develops, the insurer cannot compel the insured to surrender 
control of the litigation, and must, if necessary, secure independent counsel for the insured”) 
(emphasis in original). 
22. The third restatement’s drafters debated the point and ultimately decided to note 
the unique role of the tripartite relationship in American law.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §134 cmt.f (2006) (stating that the triangular relationship is 
special, and therefore practices permissible in that relationship may not travel well to other 
practice settings).  
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 Another concern with the “standard position” is a fundamental one. 
Emphasis on professional codes and the lawyer’s duty of loyalty has caused 
courts to give undue emphasis to “interests” at the expense of “rights” 
which are set forth in the insurance contract.23  A party’s interests may 
diverge from the rights he retains to vindicate that interest.24  A proper 
approach to assessing defense counsel’s role within the triangular 
relationship should emphasize the rights retained and transferred by the 
parties to the insurance contract.  The current emphasis on “interests” is 
unduly disruptive of the bargain struck.25   
In assessing the “standard position” we cannot lose sight of the difficult 
environment in which the triangular relationship operates.  This 
environment results from both the myriad demands placed on the 
participants in the triangular relationship by their own diverging interests 
and the fact that the relationship is subject to influence by persons outside 
the relationship, particularly claimants.26  These outsiders may deem it to 
be in their best interests to exploit tensions and exacerbate disruptive, 
centrifugal tendencies within the triangular relationship. Therefore, not 
only must the triangular relationship maintain its own equilibrium, it must 
occasionally do so in the teeth of efforts by outsiders to destabilize the 
relationship in order to obtain the benefits of a divide and conquer 
strategy.27  For example, a claimant may plead a claim solely to force the 
                                                                                                                 
23. See, e.g., Lieberman v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 84 N.J. 325, 338 (1980), 
(holding that when there is an actual conflict of interest between insurer and insured, 
defense counsel should not continue to represent both clients because of  the duty of loyalty 
to the latter). 
24. See William T. Barker, Laying the Foundation for Staff Counsel Representation of 
Insureds, 39 TORT & INS. L.J. 897, 904 (2004). 
25. Professor Pepper criticizes the idea that the insurance contract should control the 
professional relationship between the policyholder and the retained defense counsel.  
Pepper,  supra note 7,  at 38, 62.  I am not arguing that the insurance contract controls, but I 
do not concede that it is irrelevant; rather, I contend that all the relevant legal documents 
(insurance contract, retainer) and the legal rules they import (insurance law, professional 
responsibility) must be evaluated in determining defense counsel’s role and responsibilities 
within the triangular relationship. 
26. See Gregor J. Schwinghammer, Jr., Insurance Litigation in Florida: Declaratory 
Judgments and the Duty to Defend, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 945, 945-46, 970-75 (1996). The 
article features a discussion of Allstate v. Conde, a case where a shooter’s victim filed a 
claim for recovery from insurer even though intentional acts were precluded from recovery. 
Allstate v. Conde, 595 So.2d 1005 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992). 
27. I do not want to lay all of the problems presented by the triangular relationship at 
the foot of third party claimants.  Many difficulties, and many of the most significant cases 
in this area, have involved disagreement between the parties to the insurance contract as to 
how the claim should be handled.  Betts v. Allstate Ins. Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 528, 546 (Cal. 
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defendant’s insurer to assume the defense claims in the hope that the 
insurer may prefer to settle a non-covered claim rather than incur the 
defense costs.28 
The path taken here is to examine and identify the nature of the 
occasionally opposing interests that are parts of the triangular relationship.  
This descriptive approach will identify the triangular relationship as it is 
generally understood; critically evaluate the relationship’s strengths and 
weaknesses ; and provide instructive  suggestions on how lawyers should 
approach  recurrent problem areas if she finds  herself in the middle of a 
policyholder-insurer disagreement.  The approach taken here rejects the all-
too-easily invoked tendency to characterize the occasional opposing 
interests of the insurer and the policyholder as “conflicts of interests.”29  It 
                                                                                                                          
Ct. App. 1984) (finding that insurer and defense counsel acted improperly in placing 
interests of insurer ahead of policyholder by resisting settlement and advising policyholder 
to file for bankruptcy if judgment exceeded policy limits); Parsons v. Continental Nat’l Am. 
Group, 550 P.2d 94, 99 (Ariz. 1976) (holding that insurer was precluded from contesting 
judgment against policyholder when facts underlying coverage defense were disclosed by 
retained defense counsel to insurer and constituted  policyholder-client’s confidential 
information). 
28. See Schwinghammer, supra note 26.  This tactic occasionally works because the 
insurer’s obligation to defend its policyholders is defined more broadly under the law than 
its duty to indemnify them. Id. at 948 Insurers are frequently required to defend claims that 
pose only a remote possibility the insurer will be obligated to indemnify the policyholder for 
the liability loss.  Id. at 949-50. A claimant may also plead a claim solely to create a conflict 
that will disqualify the insurer from controlling the defense.  Such a loss may increase the 
insurer’s short term financial exposure because the insurer will now be required to pay for 
counsel selected by the policyholder and this cost is frequently greater than the cost incurred 
when the insurer selects counsel because (1) the policyholder, unlike the insurer, cannot 
promise volume in exchange for discounted rates, and (2) the policyholder is paying counsel 
with the insurer’s money and thus lacks the incentive to purchase services economically. 
29. The professional bar has consistently treated conflicts that arise within the 
triangular relationship as subject to resolution as if the problem were a traditional, 
professional conflicts of interest problem, disruptive of a binary relationship.  ABA 
Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-403 (1996) (“Whatever 
the rights and duties of the insurer and insured under the insurance contract, that contract 
does not define the ethical responsibilities of the lawyer to his client”) (footnote omitted); 
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 282 (1950) (noting that lawyer retained 
by insurer to defend policyholder shall defend latter as his client with undivided loyalty); 
ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility Informal Op. 1402 (1977) 
(noting that lawyer who is a salaried employee of insurer may represent the policyholder 
but, ”it is important that the lawyer fully disclose to the client the lawyer’s relationship to 
the insurer, and remain sensitive to any divergence of interests between the [two], and at all 
times act in a fashion that the insured  has no basis to believe his interests are not fully and 
fairly represented”“) (emphasis added).  Under the professional model, the judiciary’s 
concerns over public confidence in the legal system are frequently relied on as a relevant 
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is important to distinguish between the interests which are subsumed within 
the insurance contract and bargained out in favor of either the insurer or the 
policyholder and the conduct by the policyholder or insurer that 
compromises defense counsel’s ability to represent competently and loyally 
the interests of a client as they are framed by the insurance contract.  Not 
every occasion of policyholder-insurer disagreement should be treated as 
controlling how retained defense counsel discharges his professional 
obligations under the retention.  
The standard position has not escaped prolonged and probing criticism.  
Charles Silver and Kent Syverud have criticized the preferred treatment 
afforded policyholders within the triangular relationship.30  They contend 
that the triangular relationship should not be deemed unique but should be 
dealt with in a manner consistent with the legal system’s general handling 
of joint representation questions.31  I substantially agree with many of the 
positions taken by Silver and Syverud.  Following their path, I believe that 
refinement of the standard position is preferable to the current approach of 
resolving insurer-policyholder conflicts, which affect retained defense 
counsel, solely by reference to professional codes.  
One should address questions involving defense counsel’s role within 
the triangular relationship from a perspective that emphasizes practical, 
functional solutions.32  Viewed from such a perspective, judicial decisions 
making should be focused so that the benefits both parties sought from the 
insurance contract are preserved.  The courts should not be guided by a 
desire to force the insurer and policyholder to accept a form of 
representation that is outside that contemplated by the insurance contract.  
                                                                                                                          
factor in deciding whether counsels continued representation of a client should be 
terminated due to the perception of a conflict of interest.   See Silver Chrysler Plymouth, 
Inc. v. Chrysler Motor Co., 518 F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting that court must decide 
the issue of counsel’s ability to represent a client loyally in a manner that does not violate to 
the administration of justice and simultaneously maintains in the public mind a high regard 
for the legal profession). 
30. Charles Silver and Kent Syverud, The Professional Responsibilities of Insurance 
Defense Lawyers, 45 DUKE L.J. 255, 335-389 (1995). 
31. Id. 
32. See Simon by Simon v. Van Steenlandt, 664, N.E.2d 231, 233-34 (Ill. Ct. App. 
1996) (noting the fact that parent-insured was named as defendant in personal injury action 
did not create conflict of interest  because parent and child were only “nominally adverse,” 
and the “lawyer in this case was only retained to defend the parent’s interest under the 
policy” (emphasis added); cf. Buehler v. Sbardellati, 41 Cal. Rptr.2d 104 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1995) (approving jury instruction that lawyer who was asked by clients to represent a 
partnership to be formed by them did not have a conflict of interest when clients had a 
common plan and  engaged lawyer’s services to implement their joint plan). 
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If there is any inequality between the policyholder and insurer insofar as 
defense counsel is concerned, it is often addressed by the insurance 
contract and thus implicitly accepted by the insurer and the policyholder.33  
Consequently, if defense counsel finds that her duty of loyalty is subjected 
to conflicting pulls from the policyholder and the insurer, she may find, 
after reflective analysis, that the parties to the insurance contract implicitly 
accepted that some conflicts may be resolved by defense counsel in favor 
of either the policyholder or the insurer in order that both the lawyer-client 
relationship between defense counsel and the policyholder and the 
continuation of the defense may be preserved.  This is a method of interest 
resolution that courts should respect.  Rather than focusing so intently on 
the individual constituents of the relationship, it would be more helpful to 
conceive of defense counsel as the lawyer for the “common defense” and 
evaluate her duties in that context. I appreciate that this is controversial, but 
as I hope to demonstrate in this paper, this approach avoids the current 
tendency to see the dilemma as a Hobsen choice and to align counsel with 
the interests of the policyholder as, in effect, the lesser of two evils. 
One last point before the main discussion Is that it is not unusual for 
the professional responsibility issue to be encased in another controlling 
legal rule.  For example, in the context of representing a defendant in a 
civil commitment proceeding, the issue of lawyer-client authority issue 
may be encased within the question whether the client’s right to due 
process of law was violated by the lawyer’s assertion of unilateral decision 
making in an area the rules of professional responsibility assign to the 
client or jointly to the lawyer and the client.34  In this context, the 
                                                                                                                 
33. For example, most liability insurance policies contain deductibles, which 
effectively transfer to the policyholder the first dollar costs of an indemnification.  If a 
policy has a $100,000 policy limit with a $5,000 deductible and the matter settles for 
$15,000, the loss will be allocated $10,000 to the insurer and $5,000 to the policyholder.  
The policyholder’s substantial financial interest in settlements due to deductible obligations, 
does not deprive the insurer its right to control the defense and to settle, even to settle 
entirely within the deductible.  See Jon Epstein, Annotation, Liability of Insurer to Insured 
for Settling Third-Party Claim Within Policy Limits Resulting in Detriment to Insured, 18 
A.L.R. 5TH 474, 487-88 (1994) (noting that majority of jurisdictions do not permit 
policyholder to escape the obligation to reimburse the insurer for deductibles after the 
insurer has settled a claim against the policyholder). 
34. See People v. Allen, 50 Cal. Rptr.3d 913, 915 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that 
lawyer’s decision not to honor defendant’s express wish to testify in civil commitment 
proceeding did not violate defendant’s right to due process because proceedings were civil, 
defendant did not have a right to testify, and allowing him to testify would interfere with 
counsel’s ability to control defense and provide best defense possible); cf. Taylor v. Illinois, 
484 U.S. 400, 415-18 (1988) (holding that defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective 
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professional rule may not be referenced, but if it is referenced it may be 
criticized as outside the scope of matters properly to be considered.35   It is 
interesting that the negation of professional obligations in the due process 
context have generated no consternation among commentators; the 
integration of professional duties within a larger body of legal rights is 
accepted.36  I argue that the same approach should be taken here. 
This article discusses the role of retained defense counsel from the 
vantage point of two hypotheticals.  The hypotheticals each use an 
automobile liability insurance problem to frame the issue; however, the 
problems discussed are generic and would arise and be resolved similarly 
under other forms of liability coverage, such as Homeowners Liability or 
Commercial General Liability.   The hypotheticals will hopefully provide a 
context for ideas and solutions to the difficult representation issues that 
arise out of the triangular relationship.   
 
III.WHO CONTROLS DEFENSE COUNSEL REGARDING       
LITIGATION TACTICS 
 
Policyholder is involved in a two vehicle collision and is sued by 
the driver of the other vehicle’s driver for personal injuries.  
Policyholder tenders the claim to the insurer which 
unconditionally accepts the defense and appoints Lawyer to 
represent the policyholder.  
 
Lawyer reasonably believes that the best trial strategy is to 
concede liability and only contest damages and communicates this 
opinion to Policyholder and Insurer.  Policyholder is adamant that 
he is not responsible for the accident despite the consistency in the 
evidence that he was negligent, perhaps even grossly negligent. 
                                                                                                                          
assistance of counsel was not infringed when defense counsel withheld from defendant 
counsel’s intent to employ the tactic of violating a discovery order to spring a “surprise” 
witness even though the tactic resulted in an evidence sanction imposed on the defense). See 
generally Rodney J. Uphoff, Who Should Control the Decision to Call a Witness: 
Respecting a Criminal Defendant’s Tactical Choices, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 763 (2000). 
35. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 176-77 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(criticizing majority for extended discussion of Model Rule 3.3 dealing with candor to the 
court, in Sixth Amendment challenge to lawyer’s threat to inform the court if defendant 
provided false testimony in a criminal trial).  ABA Model Rule 3.3 then permitted, but did 
not require disclosure. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. (1983). 
36. See Susan P. Shapiro, Bushwhacking the Ethical High Road: Conflict of Interest 
in the Practice of Law and Real Life, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 87, 125-26, 128, 151 (2003). 
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Insurer informs Lawyer that it agrees with Lawyer's assessment.  
May Lawyer concede liability and try only the issue of damages?  
May Lawyer present no defense to the liability proof and contest 
only damages? 
 
Control of the defense by the insurer is the hallmark of the triangular 
relationship,37 but what is specifically included in this notion of "control" 
receives little attention.38  It is expected that defense counsel is normally 
given substantial discretion simply because counsel is knowledgeable and 
                                                                                                                 
37. See Ronald E. Mallen, Looking to the Millennium: Will the Tripartite Relationship 
Survive?, 66 DEF. COUNS. J. 481, 481 (1999). 
38. Some attention has been given, however, to the related problem of devoting too 
little resources by the insurer to the defense of the claim.  See Bevevino v. Saydjari, 76 
F.R.D. 88, 93-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (refusing to set aside verdict due to defense counsel’s 
ineptitude when counsel’s conduct was result of insurer’s deliberate underfunding of the 
defense), aff’d 574 F.2d 676, 685 (2d Cir. 1978).  See Thomas Cooney, The Perils of 
Defense Counsel’s Relinquishment of Control Over Preparation of the Defense to the 
Insurer, 52 INS. COUNS. J. 259 (1985) (discussing problems raised by insurer litigation 
related cost containment efforts).  Insurer-imposed litigation guidelines have received 
significant judicial and academic attention as to whether the guidelines themselves 
improperly interfere with retained defense counsel’s independent professional judgment.  
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’s Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-421 (2001) (“[A] lawyer 
must not permit compliance with ‘guidelines’ and other directives of an insurer relating to 
the lawyer’s services to impair materially the lawyer’s independent professional judgment in 
representing an insured.”)  But the larger issue is cost containment and payment, not 
independent judgment: who decides how much the contracted defense will cost the defense 
counsel or the insurer?  A lawyer may be professionally obligated to do more than the 
insurer wishes to pay.  See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 728-29 n.14 (1986) (“Generally 
speaking, a lawyer is under an ethical obligation to exercise independent professional 
judgment on behalf of his client; he must not allow his own interests, financial or otherwise, 
to influence his professional advice.”)  Should the lawyer’s professional obligations, as 
defined by the lawyer and the professional bar, determine the insurer’s contractual 
obligation to provide a defense?  Compare Michael D. Morrison and James R. Old, Jr., 
Economic, Exigencies and Ethics: Whose Choice? Emerging Trends and Issues in Texas 
Insurance Defense Practice, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 349 (2001) (lawyers and professional bar 
determine); with Charles Silver, Flat Fees and Staff Attorneys: Unnecessary Casualties in 
the Continuing Battle Over the Law Governing Insurance Defense Lawyers, 4 CONN. INS. 
L.J. 205 (1997-1998) (arguing that insurer imposed litigation guidelines and cost-
containment strategies do not per se improperly interfere with retained defense counsel’s 
professional obligations to the client-policyholder). See generally Claire Hamner Matturro, 
Ethical and Legal Snares Waiting for Attorneys Subject to Legal Fee Audits and Billing 
Guidelines, 24 J. LEGAL PROF. 111 (2000) (discussing legal audits and billing audits 
throughout article); Susan Randall, Managed Litigation and the Professional Obligations of 
Insurance Defense Lawyers, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1 (2001) (collecting and discussing case 
and commentary on the topic). 
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experienced in the matter.  In most cases the matter is resolved through 
default; the insurer instructs retained defense counsel and the policyholder, 
if she is even informed ex ante about the decision, either (1) acquiesces, (2) 
agrees after a half-hearted opposition, or, (3) in the most common of cases, 
acts simply as a passive spectator.  Much of this soft underbelly of the law 
defies exposure because of the lawyer’s ability to “control” the client.  A 
lawyer persuades and, to a larger extent, the client accepts that the lawyer's 
analysis and legal recommendations should be followed.  It would, after all, 
be somewhat surprising if the client consistently disregarded the lawyer’s 
advice and recommendations as to matters germane to the representation.  
A client desires to be represented by a lawyer because lawyers possess the 
knowledge, experience, and expertise that clients lack. Occasionally 
however, the lawyer’s recommendations and advice will conflict with the 
client’s personal agenda and the client will resist following the lawyer’s 
recommendations.  That is the situation assumed in this hypothetical.  
Thus, the question is poised as to how counsel should resolve the dilemma 
of conflicting instructions received from the policyholder and the insurer.   
Before we address the issue who, policyholder or insurer, may instruct 
counsel, we should first address whether a client has a say in the matter.  
Are litigation and trial tactics some things that are left to the lawyer’s 
professional competence and the lawyer’s unfettered discretion?  The 
professional codes are somewhat opaque on this point.  The American Bar 
Association’s Model Rules, Rule 1.2 provides in pertinent part, “a lawyer 
shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning objectives of representation . 
. . and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be 
pursued.39  The distinction between the objectives or ends of the litigation 
and the means by which they are to be achieved is frequently stated in the 
law and just as frequently conceded to be relatively imprecise.  "[A] clear 
distinction between objectives and means sometimes cannot be drawn, and 
in many cases the client-lawyer relationship partakes of a joint 
undertaking."40  Nonetheless, the black letter rule suggests that the client 
controls the identification and defining of representation “objectives”, i.e., 
the lawyer must “abide” by the client's decision on those points;41 but the 
term "consults" suggests more lawyer discretion for the means to achieve 
the client’s objectives.  This distinction is also supported by the comment 
to Rule 1.2, that states, “[c]lients normally defer to the special knowledge 
                                                                                                                 
39. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2007) (emphasis added). 
40. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. (1992). 
41. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2007).  
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and skill of their lawyer with respect to the means to be used to accomplish 
their objectives, particularly with respect to technical, legal and tactical 
matters.”42  Rule 1.2 seems to support, within the context of the 
hypothetical, that it is counsel’s initial decision to litigate only the damages 
issues on the theory that evaluating evidence and case presentation are 
technical and legal tactical issues, and tactical decisions will not result in 
any direct expense to the policyholder.  Direct expense here refers to 
immediate “out of pocket” outlays such as expert witness fees, deposition 
costs, etc.  There is always the prospect that the lawyer’s tactical choices 
will fail and the client will end up paying more because of it, but this type 
of cost is inherent in any representational relationship. 
The problem is that almost any issue in a litigated matter can be 
defined as an end or as a means to achieve an end.  In the above 
hypothetical, is the "end" minimization of economic exposure, or 
vindication of self and one's sense of self-worth?  It is difficult to treat the 
decision to litigate only damages as a "means" decision under the 
vindication of self-worth “end.”  We may expect that the insurer and the 
policyholder will often define ends differently, and this may be intensified 
when a claim is presented and the insurer assumes control of the defense.  
Insurers may be expected to be more oriented towards loss minimization; 
policyholders may be expected to be more inclined than insurers to see the 
litigation process as a forum for vindication and self-validation.  But even 
this viewpoint may be inverted.  A policyholder may be tremendously risk 
averse to any prospect of a financial loss arising out of the litigation and 
may see loss minimization as the primary objective.  The insurer, as the 
prototypical "repeat player,"43 may evaluate a particular lawsuit as one in 
which the larger objective is the signal a steadfast defense will send to 
plaintiff's counsel in the particular case and/or the plaintiff trial bar in 
general.  Either the insurer or the policyholder may see a particular claim as 
a self-contained event or as part of a process.  The insurer may be 
concerned about the case’s precedental value because it is a repeat player 
and is similarly situated across a number of claims.  The policyholder will 
not share this concern, but may be concerned about the impact that 
litigation will have when the claimant has a business or family relationship 
                                                                                                                 
42. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. (2007). 
43. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the 
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97-101 (1974) (noting that parties that 
have substantial experience with the legal system may be expected to be better able to use 
the system to their advantage and will be less risk adverse regarding the uncertainty of 
litigation than parties who only occasionally encounter the legal system). 
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with the policyholder.  That relationship will color the viewpoints of both 
policyholder and insurer, but often in different ways.  The policyholder will 
often desire that the claim be resolved in a fashion that preserves the 
relationship.  This suggests action short of litigation and the loss of 
negotiation leverage.  The insurer may be concerned that the relationship 
has fostered the claim.  This attitude is so strong on the insurer’s part that 
they frequently seek to exclude coverage for claims against the 
policyholder by related family members.44   
Even when the lawyer has initial discretion, that discretion may be 
subject to overriding by client instruction, at least to the extent the 
instruction would not require the lawyer to violate a professional code.45  
Lawyers are interchangeably characterized as both agents and independent 
contractors with respect to clients.46  The label seems to follow the result 
                                                                                                                 
44. See Keeton & Widiss, supra note 4, at §4.9(c)(1) (noting prevalence of household 
and family member exclusion clauses in automobile liability insurance policies). 
45. See Wisconsin v. Divanovic, 546 N.W.2d 501, 506 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (noting 
that court appointed counsel must abide by the client’s instructions concerning the 
objectives of the representation, but that the lawyer, in so doing, may not engage in action 
that would “constitute a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law”).  
Some decisions, particularly in the context of the criminal justice system, are deemed so 
fundamental that the court must directly obtain the defendant-client’s assent.  Jones v. 
Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (listing “fundamental” choices).  In other cases, a court 
may assume that counsel speaks for the defendant-client.  There is, admittedly, a fine line 
between a case which holds that counsel must abide by the client’s instruction as to 
objectives, see id. at 753-54,  and a case which holds that a decision is technically complex 
and therefore appropriately assigned to counsel to make rather than being deemed personal 
or fundamental and thus belonging to the client, see United States v. Boyd, 86 F.3d 719, 724 
(7th Cir. 1996) (holding that decision whether to challenge juror is tactical decision 
committed to counsel).  No objection to counsel’s decision was made at trial and the Boyd 
court’s decision was influenced by an unwillingness to allow a defendant to “game the 
system” by feigning acquiescence but thereafter objecting if the strategy failed.  Id. at 722-
23; see also Gonzalez v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1765, 1771 (2008) (holding that decision 
to conduct voir dire before Article 1 Magistrate Judge could be made by counsel).  The 
Court expressly noted that it did not address the question of the client’s objection to 
counsel’s tactical choice.  Id. at 1772.  ABA Model Rule 1.2 takes no position how 
disagreements over means-based decisions should be resolved, other than to advise 
consultation and the option of termination of the relationship by either the lawyer or the 
client if the matter cannot be resolved.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 2 
(2007). 
46. See McCarthy v. Recordex Service, Inc., 80 F.3d 842, 853 (3d Cir. 1996); see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 1, cmt.(e) (1958) (noting that attorneys are agents of 
their clients, although as to physical activities, they are independent contractors).  In some 
cases defense counsel is characterized as a co-agent of the policyholder and the insurer.  
Marten Transport Ltd. v. Hartford Speciality Co., 533 N.W.2d 452, 457 (Wis. 1995) (noting 
that co-agency was proper identification of relationship when the policyholder selected 
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rather than assist in determining the result.  While courts sometimes 
characterize lawyers as independent contractors, and therefore outside 
client control as to the manner of performing their legal work, the fact is 
that those statements are made in contexts where the client has not 
specifically instructed the lawyer.47  The more accurate view is that client 
instruction trumps lawyer professional discretion as long as the instruction 
does not require the lawyer to act illegally or unprofessionally.48  Thus, 
while we may expect that the client will defer to the lawyer’s expertise, the 
client is not legally obligated to do so; rather, it is the lawyer who must 
defer to the client’s call.  Even on the issue of trial tactics, while the   
lawyer proposes, the client disposes.49  Consequently, we must confront the 
issue of from whom retained defense counsel must take instruction, the 
                                                                                                                          
counsel and distinguishing such a case from the A relationship between an insurer and a 
defense counsel fostered by a classic tripartite insurance scheme).  
47. The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers adopts this view, noting that 
while the lawyer may usually exercise any lawful means to advance a client’s objectives, 
that discretion is limited by client instruction.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS 21(3) (2000).  The client’s authority to instruct the lawyers is, on the other hand, 
only limited by the lawyer’s obligation not to engage in unlawful conduct or disobedience of 
an order of a tribunal.  Id. at 23; see Foothills Dev. Co. v. Clark County Bd. Of County 
Comm’rs, 730 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that lawyer was obliged to 
follow client’s specific instructions). 
48. As noted earlier, instances do occasionally arise when courts approve of lawyers 
refusing or failing to follow a client’s direct instructions, but these appear limited to 
representation in criminal or quasi-criminal matters when the issue is raised in the context of 
the defendant’s right to a fair trial.  See supra note 30.  See Sistrunk v. Vaughn, 96 F.3d 666, 
668, 671 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that as to non-fundamental issues appointed appellate 
defense counsel may, after consultation, override client’s wishes as to which issues to raise 
in the Brief); People v. Penrod, 169 Cal. Rptr. 533, 537-540 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (stating 
that ordinarily decision as to which witnesses to call is tactical decision within attorney’s 
control).  In Penrod, the client objections were framed in terms of a mid trial effort to 
substitute new counsel for court-appointed counsel and a complaint that he was not 
personally permitted to interview witnesses so as to play a larger role in witness designation 
for trial.  Id. at 540; see generally GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL, THE  LAW AND ETHICS 
OF LAWYERING, 826-28 (4th ed. 2005) (collecting cases). 
49. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 22, cmt. d (2000).  For an 
interesting application of this principle, see Johnson v. Amethyst Corp., 463 S.E.2d 397, 400 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1995) (finding error when the trial court permitted defense counsel, retained 
by the insurer to represent the policyholder without the policyholder’s consent, to set aside a 
default judgment against the policy-holder);  but cf. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 100 
Cal. Rptr.2d 807, 810-11 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (concluding that insurer could intervene in 
litigation commenced against its policyholder when the policyholder, a corporation, was 
unable to appear because its corporate status was suspended due to non-payment of taxes; 
the insurer had a direct interest in preventing the entry of a default judgment that it might be 
required to satisfy). 
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policyholder or the insurer?50  Is the matter controlled by the professional 
rules or does the tripartite relationship warrant a different approach? 
Pursuant to the insurance contract the policyholder has ceded control 
over the litigation to the insurer.  Does that fact control counsel's 
relationship with the policyholder-client?  In the context of this 
hypothetical, the central issue is control over litigation tactics.  The 
policyholder wishes to contest liability, perhaps to avoid the stigma of 
responsibility or the economic consequences of a finding of fault.51  A 
defense limited to the issue of damages may be perceived by the 
policyholder as an acknowledgment of legal responsibility.  For some 
individuals such an admission may be difficult to make even in the face of 
clear evidence of fault.  Some individuals can live with the vagaries of life.  
They will accept the decision to focus the litigation on minimizing the loss 
even though it means admitting, or being understood as admitting, 
responsibility for conduct they do not actually believe was legally 
wrongful.  Other individuals will find such conduct morally and 
emotionally repugnant.  These individuals have, of course, an option.  They 
can defend at their own expense or they can bargain for “consent to settle” 
provisions.52  Should policyholders be allowed to tender the defense of the 
                                                                                                                 
50. While regulation of the legal profession has found support and criticism in a 
number of models, see John Leubsdorf, Three Models of Professional Reform, 67 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1021 (1982) (noting and comparing market, regulatory, and personal responsibility 
approaches), courts have consistently emphasize the overarching duties of the lawyer 
against a backdrop of client vulnerability; see WOLFRAM, LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 2, at 
146-47 (noting that courts consistently treat lawyer-client relationship as involving highest 
trust and confidence). These judicial sentiments are also expressed, albeit with somewhat 
lessened vigor, to the preliminary conduct leading to the formation of the relationship. See 
Id. at 495-504, 553-556 (noting that courts retain broad power to regulate fee disputes even 
though the traditional view is that a lawyer does not act in a fiduciary capacity when 
negotiating the initial retainer agreement with the client). 
51. The policyholder’s interest in avoiding reputation stigma is consistently 
subordinated to the insurer’s financial interest. See Caplan v. Fellheimer, Eichen, 
Braverman & Kaskey, 68 F.3d 828, 837-38 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that policyholder’s 
concern over harm to reputation would not support Abad faith” action against insurer for 
settlement within policy limits of claim against policyholder); Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Color Converting Indus. Co., 45 F.3d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that majority view 
is that the insurer does not have duty to handle the claim in a manner that would protect the 
policyholder from losing its best customer); W. Polymer Tech., Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 38 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 78, 84-85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that insurer could settle claim without 
consent of policyholder even though settlement allegedly injured policyholder’s reputation). 
52. Caplan v. Fellheimer, Eichen, Braverman & Kaskey, 68 F.3d 828,  837-38 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (noting that a “consent-to-settle provision protects the professional . . . who is 
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claim to their liability insurers, by which they surrender control of the 
defense to the insurer, yet still insist upon and expect the same ability to 
control defense counsel retained by the insurer as if the policyholder had 
retained counsel directly and independently for its own account?   
The difficulty with a solution to the above questions lies in the legal 
system’s adherence to a professional imperative that binds the lawyer by 
ties of loyalty to the client.53  The professional codes are largely silent as to 
whether, and if so to what extent, the client can delegate control to another, 
such as an answer.  The Restatement recognizes that the client may broadly 
delegate authority to the lawyer,54 however, that delegation is revocable.55  
The problem is the Restatement addresses the problem as a binary 
relationship between lawyer and client in which the parties allocate and 
distribute authority between themselves. The Reinstatement does not 
address the problem from a multilateral perspective when the parties enter 
into separate, but integrated relationships that require some accommodation 
from strict insistence on rights expressed at one part of the relationship in 
order for the entire relationship to be successful. 
The notion of loyalty is fundamentally expressed by the ideal that the 
lawyer must not permit her independent professional judgment -- which is 
to be devoted to the achievement of the client's lawful objectives -- to be 
corrupted by the lawyer's devotion to the interests of others.  In the context 
of the triangular relationship this ideal has been captured by the idea that 
the lawyer may not permit the interests of the insurer to deflect the lawyer 
from her duty of loyalty to the policyholder-client.  Yet, it is somewhat 
surprising that an ideal that is supposedly based on client interest cannot be 
subordinated to the wishes of the client.  If the client authorizes another to 
exercise all or some of the prerogatives of a "client", why should a lawyer 
be precluded from functioning as a lawyer under such an arrangement?  
And if a lawyer is retained as a result of an arrangement whereby one 
person authorizes another person to control and direct the lawyer, should 
the first person be permitted to abrogate that agreement yet retain the 
benefits derived from the arrangement -- the services of the lawyer? 
                                                                                                                          
concerned about his or her reputation”); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE 801(d) (requiring the 
consent of health care professionals for settlement of health care malpractice claims). 
53. Loyalty to the client is an integral aspect of the lawyer-client relationship.  Rule 
1.7 cmt.1: “Loyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer’s 
relationship to a client”; see, supra, note 2. 
54. RESTATEMENT, LAWYERS, supra note 1, § 22(1). 
55. Id. at § 22(3). 
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The allocation of the right to control the lawyer, as between joint 
clients, can be compared to the allocation between constituents of a 
represented entity of the right to control the lawyer for the entity.56  Owners 
of an entity may contract amongst themselves with respect to how a lawyer 
for that entity will be instructed and delegate the power to instruct and 
control the lawyer to specific constituents of an entity client.57  Transfer of 
                                                                                                                 
56. Rule 1.13(a) (adopting rule that lawyer represents entity as client); cf. American 
Mut. Liab. Co. v. Superior Court, 113 Cal. Rptr. 561, 571 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974): 
 
In the insured-insurer relationship, the attorney 
characteristically is engaged and paid by the insurer to 
defend the insured.  The insured and the insurer have 
certain obligations each to the other, as previously noted, 
arising from the insurance contract.  Both the insured and 
the insurer have a common interest in defeating or settling 
the third party’s claim.  If the matter reaches litigation, the 
attorney appears of record for the insured and at all times 
represents him in terms measured by the extent of his 
employment.   
 
In such a situation, the attorney has two clients whose 
primary, overlapping and common interest is the speedy 
and successful resolution of the claim and litigation.  
Conceptually, each member of the trio, attorney, client-
insured, and client-insurer has corresponding rights and 
obligations founded largely on contract, and as to the 
attorney, by the Rules of Professional Conduct as well.  
The three parties may be viewed as a loose partnership, 
coalition or alliance directed toward a. common goal, 
sharing a common purpose which lasts during the pendency 
of the claim or litigation against the insured. 
Communications are routinely exchanged between them 
relating to the joint and common purpose – the successful 
defense and resolution of the claim. Insured, insurer, and 
attorney, together form an entity – the defense team – 
arising from the obligations to defend and to co-operate, 
imposed by contract and professional duty.  This entity may 
be conceived as comprising a unitary whole with intramural 
relationships and reciprocal obligations and duties each to 
the other quite separate and apart from the extramural 
relations with third parties or with the world at large.  
Together, the team occupies one side of the litigating arena. 
 Id. 
57. See RESTATEMENT, LAWYERS, supra note 1, 14, cmt. f: When the client is a 
corporation or other organization, the organization’s organic law determines whether a 
particular agent has authority to retain and direct the lawyer.  In Formal Opinion 1994-137 
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the power to control counsel by consent of the owners of an entity does not 
appear to be objectionable.58  The lawyer retained by the entity would 
rightfully look for instruction to the constituents with the delegated power 
to control the lawyer.59  Professional codes have historically prevented the 
owners of the entity from having any direct control over the lawyer for the 
entity to the extent that the lawyer could not report entity misfeasance to 
the owners.  In this context, the legal profession exhibited no unease with 
the view that the owners of the entity (shareholders) could irrevocably 
delegate to their agent (Board of Directors) the power to control the entity’s 
lawyer.  Until recently, professional codes expressly ordered the lawyer for 
the entity to report no further than the Board.  Here delegation of authority 
is enshrined as necessary to permit the proper functioning and advising of 
the entity.  Although the current version of Model Rule 1.13 relaxes the 
strict requirement of no outside disclosure absent consent, the relaxation is 
                                                                                                                          
the California State Bar Committee on Professional Responsibility and Competence 
emphasized the desirability of a partnership agreement defining how and by whom the 
lawyer for the partnership would be instructed.  Although the Committee did not expressly 
address how the agreement would control counsel, its comments carry the inference that the 
agreement could control counsel.  Similarly, in Griva v. Davison, 637 A.2d 830, 840 (D.C. 
App. 1994), the court held that a unanimous consent provision in partnership agreement 
made individual partners functional clients of the partnership’s lawyers.  The inference 
again from the opinion is that the partnership agreement may control not only who is 
counsel’s client but who instructs counsel.  For example, if the agreement specified that 
partner A should instruct counsel, this would indicate that partners B and C were not 
functional clients and that as between A, B, and C, the three have delegated authority to A to 
speak for the partnership when dealing with counsel.  See generally WOLFRAM, LEGAL 
ETHICS, supra note 2, at 8.3, pp.426-27 (noting that issue has been ducked by most courts 
because of judicial disinclination to become involved in client selection while at the same 
time the court is hesitant to vest one faction with the sole right to select and control counsel 
for the entity). 
58. The professional codes expressly address decision-making between corporate 
client and lawyer (see ABA Rules, Rule 1.13(b) and comment) but do not expressly address 
the issue as to non-corporate entities.  See CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
ANNOTATED RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 206-207 (6th ed. 2007) (noting split among 
authorities whether non-corporate entities should be treated as entities or as aggregation of 
individual constituents of non-corporate entity).  The position taken in the Restatement of 
the Law Governing Lawyers that the entity’s organic law determines which entity 
constituents directs and instructs counsel, see, supra, note 57, was not accompanied with 
any authorities in the Reporter’s Note to comment f. 
59. This is the accepted model in the corporate context.  WOLFRAM, LEGAL ETHICS, 
supra note 2, at §13.7.2, p.734 (noting that lawyer should accept direction from person(s) 
within corporation who is lawfully entitled to give direction to counsel and that person is 
defined by the internal structure of the corporation). 
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slight and reserves discretion to the lawyer on whether to disclose outside 
the entity.60   
The entity model adopts nicely to the triangular relationship.  The 
insurer and policyholder have, in function and effect, created a defacto joint 
venture to defeat or resolve the claim brought against the policyholder that 
affects their shared, mutual interests.  Admittedly, there are some 
differences between the traditional entity representation and the defacto 
joint venture that is the triangular relationship. In the triangular 
relationship, a lawyer-client relationship exists between the lawyer and the 
person (policyholder) who has surrendered the right to control the lawyer to 
another (insurer).61  In the entity representation case, no lawyer-client 
relationship necessarily exists between the lawyer and the constituent who 
has been assigned the right to instruct and control the lawyer.62  
Concededly, in the entity context, the lawyer formally represents the entity, 
whereas in the triangular relationship, the lawyer formally represents the 
individual policyholder.63  But, the formal presence of a lawyer-client 
                                                                                                                 
60. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2007); see also HAZARD, supra 
note 48, at 367 (discussing revision of Model Rule 1.13(c) to permit attorney disclosure of 
entity wrongdoing when entity’s highest authorities refuse to address and rectify the 
problem and the wrongdoing will likely result in substantial injury to the entity).  The ABA 
initially rejected a draft of the Model Rules that would have permitted the lawyer in limited 
circumstances to disclose corporate wrongdoing to shareholders or others as necessary in the 
best interests of the organization in favor of the previous version of Rule 1.13 that did not 
allow for disclosure except as authorized by the entity client’s highest authority.  See Evan 
A. Davis, The Meaning of Professional Independence, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 1284, 
1287-88 (2003).  The current rule version permits disclosure outside the entity in limited 
circumstances.  See HAZARD, supra note 48, at 367.   
61. Susan P. Shapiro, Bushwhacking the Ethical High Road: Conflict of Interest on 
the Practice of Law and Real Life, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 87, 120 (2003). 
62. James M. Fischer, Representing Partnerships: Who is/Are the Client(s)?, 26 PAC. 
L.J. 961, 963 (1995). 
63. Compare Shapiro, supra note 61, at 120 with Fischer, supra note 62, at 963.  
However, the concession is broader than the law requires:   
 
There are two competing theories that apply to the 
issue of client identification when the lawyer represents an 
artificial legal contract, such as a corporation of 
partnership.  The “group” or “aggregate” theory holds that 
the lawyer represents both the legal entity and leading 
individuals who control or manage the entity.  The “entity 
theory” holds that the lawyer represents the entity alone. 
 
 
2008] ALLOCATION OF POWER 45 
 
relationship on this point should not be determinative; functionally, the 
situations are similar.64  In both situations, the retention of the lawyer is 
designed to achieve a common goal.  The insurer and the policyholder have 
contractually identified a common goal, defense of the claim, just as the 
constituents of the entity have identified a common goal, the success of the 
entity.  In both situations, the interested parties have decided, as between 
themselves, that control over the lawyer should not be shared but should be 
delegated to one of the parties.  In both situations, the decision to delegate 
control can be assumed to be generally beneficial to the interested parties.   
Neither the decisional law nor the professional codes prohibit joint 
representation, except in limited situations.65  The ways in which conflicts 
of interest issues are raised—for example, lawyer discipline, motion to 
disqualify, legal malpractice, etc.–tend to emphasize the negative aspects of 
joint representation.66  Yet, the very persistence of joint representation is 
evidence of its value to clients.67  If insurer control of the defense was an 
                                                                                                                          
 Fischer, supra note 62, at 963 (footnotes omitted).  The “entity” theory dominates 
in the context of corporate representation, but is less entrenched in other areas, such as the 
representation of partnerships, associations, ventures, etc.  Id. at 965-68. 
64. But see Pepper, supra note 7, at 29-31 (arguing that in forming a partnership or 
venture the lawyer is often confronted with conflicts among the promoters of the venture).  
That is correct, but besides the point here.  The issue here is not forming a relationship 
among potentially or actually conflicted persons, but addressing how decision making 
authority has been allocated within relationships formed independently of one another, but 
with an awareness of and dependence on the other relationships.  The legs of the triangular 
relationships do not act in isolation; they act together.  In assigning rights and duties within 
the triangular relationship that fact should not be ignored. 
65. See WOLFRAM, supra note 2, at 349-50. 
66. Id. at 349. 
67. Id.  Wolfram notes that: 
 
[T]here are good reasons for clients to wish a lawyer 
to undertake a joint representation.  The net fee charged to 
the clients can be less than for separate representations.  
Two or more clients may so trust or otherwise value the 
same lawyer that they are willing to overlook relatively 
minor differences in their positions.  The clients might find 
it better for tactical reasons to band together behind a 
common champion rather than to hang separately.  Among 
other things, clients may deliberately choose joint 
representation in order to minimize mutual recrimination. 
 
 Id.(footnote omitted).  See generally Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, An 
Economic Analysis of Conflict of Interest Regulation, 82  IOWA L. REV.  965 (1997) (arguing 
that the conflicts of interest rules found in modern professional codes are efficient rules, 
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ineffective and inefficient allocation of resources, it would not command 
the usage that it does.  Indeed, there is little question but that the economies 
of scale, litigation experience, and risk neutrality that insurers bring to 
claim adjustment and litigation reduce both the aggregate costs of defense 
and the amount expended to satisfy claims against policyholders.68 
Both course of practice and intuition support the cost effectiveness of 
insurer control.69 If policyholder control were more efficient, one assumes 
that one or more insurers would have stumbled upon it by now and it would 
have come to dominate the market.  The fact that the market does support 
insurer control is evidence of the superior efficiency of insurer control.  In 
Galanter’s study of litigation involving repeat and episodic players, he 
observed that the repeat players’ ability to control their lawyers was central 
to their success.70  Galanter’s observations were anecdotal; they are, 
nonetheless, consistent with informed intuition regarding litigation. 
The limits to my model need to be recognized.  Defense counsel is 
permitted to look to a person for instruction who is authorized to control 
the defense in the policyholder’s place consistent with the insurance 
contract.  But the model does not permit counsel to engage in conduct 
inconsistent with the policyholder's legitimate expectations regarding 
representation. Defense counsel may not make tactical decisions for the 
purpose of benefiting the insurer but prejudicing the policyholder.71  The 
model does hold that the policyholder-client, having surrendered control of 
the defense of the claim to the insurer, does not have a reasonable 
                                                                                                                          
consistent with economic theory, and operate in the public interest);  but cf. Benjamin Hoorn 
Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?: An Economic Analysis of the Justifications for 
Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429, 467 (2001) (arguing that professional 
conflict of interest rules often operate to the primary benefit of the professional bar rather 
than clients). 
68. See Galanter, supra note 43, at 97, 114, 119. 
69. See id. at 114-15. 
70. See id. at 114-119. 
71. See Ladner v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 607 N.Y.S.2d 296, 298 (App. Div. 1994) 
(noting that counsel’s tactical decision to place emphasis on allegations for which insurer 
had lowest policy limits exposure was improper).  Sometimes this point can be confused by 
overly broad language.  Cf. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Traver, 980 S.W.2d 625, 628 
(Tex. 1998) (stating that retained defense counsel may not permit insurer’s right to control 
the defense to prejudice the “interests” of the policyholder).  Interests should, however, be 
understood to refer to rights retained under the insurance contract.  See id. at 627 (noting 
that insurer’s right to control defense allows the insurer, “to accept or reject settlement 
offers and, where no conflict of interest exists, to make other decisions that would normally 
be vested in the client, here the insured.”). 
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expectation that it may control the defense. There may be, in some cases, a 
fine line between conduct impermissibly designed to further the insurer’s 
interests vis à vis the policyholder and conduct designed to further the 
insurer’s legitimate goal of controlling the defense for the purpose of 
minimizing the parties’ joint exposure to the claimant.  Nevertheless, the 
line does exist.  In those situations when the insurer’s ability to control the 
defense will serve to minimize the economic exposure of both policyholder 
and insurer to the claimant, the case for exclusive insurer control is most 
strongly made. 
We can make the policyholder’s interest in controlling the defense 
more substantial, but this does not change the result.  Assume the 
policyholder publishes a paper in the Gay & Lesbian community.  One of 
the policyholder’s staffers sues for same-sex sexual harassment and 
discrimination.  The policyholder tenders the claim to its insurer, which 
accepts unconditionally. As part of the defense, insurer instructs defense 
counsel to raise the defense that sexual harassment and discrimination 
claims are not actionable between members of the same sex, a position that 
has significant but not absolute legal support.72 This litigation position is 
personally and publicly embarrassing to the policyholder who instructs 
counsel not to plead the defense. 
If counsel were retained directly by the policyholder for its own 
account, counsel would be obligated to abide by the policyholder-client’s 
instruction.73  But within the context of the triangular relationship, 
however, the policyholder-client does not have the right to instruct counsel 
not to plead the defense. The fact that the defense injures the policyholder’s 
reputation is not controlling once the policyholder tenders the claim and 
surrenders control of the defense to the insurer.74  The simple fact is that 
                                                                                                                 
72. The Supreme Court has held that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under 
Title VII.  Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 523 U.S. 75, 79-82 (1998).  Not all 
employers are subject to Title VII and the status of same-sex sexual harassment under state 
or common law is mixed.  See Norma Rotunno, Annotation, Same Sex Sexual Harassment 
Under State Anti-Discrimination Laws, 73 A.L.R.5TH 1 (1999). 
73. See supra text and notes 45-48 and accompanying text for discussion noting that 
the decisional law and the professional codes are quite clear that a lawyer may not disregard 
a client’s instructions, save in the most extreme circumstances, e.g., client instructs lawyer 
to commit an illegal act or compliance with client’s instructions would require lawyer to 
violate professional codes.   
74. See supra note 51. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.  Most importantly, 
the reticence expressed in Rule 1.2 in taking a position when lawyer and client disagree on 
the means by which the representation will be conducted expressly reference the “interests 
of ... other persons “as a significant reason for the reticence.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
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the policyholder can not have it both ways.  The policyholder can defend 
on his or her own account or the policyholder can surrender the control of 
the defense for the liability insurance contract’s economic benefits.  But 
once the policyholder surrenders control, the policyholder’s rights as a 
litigant and client are subject to the allocation of rights established by the 
insurance contract.  The insurer is entitled to limit its economic exposure 
by raising viable defenses that would defeat or reduce the claim.  That right 
may be contrary to the policyholder’s current interests, but to the extent the 
policyholder’s interests do not rise to the level of a right protected by the 
insurance contract, the insurer’s right to control the defense is not impaired.  
The insurer’s actions in controlling retained defense counsel are fully 
consistent with the identified joint interests of the parties under the 
insurance contract, which is the defeat or minimization of the economic 
consequences of the claim. 
It may be argued that the right to control the defense cannot be 
contracted away to another as that would impermissibly compromise the 
lawyer's inviolate duty to maintain professional independence on the 
client's behalf.75  That position was taken in Hayes v. Eagle-Picher 
Industries, Inc.76  The decision dealt with a specific conflicts rule that 
directly addresses the issue, the “aggregate settlement” rule,77 but the 
decision does articulate the view that professional code provisions may be 
immutable and not subject to waiver even by willing, fully informed 
                                                                                                                          
CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 2 (2007).  Although the comment does not specifically refer to the 
triangular relationship, that relationship does reflect the types of concerns that Rule 1.2 
recognizes as not warranting the usual deference to client decision making and instruction.   
75. Cf. Kracht v. Perrin, Gartland & Doyle, 268 Cal. Rptr. 637, 639-41 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1990) (noting that an attorney’s duty of undivided loyalty may not be delegated away and is 
owed solely to the client). 
76. 513 F.2d 892, 893-94 ( 10th Cir. 1975). 
77. A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an 
aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the clients, or in a criminal case an 
aggregated agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas, unless each client gives 
informed consent, in a writing signed by the client.  The lawyer’s disclosure shall include the 
existence and nature of all the claims or pleas involved and of the participation of each 
person in the settlement.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2007). See generally 
ANNOTATED RULES supra note 58, at 148-149; Howard M. Erichson, A Typology of 
Aggregate Settlements, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1769, 1769-70 (2005) (arguing for a more 
precise understanding of the term “aggregate settlement” and providing suggested 
definitions). 
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clients.78  As this paper takes a contrary position, the decision is worth 
exploring.   
The Hayes v. Eagle-Picher lawsuit was commenced by a large number 
of plaintiffs who were all represented by common counsel.  The plaintiffs 
agreed amongst themselves to be bound by a majority vote regarding a 
proposed settlement and voted thirteen to five to accept the defendant’s 
lump sum offer.79  The trial court reduced the settlement to a judgment 
based on the vote.80 
The appellate court’s holding that the approval process was flawed 
rested on two grounds.81  First, the court found the approval agreement to 
interfere with the attorney-client relationship: 
 
[T]his arrangement is contrary to the plain duties owed by an 
attorney to a client.  An agreement such as the present one which 
allows a case to be settled contrary to the wishes of the client and 
without his approving the terms of the settlement is opposed to 
the basic fundamentals of the attorney-client relationship. 
Inasmuch as the attorney is merely an agent for the client in 
negotiation and settlement, the approval of the client is an all 
important essential to a settlement which is to be binding, and if 
this approval is not present the court is placed in a most 
unfavorable position in enforcing it.82 
 
Second, the court found that the clients could not agree to the settlement 
until they were informed of the terms of the actual settlement: 
 
One other aspect which complicates the problem is the fact 
that the agreement calling for the majority governing the 
decision to settle was entered into some time prior to the date of 
negotiations.  It is difficult to see how this could be binding on 
                                                                                                                 
78. Hayes, 513 F.2d at 892-93. Other provisions of the professional codes also carry 
this immutability trait.  For example, the no ex-parte contact rule that prohibits a lawyer 
from communicating with a represented person without the consent of that person’s 
attorney, is immutable; the client may not waive the attorney’s right to give or withhold 
consent.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2007). Waivers of conflicts of interest 
are circumscribed by Rule 1.7(b), that in some contexts bars the waiver of the conflict of 
interest by the client. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (2007). 
79. Hayes, 513 F.2d at 892-93. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 893-95. 
82. Id. at 894. 
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non-consenting plaintiffs as of the time of the proposed 
settlement and in the light of the terms agreed on.  In other 
words, it would seem that plaintiffs would have the right to agree 
or refuse to agree once the terms of the settlement were made 
known to them.83 
 
The ABA Ethics Committee stated that the primary justification for the 
“aggregate settlement” rule is to protect each client’s right to control the 
decision to settle and protect that right from outside interference.84   
Hayes v. Eagle-Picher states a position that is attractive to those who 
believe that the client oriented (policyholder) obligations expressed in 
professional code should control the conflicts presented by the triangular 
relationship.85  Moreover, the Hayes v. Eagle-Picher position on advance 
consent to aggregate settlements is well accepted in the case law.86 The 
position denies clients the right to contract around a rule of professional 
conduct and vest actual authority in their attorneys to negotiate on their 
                                                                                                                 
83. Id. 
84. ABA COMM. ETHICS AND PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, Formal Op. 06-438 (2006). 
85. Pepper, supra note 7, at 47.  But cf. Charles Silver & Lynn A. Baker, Mass 
Lawsuits and the Aggregate Settlement Rule, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 733, 770-773 (1997) 
(criticizing Hayes v. Eagle-Picher and the rigorous application of Model Rule 1.8(g) which 
has been construed to require consent by all jointly represented clients to an aggregate 
settlement). 
86. Abbott v. Kidder Peabody & Co., Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1048-51 (D. Colo. 
1999) (holding a retainer provision that purported to deprive a client of the right to control 
the case is void as against public policy).  In Abbott, 200 plaintiffs filed a non-class action, 
single complaint against the defendant.  Id. at 1048.  The plaintiffs hired a single law firm to 
represent their interests.  Id.  The retainer agreement created a steering committee to control 
the litigation and provided for a formula for allocating the proceeds of the litigation amongst 
the plaintiffs.  Id. at 1048-49.  The court found a violation of the aggregate settlement rule, 
citing Hayes v. Eagle-Pitcher and disqualified the law firm.  Id. at 1050-51.  In Tax 
Authority v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 898 A.2d 512 (N.J. 2006), the court reached a similar 
conclusion when 154 franchisees sued their common franchisor through one lawyer.  The 
retainer provided for a majority vote as binding on all franchisees.  Id. at 515.  The court 
found that such provisions violated New Jersey’s Rule 1.8(g), which is pattered on Model 
Rule 1.8(g), but the court gave its decision prospective application only, thus saving the 
provision from invalidation.  Id. at 523.  The court treated the matter as one of first 
impression, as New Jersey had recently replaced its Model Code based rules within a Model 
Rules based regime.  Id.  Given that the court found no significant difference between the 
Model Code and Model Rule provisions, that position is interesting to say the least.  Perhaps 
the court was troubled by the difficulties rigid enforcement of Rule 1.8(g) would engender.  
The court did refer the matter to the Commission on Ethics Reform to examine the matter.  
Id. 
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behalf and commit the clients to a settlement.87  Such a conferral of actual 
authority would be contrary to the “approval” language of the first part of 
the opinion and the “knowledge of terms” language in the second part of 
the opinion.   
Decisions, such as Hayes v. Eagle-Picher, proceed from the flawed 
premises that clients are either less competent and less capable than 
principals in general or that a client cannot delegate authority ex ante 
unless the client is as fully informed of the benefits and costs of the 
decision as the client would be ex post.88  The first premise has no basis in 
fact; there is no reason to suppose that clients, as principals, are less in 
informed as to their own interests and how those interests may be achieved 
than principals in general.  The second premise is also flawed; uncertainty 
is a necessary element of most decision making.  Decision makers have to 
balance the cost of acquiring more information against the benefit of 
having that information.  Sometimes the information is not now available; 
yet, the benefits of action based on a present commitment may be 
compelling.  In such a situation, the decision to proceed, based on a 
commitment in the face of uncertainty, is reasonable. 
Using professional codes to disable clients from entering into 
agreements delegating authority to control counsel begs the question why a 
requirement ostensibly for the client's benefit, cannot be waived or 
modified by the client. The professional codes take an inconsistent 
approach on this point – some provisions limiting client options are 
                                                                                                                 
87. Hayes v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 513 F.2d 892, 894-895 (10th Cir. 1975). 
88. The professional codes do not prevent the client from conferring actual authority 
on the lawyer to settle the case on terms the lawyer deems advisable.  MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2  cmt. 3 (2007) (noting that “[a]t the outset of a representation, the 
client may authorize the lawyer to take specific action on the client’s behalf without further 
consultation.”).  See Eunice A. Eichelberger, Annotation, Authority of Attorney to 
Compromise Action – Modern Cases, 90 A.L.R. 4TH 326, § 8 (1991) (collecting cases 
holding that an attorney may be delegated actual authority ex ante to enter into agreement 
on the client’s behalf to settle the matter for the client).  This approach is countermanded by 
Rule 1.8(g) apparently out of concern that the lawyer may sacrifice the interests of some 
clients to advance the interests of others, although why a client could not provide ex ante an 
advance waiver of that right is not addressed in Rule 1.8(g).  By its terms, Rule 1.8(g) 
requires disclosures that are not amenable to advance waiver, but it is an open question 
whether the protection provided by Rule 1.8(g) could be waived by appropriate general 
disclosures as to what protections Rule 1.8(g) provides to individual clients.  The 
Restatement briefly addresses the issue.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS § 122 cmt. d (2000) (stating that advance waivers are subject to “special 
scrutiny”).  See infra note 89 (discussing advance waivers).  See infra Part IV. 
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waiveable, others are not.89  The professional codes have not developed a 
rationale that explains this inconsistency.90   
Is the right to instruct and control counsel so sacrosanct and so 
essential to the professional relationship that any effort by a non-entity 
client to divest himself of the right and delegate it to an interested party 
would be deemed socially and legally unacceptable per se?91  When an 
indemnitor (insurer) is sued directly, the indemnitee (policyholder) does 
not control the defense.92  Under a no reservation, policy limits defense, 
                                                                                                                 
89. A client can generally waive most protections provided to clients against lawyer 
breaches of the professional codes.  Zador Corp. v. Kwan, Cal. Rptr. 2d 754, 763 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1995) (approving the use of advance waivers of otherwise disqualifying conflicts so as 
to permit the lawyer to represent continuing client adverse to now former co-client).  See 
generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 122 (2000) (noting 
general ability of clients to waive disqualifying conflicts of interests otherwise preventing 
joint representation).  Consent may also be given to “future conflicts” although such consent 
is subject to “special scrutiny.”  Id. § 122 cmt. d.  Although the consent may not be open-
ended, but should be specific and tied to the matter in which the lawyer is representing the 
client providing the consent.  This requirement tracks existing law: some opinions permit 
open-ended waivers when the parties are “experienced users of legal services.”  E.g., ABA 
Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 436 (2005).  Some protections may 
not be waived.  See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h) (2007) (barring 
lawyer from making ex ante agreement with client limiting liability of lawyer for 
malpractice, unless the client is independently represented in making such a decision).  No 
American jurisdiction so permits, but such limitations are recognized in a few foreign 
jurisdictions.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 54 (2000) (stating 
that “[a]n agreement prospectively limiting a lawyer’s liability to a client for malpractice is 
unenforceable”).  Many American jurisdictions now permit lawyers to avoid vicarious 
liability for the malpractice of other members of a law firm by forming the firm as a 
professional corporation or limited liability partnership.  Annotation, Liability of 
Professional Corporation of Lawyers, or Individual Members Thereof, for Malpractice or 
Other Tort of Another Member, 39 A.L.R. 4TH 556 (1985). 
90. Richard W. Painter, Advance Waiver of Conflicts, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 289 
(2000) (discussing default and immutable rules of professional conduct).  Silver & Syverud, 
Insurance Defense Lawyers, supra note 30 (discussing mutable and immutable rules of 
professional conduct).  Professor Painter develops the theme that rules of professional 
conduct should be more contractual in structure and function.  Richard W. Painter, Rules 
Lawyers Play By, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 665 (2001). 
91. WOLFRAM, LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 2, at 148 (noting that the traditional bilateral 
model of the lawyer-client relationship is antiquated and unduly limiting); Leubsdorf, supra 
note 6 (noting disharmony between the traditional concept of the lawyer-client relationship 
as between individuals and the modern reality that legal relationships exist between and 
among groups of individuals). 
92. See Sherwood Brands v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 698 A.2d 1078, 1083 
(Md. 1997); cf. Canton Poultry & Deli Inc. v. Stockwell, Harris, Widom & Woolverton, 135 
Cal. Rptr.2d 695, 703 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that in workers compensation litigation 
once employer is dismissed from the litigation, employer has no reasonable basis for 
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the claim is effectively only against the insurer, as if the claim were 
brought as a direct action.93  Function should control form. A general 
prohibition against a lawyer accepting instructions from the insurer 
because of an abstract ideal of professional independence arising out of the 
fact that the indemnitee rather than indemnitor is the named defendant 
would inflict injury on the very persons that the ideal is supposed to 
protect because this course of action would prevent policyholders from 
reaching bargains that protect their economic interests at their least cost.94  
It would also interfere with the policyholder’s ability to exercise control 
over his affairs by depriving him of options that are preserved when 
insurer control is respected.95  Under the insurer-control model the 
policyholder has the choice of withholding tender and controlling the 
defense or making the tender in exchange for the benefits of insurance.96  
While the alternative (tender the claim yet retain control) appears 
superficially superior for the policyholder, that alternative raises problems 
that may diminish the value of the insurance contract to the policyholder.  
For example, if the policyholder controls the defense, the traditional basis 
for binding the insurer to the adjudication of the underlying claim and 
barring the insurer from raising coverage defenses is lost.97  Moreover, 
insurer control is economically efficient.98  Depriving the insurer of control 
                                                                                                                          
believing that it is a client of retained defense counsel; counsel owes sole duty to insurer 
absent developments in the case that require counsel to defend or protect the interests of the 
employer). 
93. See Robertson v. Chen, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 264, 267-68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).  See 
generally Douglas R. Richmond, Liability Insurers’ Right to Defend their Insureds, 35 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 115 (2001-2002).   
94. See generally William T. Barker, Insurance Defense Ethics and the Liability 
Insurance Bargain, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 75 (1997-1998) (discussing the bargaining aspects of 
the insurer/insured relationship).   
95. Id. 
96. Cf. Delmonte v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 975 P.2d 1159, 1173 (Haw. 1999) 
(noting that if the policyholder elects to reject a defense offered by the insurer, the 
policyholder would thereafter be  financially responsible for the costs of the defense).  In the 
spirit of full disclosure, it should be noted that the Delmonte court  takes positions contrary 
to those proposed in this paper in stating,  Aa contractual provision that conflicts with an 
attorney’s representation in accord with the Hawaii’s Rules of Professional Conduct . . . 
must yield to the requirement of professional ethics. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
97. See James M. Fischer, Insurer or Policyholder Control of the Defense and the 
Duty to Fund Settlements, 2 NEV. L.J. 1, 12  (2002). 
98. See 7C JOHN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE 4687 (rev. ed. 1979).  In 
situations where the claim is within policy limits, courts frequently state that only the 
insurer has a financial stake in the litigation.  See, e.g., Davenport v. St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 927, 931 (5th Cir. 1992) (“Adequate coverage for the potential liability 
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will likely raise the cost of policies or require the insurer to take counter 
action elsewhere, such as by limiting coverage or including the costs of 
defense in the policy limits. 
A blanket rule prohibiting delegation is also inconsistent with the rule 
permitting the lawyer and the client(s) to define the scope of the 
representation.99  Permitting the insurer to exercise exclusive control over 
the defense of the claim is a reasonable accommodation of the interests of 
both insurer and policyholder.  These interests include the duties and 
obligations that both assume under the standard liability insurance policy, 
the express tender by the policyholder of the defense of the claim to the 
insurer, and the fact that the claim will be resolved within policy limits.  In 
this respect the Restatement is enlightening in its discussion of some 
reasons why a client might legitimately wish to limit his representation, 
“[a] client might reasonably choose to forgo some of the protection against 
conflicts of interest, for example, in order to get the help of an especially 
able or inexpensive lawyer or a lawyer already familiar to the client.”100 
So how does counsel respond to the conflicting instructions from the 
insurer and the policyholder regarding litigation tactics?  Counsel should 
inform the policyholder that pursuant to the arrangement by which counsel 
was retained, counsel receives and follows reasonable instructions from the 
insurer regarding the defense of the claim.  Counsel can no more follow 
the policyholder-client’s instructions in this regard than counsel could 
obey a client’s instruction to disburse funds in the lawyer’s possession 
impressed with a litigation lien, which is to say that counsel cannot.101  
                                                                                                                          
being conceded, control by the carrier is virtually absolute, since the insured has no 
exposure whatever.”). This issue is discussed in connection with Hypothetical 2.  See infra  
Part IV. 
99. “Subject to other requirements stated in this restatement, a client and lawyer may 
agree to limit a duty that a lawyer would otherwise owe to the client if: (a) the client is 
adequately informed and consents; and (b) the terms of the limitation are reasonable in the 
circumstances.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 19 (2000).  See 
also MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (2007). 
100.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §19 cmt. (b) (2000). 
101.  See In the Matter of Respondent F, 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 17, 28 (1992) 
(“[A]n attorney must retain funds in trust when the attorney’s right to the funds is disputed 
by the client.  The funds are required to be kept in trust until the resolution of the dispute.  
The rule also applies to obligations to third parties.”); State v. Angelo, 667 A.2d 81, 83 
(Conn. Ct. App. 1995) (a defense attorney who disbursed funds to a client in disregard of a 
state-imposed lien was liable to the state for damages); Achrem v. Expressway Plaza Ltd. 
P’ship, 917 P.2d 447, 450 (Nev. 1996) (holding that when a client assigns rights to the 
proceeds of litigation to a creditor the client’s attorney is not obligated to pay the proceeds 
to his client); Selective Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ronzo, 605 A.2d 705, 707 (N.J. Super.Ct. App. 
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That does not mean that the policyholder is an inconvenient but necessary 
appendage to the litigation, a “potted plant” to borrow a phase.102  Counsel 
must, however, resolve the issue of control consistent with the client's 
reasonable expectations of the scope of the representation, and, on that 
point, the policyholder-client cannot reasonably expect that he may control 
a defense that he has tendered away to the insurer.103 
What happens, however, if the issue involves a matter that has 
traditionally been deemed an “end” of the representation rather than a 
“means,” for example, the right to settle?  Does this factor tip the balance 
in favor of ceding to the policyholder/client the right to control the 
defense?  In addition, the discussion of control over litigation strategy 
elides the issue of whether the insurer and the policyholder are both clients 
of retained defense counsel, or whether the policyholder was the sole 
client.  Is that distinction meaningful in this context?  These questions are 
addressed in the next hypothetical. 
 
IV WHO CONTROLS DEFENSE COUNSEL REGARDING 
SETTLEMENTS 
 
Policyholder is sued for covered personal injuries. Insurer has 
unconditionally accepted the tender of the claim and has 
appointed Lawyer as retained defense counsel.  Insurer is willing 
to settle the matter for $25,000, a sum within policy limits.  
                                                                                                                          
Div. 1992) (holding that lienholder could recover against attorney who disbursed funds in 
derogation of lien securing workers’ compensation benefits paid to attorney’s client); Leon 
v. Martinez, 638 N.E.2d 511, 514 (N.Y. 1994) (holding that when attorneys have notice of 
an assignment of a portion of their client’s recovery, the attorney may be liable to the 
assignee if he disburses funds in derogation of the assignment). 
102.  The now famous comment was made by Mr. Brendan Sullivan, Jr., counsel for 
Lt. Col. Oliver North during the Iran-Contra investigation.  Iran-Contra Investigation: Joint 
Hearings Before the S. Select Comm. on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the 
Nicaraguan Opposition and the H. Select Comm. to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions 
with Iran, 100TH CONG. 263, (1988) (testimony of Lt. Col. Oliver North).  The term has 
found its way into the popular language and now refers to an individual’s refusal to be seen 
or perceived as an uninvolved spectator.  See, e.g., United States v. Batka, 724 F. Supp. 350, 
352 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (“[A] federal judge is not required merely to grace the proceedings with 
his presence as would the proverbial potted palm tree). 
103.  See Hurvitz v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 713 (Cal.  
Ct. App. 2003) (plaintiff physician did not have a cause of action against the defendant 
insurance company for settling against his wishes because he had tendered his defense; had 
he wished to retain the right of consent he could have paid for a policy that allowed for 
insured consent).   
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Policyholder opposes the settlement. The insurance policy 
contains standard conditions requiring the policyholder to assist 
and cooperate in  the defense of the claim.  Insurer instructs 
Lawyer to settle the case.  What should Lawyer do?  
 
The insurer, having assumed the defense of its policyholder, has a duty 
to settle the claim104 and a concomitant right to settle even over the 
policyholder's objections,105 although there is some authority that the 
insurer's right to settle over the policyholder's objections must be exercised 
in good faith,106 and not prejudice the policyholder’s rights.107  Let us 
                                                                                                                 
104. Bailey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 844 P.2d 1336, 1339 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) 
(reasoning that due to the contractual nature of the insurer/insured relationship, the insurer 
owes the insured a duty of good faith in the performance of the contract); Short v. Dairyland 
Ins. Co., 334 N.W.2d 384, 388 (Minn. 1983) (“The insurer’s duty of good faith is breached 
in situations in which the insured is clearly liable and the insurer refuses to settle within the 
policy limits…”).   
105. Mitchum v. Hudgens, 533 So.2d 194, 201-02 (Ala. 1988) (holding that retained 
defense counsel had authority to settle medical malpractice claim for sum within policy 
limits notwithstanding physician-policyholder’s objections); Harbor Ins. Co. v. City of 
Ontario, 282 Cal. Rptr. 701 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (reaching the same result regarding a self-
insured retention); Shuster v. S. Broward Hosp. Dist. Physicians’ Prof’l Liab. Ins. Trust, 591 
So.2d 174, 178 (Fla. 1992) (holding that, absent exigent circumstances, when the insurance 
contract provides that the insurer may settle the claim as it deems expedient, no bad faith 
action may be maintained against the insurer for a within policy limits settlement); Am. 
Home Assurance Co., Inc., v. Hermann’s Warehouse Corp., 563 A.2d 444, 446, 448 (N.J. 
1989) (holding that an insurer which settled a third party claim against the policyholder for 
an amount within policy limits could recover the deductible from the policyholder even 
though the policyholder did not approve the settlement).  A few courts have limited the 
insurer’s right to settle over the objections of the policyholder, but these are a distinct 
minority.  Rogers v. Robson, 392 N.E.2d 1365, 1372 (Ill. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that 
retained defense counsel breached duty to policyholder by continuing with representation 
without informing policyholder of imminent settlement knowing that policyholder objected 
to settlement), aff’d, 407 N.E.2d 47 (Ill. 1980); Saucedo v. Winger, 915 P.2d 129, 132-36 
(Kan. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that unless the policy expressly gives the insurer the right to 
settle without the policyholder’s consent, the insurer must secure the policyholder’s consent 
to a within limits settlement).  Saucedo involved a medical malpractice liability policy and 
the court noted that the policy did prohibit the policyholder from settling without the 
insurer’s consent unless the policyholder assumed all responsibility for the settlement.  Id. at 
132-33.  Cf. Miller v. Byrne, 916 P.2d 566, 574 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that the 
policyholder must be notified of any pending settlement so that the policyholder can take 
appropriate action to protect her interests).  
106. See Gardner v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 841 F.2d 82, 86 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding 
that the insurer did not act in bad faith in settling case).  See generally BARRY R. OSTRAGER 
& THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES § 12.05(a) (8th ed. 
1996) (noting that jurisdictions have split as to whether language in standard liability 
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assume that the insurer's settlement decision is based on a reasonable 
assessment of the merits of the claim.  Let us also assume that the insurance 
policy does not give the policyholder the right to preclude a settlement by 
withholding consent.108 
On these facts and with the accompanying assumptions, the insurer can 
lawfully go through with the settlement; however, the fact that the insurer 
has the legal right to close the claim by a settlement over the policyholder's 
objections does not necessarily mean that retained defense counsel may 
assist and facilitate the settlement.109  Notwithstanding this absence of a 
                                                                                                                          
insurance policies, which authorizes the insurer to effect settlement as it “deems expedient,” 
insulates the insurer from bad faith actions whenever the insurer settles the claim ultimately 
within policy limits).     
107.  For example, an insurer that settles a claim and causes its policyholder lose a 
valid counterclaim may have acted in bad faith.  Barney v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 230 Cal. 
Rptr. 215, 221 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).  Similarly, an insurer’s broad discretion over settlement 
may be circumscribed when the policy contains a retrospective premium feature, which 
allows the insurer to adjust the premium retroactively based on claim experience.  Sec. 
Officers Serv., Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 653, 658 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1993).  There is a fine line between the retrospective premium cases and the deductible 
reimbursement cases; in both situations the insurer is settling with the policyholder’s 
money.  Nonetheless, the decisions reach opposite conclusions.  Perhaps the broadest 
constraint on the insurer’s ability to consummate a within limits settlement was adopted by 
the district court in Caplan v. Fellheimer, 886 F. Supp. 498 (E.D. Pa. 1995), rev’d, 68 F.3d 
828 (3d Cir. 1995).  In that case the district court held that a settlement that would legally 
prevent a subsequent claim by the policyholder for malicious prosecution, apparently 
because the “successful termination” element of the cause of cause of action would be 
missing, could be enjoined by the objecting policyholder.  Id. at 501-02.  The court did not 
address how meritorious, if at all, the malicious prosecution action would need to be, 
although some likelihood of success would be required to the extent the success of the claim 
for injunctive relief was dependent on a showing of “probability of success on the merits,” a 
standard part of the equitable remedy in most jurisdictions.  Id. at 501-02.  The Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds that federal courts should not involve themselves 
directly in reviewing settlement of private litigation and the “deems expedient” language of 
the insurance contract gave the insurer the ability to conclude a within policy limits 
settlement without obtaining the approval of the policyholder.  68 F.3d at 836-37.   
108. Such provisions are usually limited to professional malpractice insurance 
contexts where policyholders have demonstrated a concern that settlement will damage the 
policyholder's professional reputation or trigger licensure action by a disciplinary board.  
Some of the decisions that have subjected insurers to bad faith actions for within policy 
limits settlements have involved professionals.  See Schuster v. S. Broward Hosp. Dist. 
Physicians’ Prof’l Liab. Ins. Trust, 591 So.2d 174, 177-78 (Fla. 1992); cf. Saucedo v. 
Winger, M.D., 915 P.2d 129, 133 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996).   See supra note 105 for more 
discussion of Saucedo. 
109. See Rogers, 392 N.E.2d at 1372 (holding that retained counsel defense counsel 
breached duty to policyholder by continuing with representation without informing 
policyholder of imminent settlement knowing that policyholder objected to settlement). That 
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policyholder right to complain under the insurance contract, the 
professional bar contends that retained defense counsel is precluded from 
implementing a settlement within policy limits if the policyholder 
objects.110 
That poses the control question here: in implementing a within policy 
limits settlement who controls retained defense counsel – the insurer or the 
policyholder?  We should not lose sight of the basic problem.  If the insurer 
can instruct defense counsel to implement settlement, even over the 
policyholder’s objections, the insurer’s ability to settle is eased.  The 
situation is otherwise if the policyholder may prevent defense counsel from 
                                                                                                                          
viewpoint has been generally rejected.  See Silver & Syverud, Insurance Defense Lawyers, 
supra note 30, at 296-301. 
110. See ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, FORMAL OP 403 
(holding that policyholder retains the right to renege on the tender of the defense provided 
by the insurer; therefore if a dispute arises as to the desirability of a settlement, the 
policyholder may terminate the triangular relationship, thus precluding counsel from 
participating in the settlement on the insurer’s behalf); but cf. Villa v. Cole, 6 Cal. Rptr.2d 
644, 649-50 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that in situation where a party was provided a 
defense by another party, the represented party could not disavow a settlement partially to 
the extent he perceived it to be in his interest to do so): 
 
Here, Villa accepted all the benefits of the City’s 
representation of him, and of the settlement that terminated 
the lawsuit against him.    He did not express any objection 
to the fact that the City had assumed all the costs of his 
defense; he did not offer to reimburse the City for his pro 
rata share of litigation expenses; and he never offered to 
hold the City harmless for the costs he would incur in 
continuing to defend the lawsuit on his own.  In short, 
while accepting the benefits of his dismissal, Villa did 
nothing to set aside or repudiate the settlement of which 
that dismissal was a part.  On this basis, the City clearly 
could not assume that Villa would forego later claiming the 
right to reimbursement and indemnification from the City 
for any attorney fees, litigation costs, or damage he 
incurred in further defense of Seeterlin’s action.  In order to 
protect itself against further litigation, the City was entitled 
to provide for Villa’s representation and also to require his 
dismissal as part of the overall settlement.  Villa may not 
now disavow that settlement, having effectively ratified it 
by accepting its benefits. 
 
 Id.  Having accepted the benefits of a defense, is it reasonable to permit the 
policyholder to now disavow the defense because it is in his interest (but not his right) to do 
so? 
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assisting the insurer.  The insurer will have to independently deal with the 
plaintiff/client and her lawyer.  This will increase costs and present 
opportunities for confusion.   
An aspect of the duty of loyalty is the obligation to follow the client's 
lawful instructions and help the client achieve the ends of the 
representation as defined by the client.111  Counsel should advise the client 
of the consequences of implementing the client's choices,112 but, as 
discussed previously, in connection with Hypothetical 1, under the 
professional codes the choice of ends belongs to the client.113  Indeed, the 
failure to follow a client's lawful instructions can be grounds for 
professional discipline and malpractice even though the lawyer's decision 
to disregard the client's instructions was not unreasonable.114 
To the extent that the choice of ends belongs to the policyholder-client, 
it would not be proper for counsel to take the policyholder out of the loop 
by failing to inform the policyholder of the insurer's decision to settle and 
thereby avoid receiving an instruction not to settle from the policyholder.  
It is the duty of counsel to keep the client reasonably informed about 
significant developments affecting the representation.115  Settlement falls 
within this category,116 and this would be particularly true if a client has 
                                                                                                                 
111. See supra note 2. 
112. Doe v. Hughes, Thorsness, Gantz, Powell & Brundin, 838 P.2d 804, 807 
(Alaska 1992); Nichols v. Keller, 19 Cal. Rptr.2d 601, 608 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993): 
 
One of any attorney’s basic function is to advise … 
Not only should an attorney furnish advice when requested, 
but he or she should also volunteer opinions when 
necessary to further the client’s objectives …[E]ven when a 
retention is expressly limited, the attorney may still have a 
duty to alert the client to legal problems which are 
reasonably apparent, even though they fall outside the 
scope of the retention.  
 
113. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text. 
114. See Olfe v. Gordon, 286 N.W.2d 573, 577 (Wis. 1980) (stating that a lawyer 
may be liable for losses resulting from the lawyer’s failure to follow “with reasonable 
promptness and care” the explicit instructions of the client; the fact that the lawyer honestly 
believes deviation from the client’s instruction is in the client’s best interests is no defense).  
See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 21 cmt. D (2000). 
115. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2007) (“A lawyer shall act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client”); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 20 (2000); ANNOTATED RULES, supra note 58, at 49-52. 
116. See Miller v. Sloan, 978 P.2d 922, 931 (Kan. 1999) (holding that defense 
counsel breached their fiduciary duty owed to the policyholder-client when they failed to 
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made known his position on a matter and the development is directly 
contrary to the client's position.117  Efforts by counsel to burden a client's 
free decision making in this area have been consistently struck down.118  A 
corollary of this rule holds that counsel must seasonably inform the client 
of all settlement offers in order that the client may exercise his authority 
over the matter.119  Thus, under the professional codes deliberately 
bypassing the policyholder in order to facilitate the insurer's instructions to 
settle, even though the insurer's instructions are lawful, appears, on the 
surface, to put counsel in the untenable position of disregarding the 
policyholder's rights as a client regarding settlement. 
When defense counsel informs the policyholder/client of the settlement 
or prospect of settlement, how should counsel respond to an instruction 
from the policyholder/client (such as: don’t settle) that is inconsistent with 
instructions received by the insurer (settle)?  The focus in the decided cases 
has been on the rights and duties of defense counsel vis à vis her 
                                                                                                                          
inform the client of a settlement hearing); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2007) 
(“A lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a 
matter); ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 34 (2007) (noting that lawyers 
have no inherent authority to settle a client’s claim.”). 
117. Hobart v. Decker (In re Estate of Falco), 233 Cal. Rptr. 807, 815 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1987) (stating that the client’s right to reject a settlement is absolute and unqualified); see 
generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 22, cmt. c (2000) 
(stating that authority to settle belongs to client, client may delegate authority to lawyer but 
delegation is revocable).  But cf. Ramirez v. Sturdevant, 26 Cal. Rptr.2d 554, 561 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1994) (holding that it was not unfair or unconscionable for a lawyer to condition his 
willingness to represent a client on the client’s agreement to accept a “minimum settlement 
amount”).  In Ramirez the court found that the minimum amount was a reasonable if not 
generous valuation of the client’s claim.  Id at 561.  More importantly, the dispute centered 
not over the enforceability of the settlement, because the client did agree to the settlement, 
but was centered on counsel’s right to fees and the related issue whether counsel’s conduct 
disqualified him from receiving a fee or operated to reduce the fee he would take under the 
retainer agreement. Id. 
118. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 22 cmt. c (2000) 
(noting that an irrevocable delegation of settlement authority to the lawyer is illegal as is an 
agreement that both the client and the lawyer must approve any settlement); but cf. Ramirez, 
26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 561; Robertson v. Chen, 52 Cal. Rptr.2d 264, 267 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) 
(holding that written consent of policyholder was not required by “open court” statute when 
defense counsel, with authority from insurer, agreed to within limits settlement).  An “open 
court” statute requires that settlements be signed by the party or made before the court if the 
settlement is to be summarily enforced.  See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 664.6 (West 1996 
Supp.); see generally James M. Fischer, Enforcement of Settlements: A Survey, 27 TORT & 
INS. L.J. 82, 88-89 (1991) (discussing “open court” requirements). 
119. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §20(3) (2000) 
(stating that A “lawyer must notify a client of decisions to be made by the client….”). 
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relationship with the policyholder and the insurer. The assumption appears 
to be that counsel should handle that situation the same as any situation 
when a lawyer, having entered into a concurrent or simultaneous joint 
“client” representation, receives conflicting instructions from each 
principal.120  The “client” may be an actual client or a “client equivalent,” 
which is a non client who is owed some or all of the duties that a lawyer 
would owe an actual client.121   
There is a tendency here to attempt to resolve the issue by focusing on 
whether counsel has one client or two client, and, if the latter, whether, as 
between the two clients, one client should be preferred over the other as a 
matter of law.  To determine counsel’s professional obligations we must 
look at the entire relationship between the parties and not just focus 
exclusively on the lawyer-client relationship.  Trying to resolve the 
problem solely from the “who is the client” perspective introduces 
tremendous artificiality into the triangular relationship.  Do policyholders 
really know or care whether retained defense counsel’s relationship with 
the insurer is that of “client” or “third party payer?”  The reality of the 
relationship turns on who selects and instructs counsel, a point repeatedly 
driven home in the conflict of interest cases.  Under either a “client” or 
“third party payer” approach the insurer selects and instructs counsel and 
will continue to select and instruct counsel absent a fundamental reworking 
of the triangular relationship.122  Having this power, having an immediate 
                                                                                                                 
120. In most cases courts take the position that the presence of conflicting 
instructions from co-clients or client equivalents reflects an actual conflict which counsel 
must address under the professional codes. See Susan Randall, Managed Litigation and the 
Professional Obligations of Insurance Defense Lawyers, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 3-4 
(2001). In some cases the potential for conflicting obligations induces courts to find no 
lawyer-client relationship with one of the parties.  Cf. Goodman v. Kennedy, 556 P.2d 737, 
743 (Cal. 1976) (finding no duty to advise buyer when recognition of such a duty would 
conflict with Lawyer’s duty to client-seller). 
121. ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.18 (2007) (discussing 
“duties” owed to prospective clients who consult an attorney regarding representation, but 
no retention results).  
122. The furthest any court has gone in challenging the basic assumption that, absent 
a conflict of interest, the insurer may select defense counsel and control the defense, is to 
impose some limits when the insurer uses in-house staff counsel.  Even here, only two 
jurisdictions have prohibited the insurer from using staff counsel to represent the 
policyholder.  See Am. Ins. Assoc. v. Ky. Bar Assoc., 917 S.W.2d 568 (Ky. 1996).  There 
are a few ethics opinions proscribing the use of in-house staff counsel.  Ohio Supreme Court 
Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 94-9 (1994), reported in 10 ABA/BNA 
LAWYER’S MANUAL ON PROF’L CONDUCT 291 (1994-1995).  Several articles have addressed 
the issue of using staff counsel to represent policyholders in third party actions.  See Robert 
J. Johnson, In-House Counsel Employed by Insurance Companies: A Difficult Dilemma 
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financial stake in the matter, and having a relationship with defense counsel 
that transcends the individual case, the insurer is a “client-equivalent” if it 
is not a client.  The lawyer will necessarily, and rightly, be concerned with 
the insurer’s interests, as the lawyer is necessarily and rightly concerned 
with the policyholder’s interests.  The critical question is not “who is the 
client” but what rights (and duties) attend to the insurer’s right under the 
insurance contract to select counsel and control the defense through the 
instruction and direction of counsel.   
Silver and Syverud argue that in the context of "within limits" 
settlements "defense counsel has no duty to advise or act for the 
[policyholder] on settlement, period."123 I agree, but for a different reason 
than offered by Silver and Syverud.  They based their position on the claim 
that retained defense counsel enjoys a scope-limited relationship with the 
policyholder-client.  Settlement responsibility is not part of the 
representation: 
 
Counsel must inform the insured of developments relating to 
settlement, including settlement demands received from other 
parties, because the insured is entitled to that information.  
Counsel also must tell the insured about the scope restriction and 
explain that the insured may need to hire separate counsel to 
handle settlement issues.  But, in our judgment, counsel need not 
and should not otherwise advise the insured.  When responsibility 
for settlement is excluded from the scope of the relationship with 
the insured, it is not defense counsel’s job to tell the insured how 
the insured may be affected by settlement developments or by 
settlement on particular terms.124 
 
This approach likely complies with scope-limited representation 
recognized by the ABA Model Rules as long as it is explained to the client 
and the client gives informed consent.125  Counsel must also not forget that 
                                                                                                                          
Confronting the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 945 (1996); 
Leo J. Jordan & Hilde E. Kahn, Ethical Issues Relating to Staff Counsel Representation of 
Insureds, 30 TORT & INS. L.J. 25 (1994); Ronald E. Mallen, Defense by Salaried Counsel: A 
Bane or a Blessing?, 61 DEF. COUNS. J. 518 (1994); Douglas R. Richmond, Lost in the 
Eternal Triangle of Insurance Defense Ethics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 475 (1996). 
123. Silver & Syverud, Insurance Defence Lawyers, supra note 30, at 299. 
124. Id. (citations omitted). 
125. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (2007) (permitting “reasonable” 
limitation). 
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the scope-limited representation may still require him to advise the client 
of the ramifications of retention-related activities even if those activities 
are outside the scope of the retention.126 
I prefer to base the role of the retained defense counsel regarding 
settlement on the policyholder's economic indifference to the within limits 
settlement. Only the insurer has money on the table, so only the insurer 
should be playing.127  Implicit in Silver and Syverud's position is the idea 
that the policyholder's residual interests in the matter(such as reputation, 
preexisting relationships with the claimant effect of settlement on future 
insurability and premiums, etc.) are too attenuated to warrant legal 
protection.128  If the policyholder believed otherwise, he could bargain for a 
“consent-to-settle” clause or self insure.129  “Consent-to-settle” provisions 
are not commonplace in liability policies; they either increase the cost of 
insurance or decrease the value of the policy purchased.  Consent-to-settle 
provisions commonly contain risk shifting language so that the cost of an 
erroneous decision not to settle is borne by the policyholder who withheld 
consent.130  Such a risk allocation strategy is not a viable alternative for 
consumer-oriented, insurance purchase decisions.  When a policyholder 
decides to purchase traditional insurance without a consent-to-settle 
provision and decides to tender a claim to the insurer for a defense, the 
essence of the Silver-Syverud position is that, as to within limits 
                                                                                                                 
126. Nichols v. Keller, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 601, 608 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that 
the basic responsibility of an attorney is to advise their client, the attorney may limit the 
scope of representation, but no the scope of the duty to advise). 
127. See supra note 92, discussing Canton Poultry & Deli, Inc., 135 Cal. Rptr.2d at 
703 (holding that retained defense counsel could negotiate global settlement of claims for 
which only worker’s compensation insurer would be responsible; in doing so counsel 
breached no duties owed to policyholder-employer). 
128. See  Fiege v. Cooke, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 496, 499(Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (holding 
that settlement was binding even through the defendant (policyholder) did not give assent; it 
was sufficient that the retained defense counsel and the insurance adjuster consented to the 
settlement); Orion Ins. Co. v. General Electric Co., 493 N.Y.S.2d 397, 401, 403 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1985), aff’d 509 N.Y.S.2d 778 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (holding that the insurer retained 
the right to settle the action in which its policyholders were represented by independent 
counsel selected and controlled by the policyholders pursuant to the terms of the insurance 
contract). See supra notes 33-34, 52, 81 and accompanying text. 
129. See supra note 52, 108. 
130. See Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1172-78 (1990) 
(discussing the use of “consent-to-settle” clauses to protect professional reputation). 
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settlements, the policyholder has ceded all its legally recognizable rights to 
the insurer.131 
Silver and Syverud capture the economic realities of the insurance 
contract in their approach to within limits settlements.  They also capture 
the realities of the lawyer-client relationship and the lawyer's professional 
duties attendant to that relationship because that professional relationship is 
created as a result of and flows from the insurance contract; it does not 
exist independent of the insurance contract.  The analysis here is therefore 
similar to that taken with respect to the first hypothetical and, as was the 
case earlier, the proper construction of the client-lawyer relationship is 
influenced by the underlying insurance contract from which the client-
lawyer relationship evolves.132  This conclusion should apply under either 
the two-client or one-client model that is recognized in the context of the 
triangular relationship.133 
 
A. INSURER AS CO-CLIENT 
 
For a joint client representation, the standard position is that counsel 
must give each client the quality and kind of representation each would 
                                                                                                                 
131. Silver & Syverud, Insurance Defense Lawyers, supra note 30 (does not 
specifically address the issue of insurer authority to settle when to do so would cause the 
policyholder to lose a valid counterclaim or when the insurer could recover settlement costs 
through retrospective premium rating).  
132. This point has received some judicial acceptance.   The Alabama Supreme 
Court has stated: 
 
[W]e believe that the insurance contract does affect 
the attorney-client relationship with respect to settlement of 
an action brought against an insured.  If the insured has 
contracted away the right to require his consent prior to a 
settlement of a claim against him, no real conflict of 
interest exists between the insured and the insurer, at least 
where the claim or settlement is within policy limits and 
there has been no reservation of rights by the insurer. 
 
 Mitchum v. Hudgens, 533 So.2d 194, 201 (Ala. 1988) (rejecting contrary position 
taken in Rogers v. Robson, 392 N.E.2d 1365 (1979)).  However, a subsequent Alabama 
decision held, however, that if the policyholder has a direct stake in the settlement because 
of a deductible reimbursement requirement, the policyholder’s consent must be obtained.  
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Edge Memorial Hosp., 584 So.2d 1316, 1326-27 (Ala. 
1991). 
133. See 4 Ronald Mallen & Jeffrey Smith, Legal Malpractice §29:7, at 176 (2006) 
(discussing application of Rule 1.8(f) and one-client/two-client models). 
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receive if that person was counsel's sole client.134   This is, however, on 
reflection too simplistic; the very essence of a situation presenting a 
conflict of positions is the presence of conflicting interests as to specific 
matters.  No lawyer in the context of the joint representation can provide 
the exact same representation that would be provided in the single client 
representation.  Joint representation necessarily implies that to some extent 
the lawyer may (re)solve client differences in a fashion that help one client 
yet disadvantage the other client as to that particular application.  The 
reason for this is the clients’ belief that the overall benefits derived from 
the joint representation will outweigh localized disadvantages resulting 
from the lawyer’s effort to maximize joint gains for the jointly represented 
clients.  The question is whether, and to what extent, the clients may agree 
to enter into a relationship that envisions that their shared attorney may, for 
their joint aggregate benefit, act pursuant to the instruction of one of the 
clients alone even though, on occasion, that specific action that is not in the 
immediate, short term interests of one of the clients, as the client now 
defines his interests.  Again, in keeping with the specifications of the 
discussion, we assume that the instruction given is consistent with the 
rights established by the underlying document that controls the relationship 
between the clients, the insurance contract.  That condition is met here 
since the insurance contract vests settlement authority in the insurer 
exclusively and bars the policyholder from undermining the insurer’s right 
to settle if the insurer deems a within limits settlement appropriate. 
In the joint client context the clients should be permitted to agree 
between themselves as to how counsel shall be instructed.  The proposal 
offered by Silver and Syverud implicitly adopts this approach by treating 
the insurance contract and the retainer agreements as authority allocating 
documents.  Under the approach suggested in response to hypothetical 
number 1, in the normal case the allocation of authority to the insurer 
would legitimate the insurer's instruction to counsel to settle the claim 
within policy limits.  The standard objection to this approach is as follows: 
even if the parties make provisions in their agreements allocating authority, 
between themselves, the provisions in the retainer may not be irrevocable 
as between attorney and client.135  In other words the insurance contract 
                                                                                                                 
134. Ishmael v. Millington, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592, 596 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (stating 
that the loyalty owed one client cannot consume that owed another); MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 31 (2007) (stating that “the lawyer has an equal duty of loyalty 
to each   client….”).  
135. Courts frequently state that the lawyer-client relationship does not create a 
general implied authority for the lawyer to settle the client’s claim, and that there is no 
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cannot control the retainer.  If counsel must respect a client's decision to 
revoke a prior consent, we are back to our starting position; the insurer may 
act, but counsel must sit on the sidelines.136 
                                                                                                                          
prohibition against a competent client vesting the lawyer with actual authority to settle.  
Michaud v. Michaud, 932 F.2d 77, 80 (1st Cir. 1991); Garabedian v. Allstates Eng’g Co., 
811 F.2d 802, 803 (3d Cir. 1987); McEnany v. West De. County Com. Sch. Dist., 844 F. 
Supp. 523, 529 (N.D. Iowa 1994).  Similarly, the policyholder may authorize the insurer to 
settle on its behalf.  The Restatement addresses the issue: 
  
A client may authorize a lawyer to negotiate a 
settlement that is subject to the client’s approval or to settle 
a matter on terms indicated by the client.  In class actions, 
special rules apply; a court, after notice and hearing, may 
approve a settlement negotiated by the lawyer for the class 
without the approval of named representatives or members 
of the class.  The Section allows a client to confer 
settlement authority on a lawyer, provided that the 
authorization is revocable before a settlement is reached.  A 
client authorization must be expressed by the client or 
fairly implied from the dealings of the lawyer and client.  
Thus, a client may authorize a lawyer to enter a settlement 
within a given range.  A client is bound by a settlement 
reached by such a lawyer before revocation. 
 
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 22 cmt. c (2000).  
Similarly, the policyholder may authorize the insurer to settle on its behalf.   The 
policyholder authorizes settlement by the terms of the standard liability insurance contract 
and the tender.  Cf. Ramirez v. Sturdevant, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 554, 561-62 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1994) (holding that client’s agreement in retaining authorizing lawyer to accept specified 
“minimum” settlement amount was neither unfair nor unconscionable when amount 
reflected reasonable assessment of the value of the claim).  A “within limits” settlement as 
contemplated by the parties to the insurance contract is functionally equivalent to the 
“minimum settlement amount” discussed in Ramirez.  In both situations the 
client/policyholder has agreed to a specific position. 
136. Outside the “conflict of interest” context, the general approach of courts is to 
permit the insurer unilateral authority to execute “within limits” settlements, see supra note 
105 and accompanying text, and even recover the cost of the settlement if it turns out no 
indemnity was owed under the insurance contract if the policyholder has been given 
appropriate notice and has objected to the settlement.  See Md. Cas. Co. v. Imperial 
Contracting Co., Inc., 260 Cal. Rptr. 797, 803 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that an insurer 
who defended under reservation of rights could recover amount of settlement from 
policyholder when it was subsequently determined that claim was not covered).  Given the 
insurer’s preemptive authority in the matter of concluding settlements, it is difficult to 
reconcile any suggestions that retained defense counsel should adopt a “hands off” approach 
towards settlements because of policyholder objections communicated to defense counsel. 
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The usual judicial approach to the dilemma is to accept the “standard 
position”, and find that counsel’s professional duties trump the clients’ 
duties and obligations under the insurance contract, insofar as counsel’s 
representation is concerned.  Faced with conflicting instructions from the 
policyholder and the insurer, the fair inference from the decided “conflict 
of interest” cases is that counsel should inform the insurer that its 
instructions cannot be carried out by counsel.  Because disclosure of the 
reasons for counsel’s non-assistance would possibly prejudice the 
policyholder by disclosing a possible breach of the policyholder’s duty to 
cooperate and assist, counsel may not be able to disclose the reasons for 
non-assistance to the insurer,137 absent policyholder authorization.138  
Although the case law and ethics opinions state that when defense 
counsel receives conflicting instructions she should withdraw, there is little 
case law actually applying that thinking to the problem presented by 
Hypothetical 2.  That is not really surprising because requiring defense 
counsel to withdraw and permitting the policyholder to complicate 
reasonable settlements is a singularly bad idea when the policyholder has 
previously surrendered his right to control the defense to the insurer.  
Courts quite reasonably resist taking the withdrawal principle to its natural 
and logical conclusion because the end product is socially wasteful and 
inconsistent with the expectations of the parties to the insurance contract.  
This reluctance should encourage us to reexamine the validity of the 
arguments that underlie the withdrawal requirement when defense counsel 
receives conflicting instructions.  Rather than emphasizing the status of the 
parties to the insurance contract as clients or non-clients, as the traditional 
approach does, I propose that we emphasize the parties’ reasonable 
expectations of defense counsel’s role as developed from the insurance 
contract, as common sense and good judgment would direct us.  This 
approach will, I believe, lead to views of the triangular relationship that 
further, rather than frustrate, the goals of the insurance contract. 
                                                                                                                 
137. Cf. Parsons v. Cont’l Nat’l Am. Group, 550 P.2d 94, 99 (Ariz. 1976) (defense 
counsel should not have disclosed policyholder-client confidential information to the 
insurer; insurer was estopped from basing coverage denial on information counsel 
improperly conveyed); Employers Cas. Co. v. Tilley, 496 S.W.2d 552, 560-61 (Tex. 1973) 
(same). 
138. Cf. ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 
Formal Op. 08-450 (2008) (opining that retained defense counsel may not disclose client 
confidential information of policyholder to insurer absent policyholder consent; if failure to 
disclose would involve counsel in the commission of a fraud against the insurer, counsel 
must withdraw from the representation). 
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The critical issue is whether providing a policyholder with a lawyer 
who owes certain responsibilities to a co-client, the insurer, would be, in 
the context of the hypothetical, injurious to the policyholder, the public, or 
the profession.  If retained defense counsel were permitted to ignore the 
policyholder’s instruction not to settle, and implement the insurer-client’s 
instruction to effect the within policy limits settlement, would the interests 
of either the policyholder or the legal profession be damaged such that we 
should reject empowering counsel to so act?  In resolving this question we 
must remember that the insurer still retains, in most jurisdictions, the power 
to settle the claim over the policyholder’s objections.139   The inability to 
control the defense by instructing counsel to effect the settlement may, 
however, complicate the implementation of the settlement since it will be 
necessary to file the dismissals and take other action in the litigation related 
to the claim, which will conclude the litigation and the insurer cannot do 
this unilaterally.140  Nonetheless, unless the policyholder takes control of 
the defense away from the insurer, the policyholder’s recalcitrance 
regarding settlement will, in all likelihood, simply prolong the settlement 
process, rather that prevent settlement realization and conclusion of the 
litigation. 
Moreover, as discussed in connection with Hypothetical 1, there is no 
overriding reason why the policyholder’s delegation of control of the 
defense to the insurer pursuant to the tender should not influence the 
allocation of power as between the policyholder and the insurer insofar as 
the lawyer is concerned.  Pursuant to the tender, the policyholder has 
requested a defense of the claim by the insurer.  It hardly now lies for the 
policyholder to contend that he should be permitted to assume a position 
that he earlier relinquished, particularly given the insurer’s reliance on the 
                                                                                                                 
139. See New Plumbing Contractors, Inc. v. Edwards, Sooy & Byron, 121 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 472, 474 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (barring claim of malpractice against retained defense 
counsel for failing to notify the policyholder-client of settlement negotiations and failing to 
interpose defenses to claim; insurer properly exercised its right under the policy to settle the 
claim; therefore, policyholder-client sustained no damages); cf. Purdy v. Pac. Auto. Ins. Co., 
203 Cal. Rptr. 524, 535 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that legal malpractice claim for 
excess policy limits judgment could not be stated because the cause of the loss was the 
insurer’s independent decision not to settle). 
140. If the policyholder wishes to assert control of the defense, it must be for the 
policyholder’s account, not the insurer’s.  See Rogers v. Robson, 392 N.E.2d 1365, 1372 
(Ill. Ct. App. 1979) (noting that if the policyholder objects to a settlement negotiated by the 
insurer, the policyholder may “release the insurance company from its objection under the 
policy, select different counsel, defend the action at his own expense and bear the risk of an 
adverse decision.”), aff’d on other grounds, 407 N.E.2d 47 (Ill. 1980). 
2008] ALLOCATION OF POWER 69 
 
tender in assuming the cost of the defense.  The policyholder should not be 
allowed to manipulate the situation to her advantage any more than the 
insurer should be allowed to manipulate its right to control the defense to 
its sole advantage in a manner not expressly allowed by the contract.141  
A number of courts have recognized that powers normally possessed 
by the client may be limited when the client has induced reliance on the 
belief that the power will not be exercised.  In Unified Sewerage Agency  v. 
Jelco, Inc. the court refused to disqualify a law firm when the former client 
attempted to revoke a prior consent that the current client and the law firm 
had relied on in establishing the lawyer-client relationship.142  In Ethics 
Opinion 317 the District of Columbia Bar Association directly addressed 
the issue of continued representation when the lawyer and the current client 
relied on a consent that the consenting party now wishes to revoke.  The 
Opinion noted that permitting the revocation to force the termination of the 
lawyer-client relationship would be improper and not reflect the interests of 
the other affected parties who in reliance on the consent had invested time, 
money, and effort in the representation.143  The triangular relationship 
likewise involves an investment of time, money, trust, and effort that both 
parties (policyholder and insurer) will adhere to their prior commitments, 
here, the ceding of control of the defense and the right to settle to the 
insurer.  That ceding and accompanying reasonable reliance by the insurer 
warrants permitting retained defense counsel to implement an instruction 
by the insurer to settle within policy limits even over the objections of the 
policyholder. 
The better view of the policyholder-insurer arrangement under the 
standard liability insurance policy permits the insurer to control the 
defense, including having the sole right to instruct counsel.  In other words, 
                                                                                                                 
141. Cf. Hannebaum v. Direnzo & Bomier, 469 N.W.2d 900, 904 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1991) (holding that any problem associated with a verdict form was created by the 
defendants’ decision to use single counsel and defendants should not be permitted to use a 
self-created situation to obtain a reversal). 
142. 646 F.2d 1339, 1346 (9th Cir. 1981); cf. Armenta v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 273, 279 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (“Where such work product is the result of 
collaboration by counsel, all holders of the work product privilege must consent to waiver of 
the privilege.”). 
143. DC BAR LEGAL ETHICS COMM., OP. 317, available at 
http://www.dcbar.org1for_ 
lawyers/ethics/legal_ethics/opinion/opin317.cfm.  The same result was recently reached by 
the North Carolina State Bar Ethics Committee.  N.C. BAR ETHICS COMM., IN FORMAL OP. 
11 (2007), available at http://www.ncbar.com/ethics (in the “select by number” drop down 
menu choose “2007 Formal Opinion 11”). 
70 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:1 
 
control of counsel should follow the right to select counsel.  Whoever has 
control possesses the sole right to exercise direction and instruction of 
counsel to the exclusion of the other party to the arrangement.  
 
B. INSURER AS THIRD PARTY PAYER 
 
The same arguments that apply in the joint client context also compel a 
similar result in the single client/third party payer context.  The absence of 
a lawyer-client relationship between defense counsel and the insurer does 
not diminish the role of the insurance contract, its language vesting control 
of the defense in the insurer, and the tender of the defense to the insurer by 
the policyholder as facts imbuing the insurer with the contractual authority 
to control the defense by directing and instructing counsel.144   Detailed 
disclosures by counsel in order to obtain the type of informed consent 
envisioned by the professional codes to obtain a waiver of a potential 
conflict of interest have not been the norm in the triangular relationship 
context.145 Courts have consistently held, or implied, that the provisions of 
                                                                                                                 
144. See supra note 16. 
145.  Under certain circumstances a person may by contract clothe another with 
power to retain a lawyer to conduct a defense. . . . ‘Consent and approval’ to represent the 
insured are clearly implied when the insured complies with his reciprocal duty under the 
insurance contract by forwarding the court process to the insurance company.  If the insured 
does not desire to avail himself of the company’s obligation to defend the suit including 
counsel, together with payment of any judgment and costs, he is at complete liberty to 
renounce his rights under the insurance contract and employ independent counsel at his own 
expense. 
ABA COMM. ON PROF’L ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES, FORMAL OP. 282 (1950)  
International Association of Defense Counsel, 7:4 PRACTICAL GUIDE  FOR INS. DEFENSE 
LAWYERS  17, (Supp. 2003) (“A defense lawyer who is engaged by a claims professional 
need not separately obtain an insured’s consent to or ratification of the appointment.  By 
demanding a defense under a standard liability insurance policy, an insured authorizes a 
carrier to retain a lawyer for the insured.”); but see Johnson v. Amethyst Corp., 463 S.E.2d 
397 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995), in which the court held that counsel retained by the insurer to 
represent a policyholder could not move to strike a default entered against the policyholder 
when the policyholder had never consented to the representation.  Some courts have 
permitted the insurer to intervene and present a defense in the face of a policyholder’s 
default.  Reliance Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. Rptr.2d 807, 809 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2000); Nasongkhla v. Gonzalez, 34 Cal. Rptr.2d 379 (Cal. App. Dep’t., Super. Ct. 1994) 
(holding that insurer should be permitted to intervene to set aside a default entered against 
the policyholder for failure to respond to discovery requests otherwise the insurer possibly 
would have no other opportunity to litigate fault or damages issues and would carry an 
unfair burden of proving lack of coverage).  Intervention is, however, limited to protecting 
the insurer’s interest, not the policyholder’s. 
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the insurance contract, coupled with the tender of claim to the insurer, 
adequately manifest the policyholder’s knowing intent that the insurer 
assume the defense of the claim.146  No court has required further 
disclosures by counsel as a precondition to counsel undertaking the 
representation of the policyholder.  The tendency has been just to the 
contrary.  Some courts have required the insurer to assume the defense, and 
appoint counsel, simply upon being notified by the policyholder of the 
claim, a tender being implied by the courts from the notice.147   
 
 
                                                                                                                 
146  
Under the terms of most liability insurance policies, 
the insured agrees to permit the insurer to choose counsel to 
defend the insured against claims by third parties.  As we 
stated in Fid. & Cas. Co. v. McConnaughy, this Acustomary 
clause in insurance policies . . . is consent in advance by the 
insured to such dual representation and obviates an 
improper relationship.”  However, if an actual conflict 
develops during the course of the representation, the 
attorney may not continue to represent both parties.   
 
 Atlanta Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 639 A.2d 652, 658 (Md. 1994) (citation omitted); 
see Crist v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 529 F. Supp. 601, 603 (D. Utah 1992) (noting that “the 
insurer’s duty to defend corresponds to the insured’s duty to relinquish control of the 
defense and one cannot arise without the other”); but see Tenn. Super. Ct. Board of Prof. 
Resp., Formal Opn. 99-F-143 (1999) available at http://www.tbpr.org/Attorneys/Ethics 
Opinions/Pdfs/99-F-143.pdf, holding that defense counsel must refrain from accepting 
directives from the insurer about the conduct of the defense and must refuse to share client 
confidential information with an outside audit service without the policyholder-client’s 
consent.  More importantly, the committee also concluded that the policyholder’s rights 
could not be waived in advance by the insurance contract, but required contemporaneous 
disclosure by the lawyer and consent by the client upon full disclosure; Dunkley v. 
Shoemate, 497 S.E.2d 713, 715 (N.C. App. 1998) (holding that insurance defense counsel 
selected by the insurer may not enter an appearance without the consent of the client-
policyholder); but see supra note 135. 
147. See White Mountain Cable Constr. Co., Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 631 A.2d 
907, 910 (N.H. 1993) (holding that notice by policyholder to insurer was sufficient to trigger 
insurer’s duty to defend when notice was coupled with policyholder’s statement that insurer 
had duty to defend);  Employers Cas. Co. v. Mireles, 520 S.W.2d 516, 521-522 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1975). The “notice only” test appears to be a minority view.  SCSC Corp. v. Allied 
Mut. Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 305, 316 (Minn. 1995) (formal tender of defense of the claim to 
the insurer is condition precedent to triggering insurer’s duty to defend); see LaFarge Corp. 
v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 61 F.3d 389, 399-400 (5th Cir. 1995); Eastman v. United States, 
257 F. Supp. 315, 319 (S.D. Ind. 1966); Celina Mut. Ins. Co. v. Citizens Ins. Co., 349 
N.W.2d 547, 551 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).   
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
The appropriate approach to allocation of power between policyholder 
and insurer in the context of the triangular relationship is to recognize that 
the delegation of control accomplished by the insurance contract and by the 
tender affects the relationship between the policyholder and defense 
counsel.  The policyholder is provided a defense and counsel necessarily 
looks for instruction to the party who has the lawful authority to control the 
defense.  That person is the insurer.  And that authority extends both to 
tactical questions, such as presented in hypothetical 1, or ends related 
questions, such as presented in hypothetical 2, as long as those questions 
are within the boundaries of the insurance contract.  A workable, albeit 
rough, rule of thumb here is that counsel should accept and follow 
instructions from the insurer, and disregard contrary instructions from the 
policyholder, to the extent (1) the insurer’s instructions are consistent with 
the insurer’s right to control the defense; (2) the implementation of the 
insurer’s instructions do not require counsel to commit an illegal act or 
violate the professional codes, as illuminated by the lawful delegation of 
control over the attorney to the insurer by the policyholder; and (3) the 
implementation of the insurer’s instructions would not cause counsel 
knowingly to assist the insurer in breaching a duty owed by the insurer to 
the policyholder.148  The issues raised by hypotheticals 1 and 2 falls 
squarely within the above guidelines.  In controlling the defense and 
settling within limits, the insurer, whether or not a client or third party 
payor, is acting within its lawful rights and consistent with the reasonable 
expectations of the policyholder.  In both cases, retained defense counsel 
should follow the insurer’s instructions.  
There appears to be no compelling reason why it should be presumed 
that a lawyer representing joint clients or joint interests cannot exercise 
independent professional judgment and render competent advice or engage 
in proper conduct consistent with the intended scope of the representation.  
If and when a lawyer fails to do this, remedies exist which may be 
                                                                                                                 
148. I use the term “knowingly” deliberately as I am attempting to define the 
lawyer’s professional obligations in the context of the triangular relationship.  Rule 1.0(f): “ 
‘Knowingly,’ ‘known,’ or ‘knows’ denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question.  A 
person’s knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.”  ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(f) (2007).Whether the lawyer should be liable for recklessly or 
negligently assisting the insurer in breaching a duty owed to the policyholder raises issues 
more closely connected with malpractice liability than professional responsibility, issues 
that I do not address here. 
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employed by the injured parties.  Yet the fact that rules have been broken 
does not lead one to conclude that they will necessarily be broken.  Nor has 
it been demonstrated that the frequency of violations or their severity is so 
great that a preemptive rule is required that would restructure the 
relationship so as to preclude the lawyer from giving advice that advances 
the parties’ stated objectives and which caused the lawyer to be retained in 
the first place.  
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THREE INSIGHTS FROM THE CANADIAN D&O INSURANCE  
MARKET: INERTIA, INFORMATION AND INSIDERS1 
 
M. Martin Boyer2   
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper contributes to our understanding of the role of Director's 
and Officer's insurance by answering three very specific questions: Do 
directors and corporations actively optimize their decision to purchase 
D&O insurance? Can we devise a profitable investment strategy based on 
the D&O insurance information? And does D&O insurance motivate 
managers to increase profitability? To answer the first question, I will 
argue that the most important determinant of D&O purchase in any year is 
whether the firm purchased it in the previous year so that managers do not 
appear to reassess actively their need for such coverage very often. For the 
second question, I find that there are profitable investment strategies that 
entail the purchasing of the stock of corporations that have relatively high 
directors' and officers' insurance unit price (premium divided by coverage) 
and sell the stock of corporations that have relatively low directors' and 
officers' unit price. I attribute the profitability of the strategy to the fact that 
directors' and officers' insurance represents an aggregate measure of board 
efficiency and corporate governance health. Finally, using a cross section 
of Canadian unit trust companies, I show that D&O insurance seems to de-
motivate managers to extract cash flows from assets, although this de-
motivation does not seem to reach the stock market. Two important caveats 
are in order: I am using a very short time period and I am using only 
Canadian corporations. Sadly, information regarding directors' and officers' 
insurance has not been available for very long, and is still not available 
publicly in the United States. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A.  CORPORATE DIRECTOR LIABILITY AND PROTECTION 
As representatives of the corporation, directors and officers are liable 
for the corporation’s actions.3 More importantly, the directors and officers 
are personally responsible for those actions, and accordingly their personal 
assets are at risk in the event of a lawsuit against the corporation and its 
management.4 Following the recent loss of confidence in corporate 
governance resulting from the debacle of corporate giants like Enron, 
Worldcom, Adelphia and Anderson, corporate managers are facing greater 
risk of lawsuits originating from angry shareholders who feel they were 
kept in the dark regarding the company's operations. According to a 2002 
survey, 19% of firms had at least one lawsuit brought against their directors 
in the previous ten years.5 One way for a corporate director to protect his 
personal wealth is to have the corporation buy insurance on his behalf.6 
This insurance is known as Directors’ and Officers’ (D&O) insurance.  
A D&O insurance policy becomes applicable when a manager is sued 
in his capacity as a representative of the corporation.7 The insurance 
company indemnifies the corporation and/or the manager only if the 
manager acted in good faith on behalf of the company; i.e., managers are 
not covered in case of gross negligence or criminal behavior.8 Depending 
on the type of D&O contract, the manager could be indemnified directly, or 
the corporation could be compensated for the expenses incurred in the 
manager's defense.9 As with traditional insurance contracts, D&O 
insurance contracts stipulate a premium to be paid, a policy limit, and a 
deductible.10  
                                                                                                                 
3. M. Martin Boyer, Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance and Shareholders’ 
Protection 1 (Ctr. for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on Orgs., Working Paper No. 
2003s-64, 2003), available at http://www.cirano.qc.ca/pdf/publication/2003s-64.pdf. 
4. Id. 
5. Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, 2002 Directors and Officers Liability Survey: US and 
Canadian Results, Apr. 23, 2003, available at 
www.towersperrin.com/tp/getwebcachedoc?webc=TILL/USA/2003/200304/DO_summary2
002a.pdf. 
6. Boyer, supra note 3, at 1. 
7. Id. 
8. Sanjai Bhagat, James A. Brickley & Jeffrey L. Coles, Managerial Indemnification 
and Liability Insurance; The Effect on Shareholder Wealth, 54 J. RISK & INS. 721, 724 
(1987); John M. R. Chalmers, Larry Y. Dann & Jarrad Harford, Managerial Opportunism?  
Evidence from Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance Purchases, 57 J. FIN. 609, 613 (2002). 
9. Bhagat et al., supra note 8, at 724; Chalmers et al., supra note 8, at 613. 
10. Bhagat et al., supra note 8, at 724. 
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It is important to note that D&O insurance is not the only way to 
protect managers against lawsuits. A corporation can also amend its charter 
so that the director liability is limited.11 These limited liability provisions 
“all but eliminate the directors' personal financial responsibility toward the 
firm and its shareholders.”12 By 1996, more than 70% of American 
corporations adopted limited liability provisions.13 A third way that a 
corporation can protect its directors is through corporate indemnification 
plans. These plans give directors protection against third-party lawsuits 
because under these plans the corporations are responsible for 
indemnifying the directors for court expenses.14 Corporate indemnification 
plans protect directors who acted in the best interest of the corporation, 
even if they are found guilty, so long as the harm was caused while acting 
in the best interests of the corporation and the director did not reap any 
personal benefit from their conduct.15 The public data collected for this 
study makes no mention of corporate indemnification plans and because 
Canadian corporate law does not allow limited liability provisions,16 this 
study relies exclusively on D&O insurance to study the financial protection 
offered to corporate directors. 
B.  PAST RESEARCH 
Because of the limited access to public information prior to 1990,17 
only a few studies have been conducted on the demand for D&O insurance. 
Public information became available following the Cadbury Report in the 
United Kingdom and the Dey Report in Canada.18 Both reports 
recommended to their respective securities commission that more 
information be made available on the compensation of officers and 
directors.19 As a result, more information regarding managerial 
                                                                                                                 
11. Maria Gutierrez, A Contractual Approach to the Regulation of Corporate 
Directors’ Fiduciary Duties 17 (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Working Paper No. 
0013, 2000). 
12. Boyer, supra note 3, at 1. 
13. Gutierrez, supra note 11, at 17. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16 R. Crête et S. Rousseau, Droit des sociétés par actions, 2e éd., Montréal, Éditions 
Thémis, 2008, 881 p. 
17. Prior to 1990, the only information related to D&O insurance was collected via 
surveys by Wyatt, now part of Tillinghast-Towers Perrin.  Boyer, supra note 3, at 8. 
18. Id. 
19. COMM. ON THE FIN. ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, REPORT OF THE 
COMMITTEE ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 3.2 (1992), 
available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf; TORONTO STOCK EXCH. 
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compensation is available in both countries, including the purchase of 
D&O insurance.  
The first studies that used the newly available public data in Canada 
and the United Kingdom were conducted by J.E. Core and N. O'Sullivan.20 
Using a sample of 222 firms whose fiscal year ended between May 31, 
1994 and December 31, 1994, Core found that the most important 
determinants of whether D&O insurance was purchased were the risk of a 
lawsuit and the cost of financial distress.21 In a follow-up article, Core 
found that the factors explaining premiums were about the same as the 
factors explaining the demand for D&O insurance.22 Core's results are 
supported by O'Sullivan who concluded that in the United Kingdom, D&O 
insurance coverage and managerial share ownership are corporate 
governance instrument substitutes.23 Moreover, Core and O'Sullivan 
suggested that D&O insurance acts as a monitoring device.24  
If D&O insurance reduces the expected cost of bankruptcy and acts as 
a corporate governance instrument or monitoring device, one should expect 
that stock returns should be positively correlated with D&O insurance 
purchases. Surprisingly, however, D&O insurance does not seem to have 
any impact on stock returns.25  
More recently, a study conducted by J. Chalmers, L. Dann, and J. 
Hartford examined the interaction between D&O insurance coverage and 
initial public offering (IPO) under-pricing.26  This study looked at an 
original sample of firms that went public between 1992 and 1996.27 The 
Chalmers study found that corporations with substantial D&O insurance 
coverage were, on average, more likely to be sued in the future for 
                                                                                                                          
COMM. ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CAN., WHERE WERE THE DIRECTORS? GUIDELINES 
FOR IMPROVED CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CANADA § 5.50 (1994). 
20. John E. Core, On the Corporate Demand for Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance, 
64 J. RISK & INS. 63, 64, 70 (1997); Noel O’Sullivan, Insuring the Agents : The Role of 
Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance in Corporate Governance, 64 J. RISK & INS. 545, 546 
(1997).   
21. Core, supra note 20, at 70, 81. 
22. See John E. Core, The Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance Premium : An Outside 
Assessment of the Quality of Corporate Governance, 16 J.L. Econ. & Org. 449 (2000); 
Core, supra note 20.   
23. O’Sullivan, supra note 20, at 554.   
24. O’Sullivan, supra note 23, at 554.  See generally Core, supra note 22 (suggesting 
that D&O premiums contain useful information about the quality of corporate governance).   
25. Bhagat et al., supra note 8, at 722.   
26. Chalmers et al., supra note 8, at 609-10.   
27. Id. at 610-611.   
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mispricing.28 More specifically, the study found that the three-year 
performance is negatively related to the amount of D&O insurance 
purchased at the IPO.29 Put another way, the greater the D&O insurance 
coverage, the less underpriced the stock was at the time of the initial public 
offering. 
The liability crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s was a period of 
intense uncertainty for insurance companies, especially D&O insurance 
providers. This crisis affected all types of liability insurance including 
personal automobile liability insurance, medical malpractice, product 
liability and general liability.30   This uncertainty is attributable to changes 
in the legal environment.31 As changes in the legal environment were an 
undiversifiable risk for insurers, the law of large numbers no longer applied 
to these insurance products.32 As a result, diversification was necessary   to 
cover for legal environment risks.33 The increased economic importance of 
mutual insurance companies resulted directly from this liability crisis.34 
This organizational response from the insurance industry was also 
accompanied by a contractual response: The introduction of “claims made 
and reported” (CMR) insurance policies.35   
Most D&O insurance contracts are written on a CMR basis.36 CMR 
contracts differ from regular occurrence based contracts in that they cover 
losses that are made and reported during the policy year, even though such 
claims may have been incurred in previous years.37 Regular occurrence 
based contracts cover losses that are incurred during the policy year no 
matter when the claim is reported in the future.38 
                                                                                                                 
28. Chalmers et al., supra note 8. 
29. Id. at 633. 
30. See generally George. L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort 
Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521 (1986).  For a discussion on the insurance crisis and D&O 
insurance see, Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit : Litigation Without Foundation?, 1 
J.LAW, ECON & ORG. 55, 68-9 (1991). 
31. Neil A. Doherty, The Design of Insurance Contracts When Liability Rules are 
Unstable, 58 J. RISK & INS. 227, 227 (1991). 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 227-28. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Boyer, supra note 3, at 7. 
37. Id.  “For example, suppose that an incident occurs in 1995 but is not reported until 
2000 when a claim is filed. Under a CMR contract, all the financial responsibility for the 
loss falls upon the 2000 insurer. Under an occurrence based insurance contract, it is the 
1995 insurer who is responsible.” Id. 
38. Id. 
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Past behavior has a double importance in designing the current year's 
insurance contract. Firstly, past behavior could be an indication of current 
behavior so that any information related to the insured’s risk gathered in 
the past will be used as a signal regarding the insured’s current risk.39 This 
is true both for occurrence based and CMR contracts.40 Secondly, past 
behavior is an indication of current losses paid in the case of CMR 
contracts.41 Thus past behavior becomes doubly important when the 
insurance contract is written on a CMR basis. 
C.  FINDINGS 
The findings of this study are based on an original data set of publicly 
traded Canadian corporations that filed their annual reports between 
January, 1 1993 and December 31, 1998. Canadian data is used because 
basic D&O insurance information (policy limit, deductible and premium) is 
made public in the corporations' management proxies and information 
circulars (information that is absent from standard reporting documents in 
the United States).42 
The first point this paper makes is that there is a lot of inertia 
embedded in the decision to purchase D&O insurance, as much as to the 
amount of coverage chosen. This result is not completely new, but it is 
important to mention when trying to explain why firms purchase insurance 
and in what amount. It appears that when asked whether to purchase D&O 
insurance and in what amount, firms answer by a question:  What did we 
do last year? The only noticeable variation from year to year is the 
premium paid. 
The second result relates to the informational value to investors of 
making public the D&O insurance coverage. In a world where insurers are 
examining thoroughly the risk level of their clients, one would expect that 
an investment strategy based on the perceived risk levels of Canadian 
corporations should be profitable. How should one infer from the 
management proxy and information circular an insurer's assessment on one 
firm's riskiness? I will argue that the unit price of insurance (that is the 
premium-to-limit ratio) is a good indicator. This indicator should also have 
more explanatory power for large firms because an insurer should be 
                                                                                                                 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Sean J. Griffith, Uncovering a Gatekeeper: Why the SEC Should Mandate 
Disclosure of Details Concerning Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance Policies, 154 
U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1200 (2005-2006). 
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spending more time auditing the internal procedures and financial health of 
a larger corporation because it has more to lose by not doing so. Using a 
limited number of yearly data points, I found that large firms who face a 
higher unit price of insurance are more likely to experience a low market 
return than large firms who face a lower unit price. The evidence for this is 
not as robust for smaller firms unless the first year of data, 1994, is not 
considered. An investment strategy that would be long in low unit price 
firms and short in high unit price firms would, on average, earn a five-year 
return of 25% from 1994 through 1998. This result supports the position 
that D&O insurance information is valuable to investors and should 
therefore be made public in the public firms' management proxies.  
Finally, the third result of the paper is based on a particularity of the 
Canadian securities market: the existence of income trust companies. 
Income trusts in Canada, which are similar to the now defunct limited 
master partnerships in the United States, are characterized by a dual-class 
structure, which presumably, reduces investor protection.  If that is the case, 
then the moral hazard problem for managers of having D&O insurance 
(that is, not investing as much effort in generating wealth for the 
shareholders) should be more evident for income trust than for stock 
corporations. I found that a measure of accounting performance (growth of 
the earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization) is lower 
when coverage is larger, but that does not translate into lower stock market 
performance (measured as the total yield). 
Data Collection and Data Source 
The financial data used in this study was obtained from three different 
sources: Compustat, Stock Guide and CanCorp Financial. The use of three 
different sources allowed for a larger data set compared to Compustat 
alone. Unfortunately information was not always the same for corporations 
whose financial information appeared in more than one source. If that 
occurred, a lexicographic approach to the problem was utilized, trusting the 
Compustat entry over the other two, and the Stock Guide entry over 
CanCorp's. Stock prices and total returns were drawn from the TSE-
Western tapes. All values are in Canadian dollars; any U.S. dollar figure 
has been converted to Canadian dollar using the exchange rate at the fiscal 
year-end of each company. Precise information was collected regarding 
executive compensation of publicly traded Canadian companies listed on 
the Toronto Stock Exchange. Companies traded on the TSE are required to 
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make public much more information concerning their D&O policies than 
was previously required, including coverage limits and premiums.43 
Information regarding D&O insurance purchases and executive 
compensation of publicly traded Canadian companies listed on the Toronto 
Stock Exchange was collected from the annual management proxies and 
information circulars. These management proxies also gave information 
related to the firm's block holders, board member compensation and 
ownership, as well as the type and number of shares held by each officer 
(regular or multi-voting).44 These proxies also report the basic information 
regarding D&O coverage, such as whether the corporation had D&O 
insurance, the D&O insurance policy limit, and occasionally the deductible 
and the premium paid.45 
The original sample included 354 Canadian corporations drawn from 7 
economic sectors: bio-pharmaceutical, forest and paper, industrial products, 
technological, consumer products, merchandising, and communication and 
media. These sectors were chosen based on the Toronto Stock Exchange 
(TSE) sector list drawn from the TSE Fact Book. Two important sectors of 
the Canadian economy, financial institutions, and mining and natural 
resources, were deliberately omitted to keep the sample more homogenous. 
Because of holes in the data 27 firms, mainly smaller firms were deleted 
from the start. There is no survivor bias because we collected data on new 
companies, as well as companies that disappeared during the sampled 
years. Because of this incomplete panel, the study was left with 1594 
observations, which gave an average of 4.9 years per company (out of a 
maximum of 7). Of the 327 firms used in the final sample, close to 60% 
had information for 5 years or more, including 22% for all the years. Of the 
sample in this study, 73.4% of the firms (241 firms) purchased D&O 
insurance at least once during those seven years. Of the 327 firms, over 
17% did not exist anymore at the start of 2000. Table 1.1 presents a 
                                                                                                                 
43. Griffith, supra note 42, at 1200.  Since 1996 all this information is available on 
the Ontario Securities Commission’s internet site (http://www.sedar.com).  Id.  Prior to 
1996, the information was collected directly from companies or purchased from 
Micromedia.  Martin Boyer, Is the Demand for Corporate Insurance a Habit? Evidence of 
Organizational Inertia from Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance 12 (Ctr. for Interuniversity 
Research and Analysis on Orgs., Working Paper No. 2004s-33, 2004), available at 
http://www.cirano.qc.ca/pdf/publication/2004s-33.pdf. 
44. M. Martin Boyer, Is the Demand for Corporate Insurance a Habit? Evidence from 
Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance 12-13 (Ctr. for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on 
Orgs., Working Paper No. 2003s-42, 2003), available at 
http://www.cirano.qc.ca/pdf/publication/2003s-42.pdf. 
45. Id. at 13. 
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detailed table of the number of firms, divided by sector, per year included 
in the sample. 
 
Table 1.1. Number of firms per year by economic sector 
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999  
Sector        % of total 
Bio-
pharmaceutical 4 9 10 13 19 19 16 5.83 
Forest and 
Paper 19 27 31 32 29 29 25 12.11 
Industrial 
Products 30 63 79 82 83 80 64 30.18 
Technological 5 15 21 28 37 36 33 11.04 
Consumer 
Products 21 38 44 47 48 48 37 11.75 
C&I Products 4 5 9 8 8 8 7 3.07 
Merchandizing 15 27 33 36 35 29 23 12.42 
Media 9 18 21 22 17 17 17 7.56 
Total 107 202 248 268 276 266 222 1594 
 
For each economic sector, all corporations listed in the TSE publication 
and traded on the exchange were included in the data set for each year of 
the sample. This exercise yielded a total of 1519 observations. Because of 
incongruities in the financial and management proxies (for example board 
or CEO ownership of more than 100% of the company's stock or no trading 
in the stock during the year) a high number of observations were deleted 
from the original data set, so that the final data set included 1407 
observations for 318 firms. Table 1.2 presents the statistics related to D&O 
insurance penetration by industry. 
Insurance penetration was calculated as the proportion of corporations 
that purchased D&O insurance. On average, 70% of the firms purchased 
D&O insurance, although penetration seemed to increase over the years 
(67% in 1993, 73% in 1998). D&O insurance penetration in the data set 
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was slightly below that reported by Tillinghast-Towers Perrin (1999), for 
the year 1998, but higher than Core (1997) for the years 1993 to 1994.46 In 
the case of Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, 84% of Canadian corporations were 
reported to purchase D&O insurance in 1998.47 That is a full ten percentage 
points higher than in the sample used for this study. My understanding is 
that these differences are explained by four important factors. First, 
Tillinghast-Towers Perrin relied on a corporation survey that biased their 
results because of the type of respondent. Second, the number of 
corporations polled was smaller than the entire sample of possible 
companies. Third, the same companies were not polled every year, so that 
it was difficult to keep a tab on the actual trend in the industry. Finally, the 
data set constructed for this study does not include financial firms, mining 
firms, public utilities and not-for-profit firms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
46. See Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, 1999 Directors and Officers Liability Survey: 
Executive Summary of U.S. and Canadian Results (1999) (on file with the Connecticut 
Insurance Law Journal); Core, supra note 20. 
47. Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, supra note 46.  By comparison, D&O insurance 
penetration in the United States was 84% in 1993 and 92% in 1998. 
2008] INERTIA, INFORMATION AND INSIDERS 85 
 
Table 1.2.  D&O insurance penetration by economic sector and fiscal 
year 
Fiscal Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Sector       
Bio-
pharmaceutical 88% 92% 92% 90% 90% 89% 
Forest and 
Paper 59% 58% 63% 64% 67% 70% 
Industrial 
Products 68% 69% 71% 76% 74% 64% 
Technological 90% 90% 84% 70% 68% 74% 
Consumer 
Products 68% 65% 70% 67% 63% 67% 
Merchandizing 52% 57% 58% 56% 55% 55% 
Media 77% 78% 78% 73% 79% 85% 
Weighted 
Average 67% 69% 71% 70% 71% 73% 
Percentage of corporations by economic sector and by year that carry 
D&O insurance. The weighted average is calculated by taking into account 
the number of firms by industry. 
 
In the case of Core (1997), 63% of corporations whose fiscal year 
ended between June 1, 1993 and May 31, 1994 were reported to have D&O 
insurance.48 Although Core relied on the same public information source as 
this study, his sample of companies was different because he included 
public utility, financial and mining corporations.49 This explains why 
Core's sample consisted of 222 companies, compared to the 181 companies 
(1993) and 238 companies (1994) used in this study. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
48. See Core, supra note 20, at 70. 
49. Boyer, supra note 44, at 1, 10. 
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I. RESULTS 
 
A. INERTIA 
 
The first argument presented in this paper is that risk management in 
corporations in general, and D&O purchases in particular, are subject to 
inertia. An organization plagued with inertia is one that is unwilling to 
change ex post what it did ex ante.50 Applied to the particular case of 
insurance purchases, inertia means that the current insurance contract 
specifications are better explained by the managers' previous contract 
choice than by the current economic condition of the firm. To show that 
inertia plays a role, my contention is that the traditional financial and 
governance measures that have been used to explain risk management 
decisions do not work as effectively as a measure of organizational inertia.  
To support the existence of inertia in D&O insurance purchased, it is 
interesting to note that firms that purchase D&O insurance do so for all the 
years, and firms that do not, never do. This does tell a lot about the 
presence of inertia in that the best predictor of a corporation buying D&O 
insurance this year is whether it purchased insurance last year. One can 
imagine that managers that were never covered under a D&O insurance 
policy do not request it because they do not see its use; and managers that 
have had it cannot think why they would get rid of it. 
Why are financial and governance considerations not relevant? One 
possible explanation relies on the CMR structure of D&O insurance 
contracts. CMR contracts act as a lobster trap:  corporations who purchase 
it one year can never realistically get rid of it in the future.51 Purchasing a 
CMR contract is tantamount to choosing to be consistently insured since 
firms find it difficult to drop coverage once it is purchased.52 Indeed, if a 
firm cancels its CMR insurance policy at a given time, it implicitly decides 
to drop the coverage in the future for any and every past loss that might 
have been incurred, but not yet reported.53 And even if the firm decides to 
reinstate its coverage in later years, it usually will not be covered for past 
occurrences that have not yet been reported.54 Dropping a contract written 
on a CMR basis, such as a D&O insurance contract, is therefore very risky. 
                                                                                                                 
50. Id. at 14.  
51. Id. 
52. Boyer, supra note 3, at 7. 
53. James Povlich, Risk financing solutions to employment practices liability, RISK 
MANAGEMENT, May 1994, at 57, 58. 
54. Boyer, supra note 44, at 14.  
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The structure of a CMR contract explains why firms never drop 
coverage, but it does not explain why some firms never purchase the 
insurance. This latter fact is better explained by considering that some 
firms view D&O insurance as destructive since it arguably reduces the 
directors' incentives to work hard.55 Either way, both managerial habit 
(including the CEO's beliefs) and the stated inertia associated with CMR 
contracts explain the decision to purchase D&O insurance. 
The choice of a deductible and policy limit is also very stable over the 
years. After controlling for the six traditional reasons that explain why 
corporations purchase insurance (managerial risk aversion, asset 
substitution, under investment, real services, bankruptcy, and convexity of 
the tax schedule), the Boyer study finds that nothing explains D&O policy 
limits and deductibles in a given year as much as the previous year's limit 
and deductible.56 A possible explanation comes from the method used to 
sell D&O insurance policies.  D&O insurance is mainly sold by insurance 
brokers who negotiate with insurance companies on behalf of the insured.57 
In Canada, the top two insurance brokers hold a 66% market share in terms 
of the number of accounts (it is the top four brokers in the U.S. that hold 
that much market power).58 In premium terms, the top two insurers hold a 
50% market share in the United States, and the top three D&O insurers 
(AIG, Chubb and Lloyd's) collect about 65% of the premiums.59 In Canada, 
a majority of corporations receive their D&O insurance coverage from one 
unique insurer.60  
Another interesting feature of D&O insurance is the existence of so-
called policy limit sticky points. Indeed, coverage limits are sold by layers 
of $1,000,000, although the most important steps appear to be $5,000,000, 
so that we see a clustering of D&O limits around a few sticky points.61 For 
instance, out of the 173 Canadian listed firms that purchased D&O 
insurance in 1998, two-thirds chose one of six policy limits: $5,000,000 (18 
times), $10,000,000 (43 times), $15,000,000 (12 times), $20,000,000 (18 
times), $25,000,000 (10 times) and $50,000,000 (13 times).62 Other years 
have similar sticky points. 
                                                                                                                 
55. See  ECONOMIST, June, 2003 at 14. 
56. Boyer, supra note 44, at 18. 
57. Id. at 5. 
58. Boyer, supra note 3, at 7. 
59. Boyer, supra note 44, at 5; Boyer supra note 3, at 7. 
60. Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, supra note 5, at 6. 
61. Boyer, supra note 3, at 7 
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B.  INFORMATION 
Insurance companies that write D&O insurance will, presumably, use 
all available information as to a company's financial condition and the 
efficiency of its governance procedures. Because of the amount of money 
involved in the event of a lawsuit, or only because of their extensive 
expertise in handling D&O claims, insurers have access to information that 
is not available to other agents in the economy.63 Insurers could, for 
example, conduct background checks on some of the firm's board members 
to better assess their competency and ultimately the real risk of a lawsuit.64 
Gathering this information may not be possible for investors. Due to the 
fact that the insurer's assessment of the firm's risk enters a ratemaking 
matrix that yields only a premium given the amount of coverage 
demanded,65 we may wonder whether there is any information embedded in 
the premium per dollar of coverage. Put in another way that has more 
appeal to a financial economist, one could ask whether a profitable 
investment strategy based on the D&O information contained in the 
management proxies and information circular could be designed. 
Before presenting these results, let us examine how D&O insurance 
prices evolved during the years under study (1993-1998). Table 2.1 shows 
the evolution of the premium-to-limit ratio over the six years of my sample, 
for different cut-off points. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
63. See Core, supra note 22, at 453.  
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 454. 
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Table 2.1  Premium in Canadian dollars for each thousand dollars of 
D&O insurance coverage (1993-1998) 
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 ∆94 – 98 
Number of 
observations 88 150 169 179 186 163  
95% 11.91 13.75 15.00 15.00 13.33 9.40 -31.6% 
75% 5.23 5.85 4.80 4.50 4.40 4.35 -25.6% 
50% 
(median) 3.12 3.02 3.08 2.79 2.60 2.60 
-
13.9% 
25% 2.23 2.06 1.99 1.89 1.67 1.75 -15.0% 
5% 1.22 0.70 0.86 0.82 0.80 0.52 -25.7% 
 
We see in the table that, from 1994 to 1998, the average premium went 
down for every tranche by an average of 20% and by an average of 25% 
from 1993 to 1998. As the price of each unit of coverage fell from 1993 
through 1998, not all corporations answered according to well known 
principles of microeconomics by purchasing more coverage. We can 
observe in Table 2.2 that firms that were small demanders of D&O 
insurance responded to a reduction in price by decreasing their D&O 
insurance coverage.66 
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90 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:1 
 
  Table 2.2  D&O insurance policy limit in thousands of Canadian dollars 
(1993-1998) 
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 ∆ 94 – 98 
Number of 
observations 95 158 177 189 193 170  
95% 390,054 436,363 493,866 486,940 648,078 755,244 73.1% 
75% 148,452 153,239 138,737 148,483 175,324 199,505 30.2% 
50% 
(median) 84,521 75,510 71,480 72,267 75,659 64,841 -14.1% 
25% 34,630 31,339 31,912 32,814 33,764 29,321 -6.44% 
5% 9,686 9,819 9,348 9,600 10,292 8,048 -18.0% 
 
At the same time as the unit price was falling, the average firm size was not 
increasing much either in terms of assets or market value of equity as we 
can see in Table 2.3.  
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The next analysis is by no means robust to many attacks from 
econometricians and statisticians; but the D&O insurance information is 
available only once a year, which makes portfolio investment decisions 
possible only once a year. As a result, only five years’ data are available to 
asses the profitability of the investment strategy, based on the aggregate 
Table 2.3  Evolution of firm size as measured by the log of assets  
and the log of the market value of equity (1993-1998) 
 
Panel A. Assets 
 
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Number of 
observations 95 158 177 189 193 170 
95% 7.92 8.16 8.22 8.24 8.15 8.68 
75% 6.49 6.44 6.48 6.29 6.49 6.75 
50% (median) 5.03 4.95 5.19 5.17 5.33 5.59 
25% 3.85 3.93 4.00 4.13 4.11 4.18 
5% 2.59 2.88 3.16 3.36 3.04 2.71 
 
 
Panel B. Market value of equity 
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Number of 
observations 90 156 173 187 191 169 
95% 7.65 7.66 7.89 7.74 8.06 8.16 
75% 6.54 6.22 6.16 6.26 6.48 6.48 
50% (median) 4.79 4.70 4.88 5.16 5.22 4.99 
25% 3.92 3.80 3.76 4.01 4.08 3.78 
5% 1.92 2.27 2.40 2.75 3.05 2.03 
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information revealed in a firm's management proxy and information 
circular. The goal is to see whether the unit price of D&O insurance is a 
profitable decision criterion for portfolio allocation. To do so requires 
splitting the data set into different investment baskets. The investment 
strategy would be to sell short the least profitable basket and use the 
proceeds to invest in the most profitable basket. The hypothesis is that unit 
price is a measure of the firm's riskiness that is not otherwise observable by 
investors. As a result, firms that purchase insurance with a low unit price 
should be more profitable than firms that purchase insurance with a high 
unit price. The unit price will thus determine, for each year, two baskets of 
firms with approximately the same number of firms in each basket. 
Hypothesis 2.1 Firms faced with a higher unit price 
of D&O insurance should be less profitable. 
An important component of D&O insurance is the sheer size of the 
corporation,67 if only because there are more possible damages that one 
needs to cover in the event of a lawsuit when the corporation is larger.68 
Moreover, because lawsuits should be more costly for larger corporations, 
an insurer underwriting a D&O insurance policy should spend more time 
verifying governance practices and auditing the financial statements of 
larger corporations. Insurers should spend more time examining a large 
corporation and their assessment of the risk should be more precise.  
To test this hypothesis, the data were split into four baskets: two size 
baskets and two unit price baskets. To limit the impact of important outliers 
in the sample,69the data were windsorized70 by removing the company with 
the highest annual return and the company with the lowest; a total of eight 
observations per year were removed. The distribution of firms in each 
basket is displayed in Table 2.4.  
 
 
                                                                                                                 
67. See Griffith, supra note 43, at 1201 (discussing firm size as D&O premium 
factor). 
68. Core, supra note 20, at 67-68, 73, 82 (discussing large firm size as a litigation 
factor).  Firm size should be controlled for in portfolio allocation in accordance with the 
Fama and French model. Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Differences in the Risks 
and Returns of NYSE and NASD Stocks, 49 FIN. ANALYSTS J., 37, 38-39 (1993) (explaining 
firm size as a factor of the three-factor model). 
69. The outliers in the sample included an obvious data error, as one firm’s return was 
4800%. 
70. See Karen Kafadar, John Tukey and Robustness, 18 STAT. SCI. 319, 322-23 (2003). 
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Table 2.4  Number of firms in each size and unit price basket 
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
32 21 37 30 42 29 44 37 39 33 Number of firms
 21 30 32 40 32 43 35 43 35 39  
High unit price
Large firm 
Low unit price 
Large firm The basket of firms in the table are 
High unit price
Small firm 
Low unit price 
Small firm  
 
The second hypothesis is that the D&O insurance information related to 
the unit price of insurance should be more informative for larger 
corporations than for smaller corporations. The difference in performance 
between firms that face a low unit price of D&O insurance and firms that 
face a high unit price of insurance should be more visible for larger firms. 
Hypothesis 2.2 The predictive power of the unit price 
of D&O insurance should be greater for larger firms. 
The average basket returns per year are displayed in the Table 2.5.  
 
The hypothesis for the unit price is that, controlling for size and 
extreme outliers, firms that purchase D&O insurance at a relatively low 
Table 2.5  Average annual return of firms in each size and unit price basket 
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
10.3 -4.76 -3.78 2.00 22.6 24.3 17.6 42.0 -11.4 -6.41Annual return (%) 24.4 -1.55 6.99 27.7 34.4 23.7 9.88 8.46 -25.7 -11.6 
High unit price
Large firm 
Low unit price 
Large firm All returns are calculated as 1
1
−
−τ
τ
P
P
and presented as 
High unit price
Small firm 
Low unit price 
Small firm  
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price per unit of coverage71 are more financially sound and face less 
corporate governance risk. As a result, on average, they should have higher 
returns. For small firms, this does not appear to be statistically significant. 
An investment strategy that would require investing the same amount of 
money in every small firm with a low unit price would only perform 
marginally better than the same strategy in every small firm with a high 
unit price. The five-year total return of investing in small firms faced with a 
low unit price is 49%, whereas the five-year total return of investing in 
small firms faced with a high unit price is 46%. Given the standard 
deviations, these total returns are not statistically significant. 
For large corporations72 the difference is more pronounced. Except for 
the first year of the study, the average return for low unit price firms is 
always higher than for high unit price firms. The total return of investing in 
large firms faced with a low unit price is 61%, whereas the total return of 
large firms faced with a high unit price is 35%.  
If 1994 is removed from the study for concerns associated with 
devising an investment strategy that uses only nineteen firms in the large 
firm with low unit price and small firm with high per unit price categories, 
the total return over four years is 23% for large firms with high unit price, 
17% for small firms with high unit price, 69% for large firms with low unit 
price and 51% for small firms with low unit price. By "going long" with 
low unit price companies and "going short" with high unit price companies, 
an investor would have been able, over the years 1995-1998, to generate a 
sizeable profit margin73.  
The unit price of D&O insurance analysis has an interesting predictive 
power for the company’s future profitability. As the unit price is higher, 
reflecting, in the insurer's mind a higher risk of litigation, future returns 
appear to be lower. This is even stronger for larger firms than for smaller 
firms, and supports this section’s two hypotheses. 
 
C.  INSIDERS 
 
One final insight from the Canadian market is associated with a 
particular aspect of Canadian security regulation: Income trusts. Trust 
                                                                                                                
71. See the companies in the right two cells of Table 2.4 supra p.93. 
72. See the companies in the top two cells of Table 2.4 supra p.93. 
73. The profit margin would have been 46% for large companies and 34% for small 
companies. 
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agreements largely replicate the Canada Business Corporations Act 
(CBCA) provisions, but not completely as shown in Gillen (2006). 
Income trusts operate, however, in the context of trust law that has not 
generally been developed with a view to the use of the trust as a structure 
for running a business ... (and) has thus not been developed with a view to 
protecting investors and does not contain the kinds of governance and 
shareholder remedy provisions that one typically finds in corporate statutes. 
Also, trust instruments of different income trusts differ from one to another 
in one or more aspects that create a source of potential confusion for unit 
holders since their governance knowledge of one IT may not be 
transferable or applicable to another.74 
An important aspect of Canadian income trusts is their dual-board 
structure.75 As a result of this structure, income trusts have a board of 
directors as well as a board of trustees whose duty and privileges are not 
necessarily the same.76 It is thus important to control for this aspect of 
income trusts in Canada. 
This section will analyze D & O insurance’s impact on the profitability 
of unit trusts. Income trusts are presumably riskier than stock companies 
from a governance point of view.77    Additionally, being insured induces 
moral hazard problems.78 Therefore it should be more likely that D&O 
insurance coverage will have a negative impact on performance for a unit 
trust. Performance was measured in two ways. First, it was measured by 
D&O insurance coverage’s impact on an accounting measure that reflects 
the trust’s earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
(EBITDA). This performance measure gives investors an idea of how much 
cash flow is generated by the income trust’s activities.79 Therefore, if moral 
hazard is present, income trusts should have lower EBITDA growth where 
managers are well protected by a D&O insurance policy. The second 
                                                                                                                
74. Mark Gillen, A Comparison of Business Income Trust Governance and Corporate 
Governance: Is There a Need for Legislation or Further Regulation?, 51 MCGILL L.J. 327, 
378 (2006). 
75. CERTIFIED GEN. ACCOUNTANTS ASS’N. OF CAN., DEMYSTIFYING INCOME TRUSTS 21 
(2006).  See Figure 2 infra p. 106 for an illustration of income trust corporate structure. 
76. CERTIFIED GEN. ACCOUNTANTS ASS’N. OF CAN., supra note 75, at 21. 
77. See Mark Gillen, A Comparison of Business Income Trust Governance and 
Corporate Governance: Is There a Need for Legislation or Further Regulation?, 51 
MCGILL L.J. 327, 378 (2006) (stating that investors avoided investments in business income 
trusts due to unlimited liability concerns). 
78. Eric D. Beal, Posner and Moral Hazard, 7 CONN. INS. L.J. 81, 84-85 (2001). 
79. See, e.g., Steiner Corp. v. Benninghoff, 5 F. Supp.2d 1117, 1130 (D. Nev. 1998) 
(describing EBITDA as a cash flow measure). 
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performance measure is the total yield of the unit trust on the Toronto stock 
market. This total yield is calculated as the annual cash received during the 
year plus the unit trust price at the end of year divided by the unit trust 
price at the beginning of the year (i.e., 
1−
+=
t
tt
t P
PCR ). 
This data set is much different from the data set used in the two 
previous sections. This sample includes all 144 income observations 
reported in the Canadian Financial Market Research Center database as of 
December 31st 2005.80  
Income trusts in Canada are classified according to four categories: 
business, energy, utility and real estate (REITs).81  REITs are common and 
well known in the United States.82 The Canadian income trusts market 
breakdown is as follows: business trusts, fifty-five percent; utility trusts, 
ten percent; REITs, fifteen percent; and energy trusts, twenty percent.83  
The hypothesis is that the amount of insurance coverage should have a 
negative impact on a firm's performance. To measure coverage, the log of 
the D&O insurance policy limit as well as the binary variable determining 
whether the firm is at all insured were used. For firms that are not insured, 
the log of the policy limit variable was set to zero. These two variables 
should have a negative impact on performance. 
The other variables used for regression control are: firm size; cash flow 
volatility; managerial compensation; board independence; and managerial 
entrenchment. For size, the log of the market value of equity was used, 
whereas stock price volatility in the year was used as a proxy for cash flow 
volatility. Stock price volatility is calculated as the annualized daily 
standard deviation of the stock returns. Both the directors’ and the trustees’ 
                                                                                                                
80. The final sample includes 144 observations.  The initial sample included all the 
relevant information for 237 income trusts whose fiscal year ended in 2005. Forty-eight 
were excluded because they were created in 2005 and another eighteen because they were 
created in 2004; it would have been impossible to calculate their performance. Another 
twenty-seven were excluded due to incomplete accounting data.  
81. Canadian income trusts breakdown into three categories: business trusts; royalty 
trusts; and REITs.  See CERTIFIED GEN. ACCOUNTANTS ASS’N OF CAN., supra note 75, at 61-
64.  Royalty trusts can further be broken down into energy and utility trusts.  See Trust 
Units: Income Trusts, http://www.investcom.com/incometrust/whatis.htm (last visited Sep. 
24, 2007). 
82. See S. Titman & A. Warga, Risk and the Performance of Real Estate Investment 
Trusts: A Multiple Index Approach, 14 REAL ESTATE ECONOMICS 3, (1986).  
83. See M. Boyer et al., Income Trusts Governance and Performance: Time for a Post-
mortem, Mimeograph, HEC Montréal (2009). 
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compensation are controlled. This compensation is calculated as the log of 
the annual compensation of directors and trustees respectively. If the labour 
market is efficient, higher paid directors and trustees should have a positive 
impact on the income trust's performance. It is also important to control for 
the independence of the board of director and of the board of trustees, 
because independent boards are signs of good governance84 and presumed 
to have positive impact on firm performance. This independence is 
measured as the proportion of independent directors on the board of 
directors, and as the proportion of independent trustees on the board of 
trustees. Two variables were included that measure the level of 
entrenchment of officers, directors and trustees. The first, contract 
entrenchment, is whether managers have access to a golden parachute or 
other anti-takeover measure that could reduce the managers' willingness to 
invest time and effort in the firm. The second, insider power, is measured 
as the sum of the voting rights of all investors holding more than 10%of the 
income trust's shares as a percentage of total voting rights. 
Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 present the linear regression results that model 
the accounting performance and the stock market performance of the 
income trusts in 2005. Accounting performance is measured as the 
variation in the income trust's EBITDA from 2004 to 2005, and stock 
market performance is measured as the total yield of the income trust stock 
in 2005. 
The two tables present five regression models, depending on the 
variables that are included in the regression. Model 1 is the most basic 
model; it only controls for D&O insurance coverage, firm size, and stock 
price volatility. Model 2 addswhether insurance is purchased to the 
regression. Model 3has the highest goodness of fit of all five models;85 and 
it adds managerial compensation to the regression. Model 4 adds the 
independence of the two boards to model 3 while Model 5 adds the 
managerial entrenchment measures to see if either plays any role in 
determining the income trust’s performance. In all regression models a 
dummy variable was included86 to control for the industry in which the 
income trust operates. 
The log of the policy limit consistently has a negative impact on the 
accounting performance of the income trust through the five empirical 
models as illustrated in Table 3.1. In line with this hypothesis, it appears 
                                                                                                                
84. Core, supra note 22, at 460.   
85. The goodness of fit was measured by the adjusted R². 
86. The dummy variables are not represented in the tables. 
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that the growth of cash flows is impeded by the amount of coverage for 
directors. This lends strong credence to the moral hazard hypothesis 
regarding D&O insurance protection since the growth of cash flows is 
lower when firms purchase more coverage, even after controlling for a 
multitude of other factors. 
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Table 3.1  The determinants of the performance of Canadian income 
trusts in 2005: 
Accounting returns as calculated by the growth of the earnings before 
interest, taxes depreciation and amortization 
Dependent variable: 
1
EBITDA
EBITDA
τ
τ −
 
Independent 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Insured 
 
 
0.349 
(0.445) 
0.281 
(0.442) 
0.277 
(0.445) 
0.328 
(0.434) 
Log (Limit) 
-0.042** 
(0.015) 
-0.060* 
(0.027) 
-0.055* 
(0.028) 
-0.055* 
(0.028) 
-0.060* 
(0.029) 
Firm Size 
0.038 
(0.107) 
0.043 
(0.107) 
-0.033 
(0.111) 
-0.026 
(0.113) 
-0.003 
(0.117) 
Stock Price 
Volatility 
-4.180** 
(1.127) 
-4.195** 
(1.129) 
-4.413** 
(1.118) 
-4.218** 
(1.219) 
-4.239** 
(1.227) 
Director Pay   
0.066* 
(0.028) 
0.070* 
(0.029) 
0.065* 
(0.030) 
Trustee Pay   
-0.019 
(0.023) 
-0.015 
(0.027) 
-0.013 
(0.27) 
Independence 
of Trustee 
   
0.210 
(0.779) 
0.259 
(0.790) 
Independence 
of Directors 
   
-0.471 
(0.673) 
-0.424 
(0.685) 
Insider Power     
-0.250 
(0.603) 
Contract 
Entrenchment 
    
0.187 
(0.260) 
R2 0.156 0.154 0.176 0.167 0.159 
 
The dependent variable is the one-year variation in the firm’s earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization; OLS regression with sector (business, energy, utility and real 
estate income trusts) fixed effects and 144 observations. The ** (*) represents a coefficient 
that is significant at the 1% (5%) level. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Stock price volatility and the directors' total compensation are also 
significant through the different models in explaining performance. 
Volatility has a negative impact whereas director compensation has a 
positive impact. This suggests that the level of risk of a firm's operation 
does have an impact on its ability to generate future cash flows, perhaps 
because financiers are less likely to invest resources in firms that have 
riskier operations. In terms of managerial compensation, there is support 
for the labour market efficiency hypothesis; the more highly paid directors 
generate high cash flow growth, a signal that quality has its price.  
While director compensation has a significant positive impact on 
EDBITDA growth, the trustees’ compensation has no impact, or if any, it is 
negative. Is trustee compensation less efficient than director compensation? 
Do trustees not feel as much need to perform as directors? It is not possible 
to say for sure, but there is an indication that CEOs who are less scrutinized 
by investors are "really paid like bureaucrats".87 This study found no other 
statistically significant variable in determining the accounting performance 
of Canadian income trusts. 
In terms of stock market performance, D&O insurance protection has 
no impact on the total yield of income trusts in 2005; this is illustrated in 
Table 3.2. The only variable that appears to have a significant impact is the 
volatility of the stock price. Similar to its impact in the accounting 
performance regressions, stock price volatility, which is used as a proxy for 
cash flow volatility, has a negative impact on stock market performance. 
No other variable seems to be able to explain the income trusts' total yield. 
 
 
                                                                                                                
87. See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives – It’s Not How Much 
You Pay, but How, HARV. BUS. REV., May-June 1990, at 138.  But see Brian J. Hall & 
Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?, 113 Q.J.ECON. 653, 654 
(1998) (arguing that CEOs are “not paid like Bureaucrats”). 
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Table 3.2  The determinants of the performance of Canadian income trusts in 2005: 
Total stock market yield (cash plus capital gain return) 
 
Dependent variable: 
1−
+=
t
tt
t P
PCR  
Independent 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Insured  
0.014 
(0.092) 
0.023 
(0.093) 
0.025 
(0.093) 
0.026 
(0.094) 
Log (Limit) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
Firm Size 
0.003 
(0.022) 
0.004 
(0.022) 
-0.008 
(0.023) 
-0.006 
(0.023) 
0.016 
(0.117) 
Stock Price 
Volatility 
-0.935** 
(0.231) 
-0.936** 
(0.232) 
-0.939** 
(0.234) 
-0.958** 
(0.255) 
-0.946** 
(0.254) 
Director Pay   
-0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
Trustee Pay   
0.004 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
Independence 
of Trustee 
   
0.003 
(0.163) 
0.042 
(0.164) 
Independence 
of Directors 
   
0.112 
(0.141) 
0.152 
(0.142) 
Insider Power     
0.002 
(0.001) 
Contract 
Entrenchment 
    
0.017 
(0.054) 
R2 0.176 0.170 0.162 0.155 0.163 
 
The dependent variable is the firm's one-year total stock market yield; OLS regression with sector (business, 
energy, utility and real estate income trusts) fixed effects and 144 observations. The ** (*) represents a 
coefficient that is significant at the 1% (5%) level. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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An interesting conclusion to draw from this section is that, although 
D&O insurance coverage has a negative impact on the growth of the 
income trusts' cash flows, this impact does not appear to translate to a 
lower stock market return. There are two possible explanations for this. The 
first one is that there is too much noise in the stock market value. This 
explanation could be valid if the results were different when using the 
dividend yield rather than the total yields, but in this case they are not 
significant.88 Even if the impact of D&O insurance coverage had a 
significant negative impact on the dividend yield, one would be hard 
pressed to imagine a reason why the impact on the capital gain yield would 
be positive. Why would investors attribute a positive growth option value 
to firms that have more D&O insurance coverage? 
A second explanation is that using the total yield is too crude a measure 
to make any inference related to the impact of D&O insurance on firm 
performance. An alternative would be to use a simple capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM)89 approach for 2004 to find the expected return for 2005, 
and then look at how much the actual return differed from the expected 
return. Another alternative would be to look at the total yield Sharpe ratio.90 
But, it is doubtful that any of these alternatives would change the results 
significantly.  
 
II.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
The goal of this paper was to: further our understanding of the 
motivations for a corporation to purchase directors' and officers' liability 
insurance; explore how investors could use the information; and whether 
D&O insurance coverage has any impact on firm performance. D&O 
insurance purchase decisions, based on the dataset of Canadian publicly 
traded companies from the late 1990’s, are largely driven by managerial 
                                                                                                                
88. In this case, the results were not significant and were not included in the data 
tables. 
89. CAPM, “holds that rational investors value stocks according only to their 
expected return and nondiversifiable risk.”  Lynn A. Stout, How Efficient Markets 
Undervalue Stocks: CAPM and ECMH under Conditions of Uncertainty and 
Disagreement. 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 475, 475 (1997).   
90. In order to calculate the Sharpe ratio you take the return net of the risk free rate 
and divide it by the standard deviation of the return.  William F. Sharpe, The Sharpe Ratio, 
J. PORTFOLIO MGMT, 49, 50 (Fall 1994).  “The Sharpe ratio is designed to measure the 
expected return per unit for a zero-investment strategy.  The difference between the returns 
on two investment assets represents the results of such a strategy.”  Id. at 57. 
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inertia; one year's decision is tributary to last year's decision.91 The 
information contained in the management proxy and information circular 
related to D&O insurance appears to have value for the market; a profitable 
trading strategy can be devised by purchasing the common stock of large 
Canadian corporations that face a low unit price of insurance92 and shorting 
the common stock of large Canadian corporations that face a high unit 
price. This strategy, over the arguably very short time period under study, 
yields a profit of 10% on average per year. D&O insurance coverage has a 
negative impact on the accounting performance of a piece of financial 
Canadian, Income trust, but that the market return does not seem to be 
affected. This suggests that managers are faced with moral hazard problems 
because D&O insurance coverage reduces their ability to increase cash 
flows in the firm. The fact that market returns do not seem to follow the 
same pattern is problematic and is left open for further research. 
What can be taken away from ’these three insights? The most important 
conclusion is that studying D&O insurance should be of the utmost 
importance for anyone interested in corporate governance. There are three 
reasons for this.  First, D&O insurance remains a largely unexplored 
territory of academic research, not to mention professional research; few 
papers have been devoted to this aspect of corporate governance.93 Some 
                                                                                                                
91. See supra Part I.A. 
92. That is to say they have a low premium-to-coverage ratio. 
93. While there have been few articles written on D&O insurance, in the past  seven 
years there have been articles written on  D&O insurance’s role in corporate governance 
monitoring, as a measure of ex ante litigation risk, and the insurer’s role as written reporting 
results of empirical research on the monitoring role of directors' and officers' liability 
insurance, and how liability insurer intermediary to s transmit and transform the content of 
corporate and securities law., as well as articles on how D & O premiums can be used as a 
measure of ex ante litigation risk, and the connection between corporate governance and 
D&O insurance. See, e.g., Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate 
Governance: The Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795 (2007) 
(discussing how corporate managers buy D&O coverage for self-serving reasons, and that 
because the coverage itself, “does not control moral hazard, it “reduces the extent to which 
shareholder litigation aligns managers' and shareholders' incentives.” ); Tom Baker & Sean 
J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from the Directors’ and 
Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487 (2007) (reporting the empirical 
study results of  an empirical  study ofon  the underwriting process of D&O insurance which 
found that insurers seek to price D&O policies according to the risk posed by each 
prospective insured and in assessing risk, underwriters focus on corporate governance); John 
E. Core, The Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance Prelim: An outside Assessment of the 
quality of Corporate Governance, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 449 (2000) (reporting and 
discussing confirmatory evidence that D&O premiums reflect the quality of the firm's 
corporate governance); Sean J. Griffith, Uncovering a Gatekeeper: Why the SEC Should 
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governance questions are still left unanswered: Is D&O insurance part of 
the compensation package? Is it a tool to align the manager's incentives 
with those of the shareholders? Is it truly designed to protect corporate 
directors or other stakeholders like the shareholders and the debtholders? 
Second, there is evidence that D&O insurance conveys information to the 
market about the future performance of the companies, whether the stock 
market performance or the accounting performance.94 The reason D&O 
insurance conveys information is that insurers, contrary to most firm 
stakeholders, have a lot to lose by insuring a company at the wrong price.95 
As a result we should expect insurers to invest resources in auditing the 
corporate governance behaviour of the companies that seek protection 
through a D&O insurance policy. This auditing is even more informative 
because of the claims made and reported nature of D&O insurance; it 
reflects as much past behaviour as current risk of litigation. 
The most important conclusion is that shareholders should value D&O 
insurance information. As a result, the information should be made public 
in the United States.”96  A company's D&O insurance premium could thus 
signal important information concerning the firm's governance quality to 
investors and other capital market participants."97 This is supported by 
hypothesis 2. D&O insurance information is a better signal than the CEO's 
age, and could be construed as part of the compensation package of the 
directors and officers of the corporation. Given that so much is revealed 
regarding the compensation of top executives and the structure of the 
board, it appears to me paradoxical that information as easy to present as 
D&O insurance policy limit, deductible and premium, and so informative 
as to the governance health of a firm does not find its way to the annual 
reports. 
                                                                                                                          
Mandate Disclosure of Details Concerning Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance 
Policies, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (2006) (advocating for a change in U.S. securities 
regulation to make mandatory disclosure of D&O policy details).  
94. See Chalmers et al., supra note 8, at 625, 629 (discussing relationship between 
D&O insurance premiums and future stock value).  
95. Ronald E. Mallen & David W. Evans, Surviving the Directors’ and Officers’ 
Liability Crisis: Insurance and the Alternatives, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 439, 442-43 (1987).  
96. See Griffith, supra note 43, at 1203-07 (discussing importance of D&O insurance 
disclosure to investors). 
97. Id. at 1208. 
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Appendix: Corporate structures 
 
Figure 1: Stock company corporate structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Demystifying Income Trusts – CGA Canada – March, 2006 
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Figure 2: Income trust corporate structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Demystifying Income Trusts – CGA Canada – March, 2006 
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FREEDOM OF CONTRACT IN INSURANCE  
 
Susan Randall 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Insurance case law is increasingly marked by judicial reliance on the 
principle of freedom of contract.  In recent years, courts have been inclined 
to enforce insurance policies as written, with the goal of effectuating the 
intentions of the parties and the result that the insurance company typically 
prevails.  This reflexive invocation of contract principles is not appropriate 
in insurance disputes, for at least two reasons.   
The first is familiar, centering on the adhesive nature of insurance 
relationships.  Insurance policies, like many consumer contracts, are 
standardized forms, offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.  Policyholders 
have no opportunity to negotiate terms, conditions, or price and typically 
do not even see the policy until after they have completed the purchase.  
Insurance policies are complex and technical documents that very few 
policyholders can read or understand.  These ideas have been thoroughly 
explored in the scholarly literature.1  
The second reason to question the increasing judicial adherence to 
standard contract doctrine is well-known but its relevance in this context 
has not been explored.  Insurance is a highly regulated industry.  The laws 
of every state require regulatory review and approval of insurance policies 
prior to their use, and all states have some form of rate regulation.  States 
also regulate the format and appearance of insurance policies; impose 
“readability” standards; prescribe and proscribe numerous policy 
provisions; and in some contexts require an individual’s purchase of 
insurance or a company’s provision of it.    
This statutory and regulatory control of insurance relationships should 
displace judicial reliance on contract principles.  Just as an insurance 
consumer’s freedom is limited to the initial choice to purchase insurance 
(or to engage in an activity for which insurance is required), an insurance 
                                                                                                                
1. See generally Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion–Some Thoughts about 
Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of 
Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173 (1983).  For a specific 
discussion of the concept in the context of insurance, see James M. Fischer, Why Are 
Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of Interpretation?: Text Versus Context, 24 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 995 (1992).  
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company’s freedom is limited and constrained in varying degrees, 
depending on the level of statutory and regulatory control exercised in each 
of the jurisdictions regulating it.  The extensive regulation of insurance 
policy provisions and pricing, in combination with the adhesive nature of 
insurance relationships, demonstrates that freedom of contract as a public 
policy consideration is largely irrelevant in the interpretation of standard 
insurance policies.  No “intent of the parties” undergirds the substantive 
terms and provisions of the policy.  There is no “bargain” to be protected; 
instead, there is an agreement on terms over which the consumer has no 
control and the insurance company has incomplete control.  To determine 
the meaning of insurance policies, courts should rely on interpretive 
constructs that emphasis regulatory goals and strategies: solvency of 
insurance companies, fairness to consumers, and availability of insurance.  
These goals, rather than freedom of contract and protection of the parties’ 
intentions, constitute the important public policies at issue in interpretation 
and construction.    
Acknowledging the centrality of regulation and the accordingly 
diminished relevance of contract doctrine in insurance policy interpretation 
will make no difference in the outcome of many disputes.  Like freedom of 
contract, the legislative and administrative role in mandating or approving 
policy language suggests that the language of policies should be enforced.  
However, different starting points will often yield different results.  Where 
the analytical frame is contract, the judicial focus must be the parties’ 
intentions.  The writing documents the parties’ intentions, and so the policy 
comprises the “law of the bargain” and the analytical starting point.  In 
some views, it is also the end of the analysis.2  When judges operate in the 
paradigm of contract, the fictional will of the parties–as expressed in the 
policy language–prevails.   
In contrast, where policies are viewed not as a bargain between parties, 
but as standard documents governed by statute and requiring regulatory 
approval, the analysis changes.  Considerations external to the policy 
become relevant, including the statutory framework and the intent of the 
legislature; the power of the regulator and the nature and aims of the 
approval process, as well as the role of the judiciary in reviewing 
administrative actions; and broad public policy concerns, as defined by 
                                                                                                                
2. Some courts refuse to consider evidence beyond the policy where the language is 
plain, following Professor Williston’s approach in the first Restatement of Contracts; others 
take a broader view, following Professor Corbin and the second Restatement, recognizing 
that the meaning of words depends on context and permitting resort to extrinsic evidence to 
assist in ascertaining intention.  
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statute, regulation, and decisional law.  Understanding that insurance 
policies are highly regulated documents rather than freely-negotiated 
contracts permits judicial interpretation that recognizes the important 
public policies which justify insurance regulation.  Under this analytical 
paradigm, courts can protect insurance consumers’ substantive rights 
regarding insurance coverage, rather than an illusory freedom of contract.           
 
II. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO INSURANCE POLICIES  
  
In the 1970s, contract law scholars chronicled a decline in freedom of 
contract over the preceding century, notably in Grant Gilmore’s The Death 
of Contract3 and P.S. Atiyah’s The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract.4   
Scholars identified various factors accounting for the decline, including the 
rise of standard form contracts, the growth of consumer protection law, and 
the development of the concepts of adhesion and unconscionability. The 
resurgence of free market principles in 1980s, spurred by the 
transformation of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and the 
increasing prevalence of scholarship in law and economics, has caused 
another shift in the law, with a judicial return to standard contract 
principles.5    
Insurance law parallels these larger trends.  The dominant approach to 
policy interpretation and construction following the decline of contract was 
founded on the view that insurance policies are adhesion contracts and that 
insurance consumers consequently require judicial protection.   In contract 
law generally, courts revised rules for adhesion contracts to account for the 
consumer’s inability to negotiate terms and the corresponding risks of 
consumer exploitation.  Given the distinctive characteristics of insurance 
agreements, where policyholders pay premiums in exchange for a promise 
to indemnify in the event of specified but uncertain future events, courts 
created specialized modifications of those revised rules for application to 
insurance policies.  The most notable manifestations of this approach have 
been a strong version of contra proferentem, under which an ambiguity 
automatically yields a decision for the policyholder;6 protection of 
policyholders’ reasonable expectations of coverage even in the face of 
                                                                                                                
3. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (Ronald Collins ed., 1995). 
4. P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979).   
5. See, e.g., The Fall and Rise of Freedom of Contract, (F.H. Buckley, ed., 1999); 
P.S. ATIYAH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT (5th ed. 1995).   
6. See discussion infra at text accompanying notes 35-46. 
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explicit policy language to the contrary;7 and recognition of breach of an 
insurance policy as the tort of  bad faith in order to provide a disincentive 
to wrongful denial of claims or coercive settlements.8    
The competing approach is standard contract doctrine, which has 
regained ground in recent years.  Courts are increasingly willing to treat 
insurance policies as ordinary contracts,9 subject to ordinary principles of 
                                                                                                                
7. The doctrine was first described in Robert Keeton’s seminal article, Insurance 
Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 967 (1970) (“The 
objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the 
terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though painstaking study of the policy 
provisions would have negated those expectations.”).  For subsequent discussions of the 
doctrine, see Symposium, The Insurance Law Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations after 
Three Decades, 5 CONN. INS. L. J. 1 (1998), and Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of 
Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L. J. 823 
(1990).  
8. See 14 COUCH ON INS. §204:11 (3d ed. 2006) (Absent the bad faith action, a 
policyholder’s only recourse was through contract, with damages limited to amounts due 
under the policy plus interest.  Bad faith permits recovery beyond contract damages, 
including damages for emotional or economic harm as well as punitive damages).    
9. In the last year, numerous courts have articulated the view that insurance policies 
are ordinary contracts, subject to ordinary principles of contract interpretation. See, e.g., 
Kessler v. Shimp, 2007 WL 506026 (N.C. App. 2007) (insurance policies must be construed 
as written in order to preserve fundamental right of freedom of contract); Axis Reinsurance 
Co. V. Melancon, 2007 WL 60968 (E.D. La. 2007) (principle of freedom of contract 
governs risks an insurance company may exclude); Federated Mut. Ins. Co., Inc. v. Vaugh, 
2007 WL 20066 (Ala. 2007); ABT Bldg. Prod. Corp. V. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. Of 
Pittsburgh, 472 F.3d 99 (4th Cir. 2006); United Services Auto Ass’n v. Riley, 2006 WL 
1490160 (Md. 2006) (“Insurance contracts are treated as any other contract.”); Moscarillo v. 
Professional Risk Management, 2006 WL 1501050 (Md.App. 2006)(insurance policy 
construed according to contract principles to determine parties’ intentions); Vestin Mortg., 
Inc. v. First American Title Ins. Co., 2006 WL 1513232 (Utah 2006) (“An insurance policy 
is merely a contract between the insured and the insurer and is construed pursuant to the 
same rules applied to ordinary contracts.”); Sims v. Allstate Ins. Co. 2006 WL 1495110 (Ill. 
App. 2006) (court’s primary objective in construing insurance policy is to give effect to the 
parties’ intentions); McElmeel v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 2006 WL 1228911 (Ill. App. 
2006) (“An insurance policy is a contract and the general rules of contract interpretation 
apply.”) Rory v. Continental Ins. Co., 703 N.W.2d 23, 27 (insurance policies are subject to 
same principles applicable to any other species of contract; unambiguous provisions 
enforced to uphold individual freedom to contract); Klemmetsen v. American Family Mut. 
Ins. Co., 2006 WL 1409549 (D. Colo. 2006) (insurance policy interpreted according to 
ordinary contract principles, with primary goal to effectuate intent of the parties); Bonin v. 
Westport Ins. Corp., 2006 WL 1343439 (La. 2006) (insurance policy should be construed 
using the general rules of interpretation of contracts in Civil Code; noting judicial 
responsibility to determine parties’ intent); see City Fuel Corp. V. National Fire Ins. Co., 
846 N.E.2d 775 (Mass. 2006) (applying Maryland law and noting that Maryland does not 
follow the rule that insurance policies are to be construed most strongly against the 
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contract law, including protecting freedom of contract and effectuating the 
parties’ intentions.  According to one recent opinion, “the judiciary is 
without authority to modify unambiguous contracts or rebalance the 
contractual equities struck by the contracting parties because fundamental 
principles of contract law preclude such subjective post hoc judicial 
determinations of “reasonableness” as a basis upon which courts may 
refuse to enforce unambiguous contractual provisions.”10  Accordingly, 
judges have begun to reject the reasonable expectations doctrine and to 
revise contra proferentem so that there is no longer a distinctive insurance 
version of the doctrine.  The trend towards limitation of bad faith actions is 
another manifestation of the judicial turn away from specialized rules for 
insurance policies.   The next subsections demonstrate how each of these 
specialized insurance principles have given way to standard contract 
doctrine.   
 
A. REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS 
 
The doctrine of reasonable expectations has given way to firm judicial 
pronouncements about enforcing unambiguous policies as written.  
Numerous commentators have acknowledged this trend.11  In 1990, twenty 
                                                                                                                          
insurer.... instead, Maryland takes the view that insurance policies are to be construed like 
other contracts in order to determine the parties’ intentions.” but if ambiguity remains after 
review of extrinsic evidence, ordinarily resolution against drafter–like Mich. case next 
paragraph); Chang v. Brethern Mut. Ins. Co. 2006 WL 1130872 (Md. App. 2006); Carter v. 
Property Owners Ins. Co., 846 N.E.2d 712 (Ind. App. 2006) (insurance contracts subject to 
same rules of interpretation as other contracts).  See also Tech-Built 153, Inc. v. Virginia 
Sur. Co., Inc., 2006 WL 1042077 (N.H. 2006) (“where the intent of the contracting parties 
can be conclusively resolved by objective extrinsic evidence...we will not ignore that 
evidence in favor of dogmatic adherence to insurance maxims.”). 
10. Rory v. Continental Ins. Co., 703 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Mich. 2005). 
11. See, e.g., James M. Fischer, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations Is 
Indispensable, If We Only Knew What For?, 5 CONN. INS. L. J. 151 (1998) (noting that most 
courts use the doctrine only when the policy is ambiguous); Roger C. Henderson, The 
Formulation of the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 5 CONN. INS. L. J. 69 (1998); 
Robert H. Jerry, II, Insurance, Contract, and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 5 
CONN. INS. L. J. 21 (1998) (discussing the relationship between the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations and contract law); Susan M. Popik and Carol D. Quackenbos, Reasonable 
Expectations after Thirty Years: A Failed Doctrine, 5 CONN. INS. L. J. 425 (1998) 
(concluding that problems inherent in the doctrine itself account for its failure to develop 
into a coherent, principled body of law); Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations 
Revisited, 5 CONN. INS. L. J. 107 (1998) (noting growing opposition to more aggressive 
versions of reasonable expectations); Jeffrey Stempel, Unmet Expectations: Undue 
Restriction of the Reasonable Expectations Approach and the Misleading Mythology of 
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years after its initial explication by Judge Keeton, ten jurisdictions had 
adopted the doctrine of reasonable expectations.12   Today only two 
jurisdictions–Alaska and Hawai’i–accept the doctrine as it was originally 
formulated, by permitting policyholders’ expectations to trump clear policy 
language.13  Many courts discuss and apply a doctrine which they 
characterize as “the doctrine of reasonable expectations”; in reality, almost 
all of these courts are conflating the construction of ambiguities against the 
insurer with the doctrine of reasonable expectations.  For example, the 
West Virginia Supreme Court recently articulated Judge Keeton’s classic 
formulation of the doctrine thus, “The doctrine of reasonable expectations 
provides that the objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and 
intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be 
honored even though painstaking study of policy provisions would have 
negated those expectations”14 but then immediately limited the doctrine to 
cases of ambiguity: 
 
‘[i]n West Virginia, the doctrine of reasonable expectations 
is limited to those instances . . . in which the policy 
language is ambiguous.’  This Court has explained that 
‘[t]he doctrine of reasonable expectations is essentially a 
                                                                                                                          
Judicial Role, 5 CONN. INS. L. J. 181 (1998) (arguing that the doctrine is underutilized due to 
the focus on its pure version as opposed to use as a corollary to the ambiguity doctrine); See 
also Jeffrey E. Thomas, An Interdisciplinary Critique of the Reasonable Expectations 
Doctrine, 5 CONN. INS. L. J. 295 (1998) (noting that research in consumer psychology 
demonstrates that consumers do not develop expectations about coverage, undercutting the 
theoretical justification for the doctrine).  
12. Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law 
After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823, 824 (1990). Jeffrey Stempel, writing in 1998, 
found “approximately a half-dozen” jurisdictions adopting the “pure” version of the Keeton 
doctrine.  Jeffrey W. Stempel, Unmet Expectations: Undue Restriction of the Reasonable 
Expectations Approach and the Misleading Mythology of Judicial Role, 5 CONN. INS. L. J. 
181 (1998).  Other commentators have come up with a very different count–38 
jurisdictions–but that number includes jurisdictions which use the policyholder’s reasonable 
expectations to assist in resolving policy ambiguity rather than the original formulation of 
the doctrine. BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE 
COVERAGE §103(b) at 21 (9th ed. 1998). 
13. See Nelson v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 162 P.3d 1228,1235 (Alaska 2007); 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron, 393 F.Supp.2d 948, 951 (D. Alaska 2005); Keneke Roofing Inc. 
v. Island Ins. Co. 98 P.3d 246(Haw. 2004).  
14. See, e.g., Jenkins v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 632 S.E.2d 346, 352 (W.Va. 
2006). 
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rule of construction, and unambiguous contracts do not 
require construction by the courts.15 
 
Similarly, two early adherents of the classic doctrine of reasonable 
expectations, Iowa and Arizona, have retained it in name, but substituted a 
very different rule.  Both jurisdictions base their version of the doctrine on 
§211 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Standardized Agreements, 
which provides in pertinent part: 
 
(3) Where the other party has reason to believe that the 
party manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew 
that the writing contained a particular term, that term is not 
part of the agreement.16 
 
The focus of the classic insurance doctrine is the policyholder’s 
expectations; the focus of the Restatement is the insurer as drafter of the 
standardized agreement and the insurer’s understanding of the 
policyholder’s assent.17  Comment (f), as applied to insurance, states that 
the insurer’s reason to believe that the policyholder would not assent “may 
be inferred from the fact that the term is bizarre or oppressive, . . . 
eviscerates the non-standard terms explicitly agreed to, . . . or eliminates 
the dominant purpose of the transaction.”18  The doctrine of reasonable 
expectations in Iowa and Arizona clearly owes much to the Restatement 
formulation, specifically drawing from Comment (f).  In Iowa, the doctrine 
may be invoked only where an exclusion (1) is bizarre or oppressive, (2) 
eviscerates terms explicitly agreed to, or (3) eliminates the dominant 
purpose of the transaction. . . Moreover, as a precondition to reliance on 
this doctrine, an insured must establish that an ordinary layperson would 
misunderstand the policy coverage or that there are circumstances 
attributable to the insurer that led the insured to expect coverage.19   
                                                                                                                
15. Id. See also Lawson v. American Gen’l Assur. Co., 455 F.Supp.2d 526 (S.D. W. 
Va. 2006) (doctrine of reasonable expectations applied where policy ambiguous or insurer 
fails to communicate exclusion to insured or there is a misconception about the insurance 
purchased). 
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §211(3). 
17. But see Wallace v. Balint, 761 N.E.2d 598, 606 (Ohio 2002) (equating the two 
formulations). 
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §211(3), cmt.(f). 
19. See Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Sand Livestock Sys., 728 N.W.2d 216, 220-21 
(Iowa 2007); Iowa Comprehensive Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Fund Bd. v. 
Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 596 N.W.2d 546, 551 (Iowa 1999).   
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Arizona cases utilize similar language.20  Under this formulation, other 
contract doctrines–ambiguity, unconscionability, fraud, and estoppel–do 
the work.  The doctrine of reasonable expectations as formulated by Judge 
Keeton plays no role.   
Minnesota utilizes a similar approach, with its courts holding that 
“[t]he doctrine is generally applied when an insurance policy has been 
misrepresented or misunderstood, or when a legal technicality would defeat 
the insured’s objectively reasonable expectations.”21  Courts in New 
Hampshire use the term “reasonable expectations” in cases involving 
estoppel based on an agent’s representations which are contrary to the 
policy language,22 while Indiana courts enforce unambiguous clauses in 
accord with the insured’s reasonable expectations where policies provide 
“only illusory coverage.”23  Each of these formulations impose significant 
restrictions which rob the doctrine of reasonable expectations of  its 
essential character.24   
Another measure of the doctrine’s waning importance is its explicit 
rejection by the great majority of jurisdictions.   In these jurisdictions, there 
is no doctrine of reasonable expectations; the policyholder’s reasonable 
expectations function only to limit the reach of the principle of resolving 
ambiguities against the insurer.  Twenty-seven jurisdictions fall into this 
category.25   Some of these jurisdictions continue to refer to the “reasonable 
                                                                                                                
20. See, e.g. Morgan v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., No. CV 06-1136-PHX-JAT, slip 
op. at 2(D. Ariz. 2007).  The Arizona Supreme Court specifically adopted the rationale of 
Comment (f) in Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters, 682 P.2d 388, 405 
(Ariz. 1984). 
21. Carlson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 734 N.W.2d 695, 700 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007). 
22. See, e.g.,Trefethen v. N.H. Ins. Group, 645 A.2d 72, 75 (N.H. 1994)  
23. McGuire v. Century Sur. Co., 861 N.E.2d 357, 363 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). 
24. See, e.g.,Bituminous Cas. Corp. V. Sand Livestock Sys., 728 N.W.2d 216, 220-
21(Iowa 2007); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Corrigan, 697 N.W.2d 108, 118 (Iowa 2005); 
Amco Ins. Co. v. Estate of Wehde, No. 05-0503, 2006 WL 650234, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. 
2006). Arizona imposes similar limitations.  See, e.g., Gordiner v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 
742 P.2d 277, 283-84 (Ariz. 1987) (policyholder’s reasonable expectations overcome policy 
language only where policy is ambiguous; policyholder has inadequate notice of unusual or 
unexpected terms; or insurer creates an objective or subjective impression of coverage); 
State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Grabowski, 150 P.3d 275, 281 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007). 
25. See Merino v. Allstate Indem. Co., 231 Fed.Appx. 682, 683 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(“Under California law, the reasonable expectations doctrine applies only if the policy is 
ambiguous or if a term is a limitation on coverage not brought to the insured’s attention.”); 
Terra Nova Ins., Ltd. v. Fort Bridger Historical Rendezvous Site Corp., 151 Fed.Appx. 678, 
681 (10th Cir. 2005) (indicating that Wyoming courts would apply doctrine of reasonable 
expectations to ambiguous policy); Kolb v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 355 F.3d 1132, 1136 
(8th Cir. 2004) (applying Arkansas law); Avemo Ins. Co. v. Auburn Flying Serv., Inc., 242 
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F.3d 819, 822 (8th Cir. 2001) (“Under Nebraska law, we would only consider reasonable 
expectations if the contract language was first found to be ambiguous.”); Nationwide Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 270 F.3d 948, 954 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“District of Columbia law 
forbids application of the reasonable expectations doctrine to alter an otherwise clear policy 
provision.”); Park-Ohio Indus., Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 975 F.2d 1215, 1223 (6th Cir. 
1992) (Ohio has rejected the reasonable expectation doctrine); Nelson v. Becton, 929 F.2d 
1287, 1291 (8th Cir. 1991) (Eighth Circuit expressly refused to incorporate doctrine of 
reasonable expectations as part of federal common law); Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Gamble, No. 05-
5189, 2007 WL 1657107, at *4 (D. N.J. June 5, 2007); Dougherty v. Farmers New Century 
Ins. Co., No. 3:CV 06-98, 2007 WL 1074756, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2007) (reasonable 
expectations doctrine does not apply unless policy ambiguous; insurer makes unilateral 
change to policy without notifying insured; or insured requests one type of coverage and 
receives another); S. Land and Golf Co. Ltd. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2:03-2189-
DCN, 2006 WL 2443340, at *3 (D. S.C. Aug. 22, 2006); Peck v. Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 
363 F.Supp.2d 137, 145 (D. Conn. 2005); Miller v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 376 
F.Supp.2d 1238, 1245 (D. N.M. 2005); Sigmund v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 374 F.Supp.2d 
33, 36 (D. D.C. 2005); 40 Gardenville, L.L.C. v. Travelers, 387 F.Supp.2d 205, 212 (W.D. 
N.Y. 2005); Giddens v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the U.S., 356 F.Supp.2d 1313, 
1325 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (reasonable expectations doctrine cannot be used to avoid otherwise 
unambiguous limitation in policy), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, Giddens v. Equitable Life 
Assurance Soc’y of the U.S., 445 F.3d 1286, 1301 (11th Cir. 2006); Federated Mut. Ins. Co. 
v. Abston Petroleum, Inc., No. 1051589, 2007 WL 1098564, at *9 (Ala. Apr. 13, 2007); 
Safeway Ins. Co. of Ala., Inc. v. Herrera, 912 So.2d 1140, 1145 (Ala. 2005) (“[T]his Court 
limited the doctrine of ‘reasonable expectations’ to ambiguous provisions of an insurance 
policy.”]; TIG Ins. Co. of Mich. v. Homestore, Inc., 137 Cal. App. 4th 749, 755-56 (2006) 
(“Where the policy is clear and unequivocal, the only thing the insured may ‘reasonably 
expect’ is the coverage afforded by the plain language of the mutually agreed-upon terms.”); 
Hodgson v. Banner Life Ins. Co., 124 Cal. App. 4th 1358, 1361 n.2 (2004) (“It has never 
been the rule that a court could ignore the clear and explicit terms of insurance policy under 
the guise of protecting the reasonable expectations of the insured.”); Hallowell v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 443 A.2d 925, 928 (Del. 1982) (“[W]e hold that the doctrine of 
reasonable expectations is applicable in Delaware to a policy of insurance only if the terms 
thereof are ambiguous or conflicting, or if thepolicy contains a hidden trap or pitfall, or if 
the fine print purports to take away what is written in large print.”);  Deni Assoc. of Fla., 
Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 711 So.2d 1135, 1140 (Fla. 1998) (“We decline to 
adopt the doctrine of reasonable expectations. . . . To apply the doctrine to an unambiguous 
provision would be to rewrite the contract and the basis upon which the premiums are 
charged.”); Sapp v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 486 S.E.2d 71, 74 (Ga. App. 1997); Ryals 
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 1 P.3d 803, 805 (Idaho 2000) (“We decline the invitation 
[to adopt the doctrine of reasonable expectations].  We have previously rejected the 
reasonable expectations doctrine in favor of traditional rules of contract construction.”); El 
Rincon Supportive Servs. Org., Inc. v. First Nonprofit Mut. Ins. Co., 803 N.E.2d 532, 540 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (“The ‘reasonable expectations’ doctrine is not recognized in Illinois.”); 
Conseco, Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, No. 49D130202CP000348, 2002 
WL 31961447, at *13 (Ind. Cir. Dec. 31, 2002) (reasonable expectations doctrine has no 
application unless policy ambiguous or illusory); Rhynerson v. Hardy, No. 95282, 2006 WL 
1976781, at *6 (Kan. App. July 14, 2006) (“In Kansas, the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations only applies when a contract is ambiguous.”); A.W. Chesterton Co. v. Mass. 
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Insurers Insolvency Fund, 838 N.E.2d 1237, 1250 (Mass. 2005); Wilkie v. Auto-Owners 
Ins. Co., 664 N.W.2d 776, 782 (Mich. 2003) (“[T]he rule of reasonable expectations . . . is 
invalid as an approach to contract interpretation.”); Harvey v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 258695, 
2006 WL 707789, at *2 (Mich. App. Mar. 21, 2006) (“‘[T]he rule of reasonable 
expectations has no application in Michigan, and those cases that recognized this doctrine’ 
have been overruled.”); Reinsurance Ass’n of Minn. v. Johannessen, 516 N.W.2d 562, 566 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (“The doctrine should not be applied where a prominent policy term 
excludes coverage and the evidence does not indicated the insured was misled.”); Farmers 
Ins. Exch. v. Young, 832 P.2d 376, 379 n.3 (Nev. 1992) (discussing other jurisdictions’ use 
of reasonable expectations doctrine and stating “We have not gone that far”; using 
expectations of parties only where the policy is ambiguous); N.H. Banfield v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., 880 A.2d 373, 379 (N.H. 2005); Morrison v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co. of Am., 887 A.2d 166, 
169 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005); Argent v. Brady, 901 A.2d 419, 424 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2006) (“Only where the language is ambiguous does the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations come into play, permitting a construction that favors such expectations of an 
insured.”); Rehders v. Allstate Ins. Co., 135 P.3d 237, 246 (N.M. App. 2006) (“The doctrine 
of reasonable expectations may be invoked when the language of an insurance policy or 
representations of the insurance company lead an insured to reasonably expect coverage. . . 
The doctrine is also available where policy language is ambiguous.”); Nationwide Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Lagodinski, 683 N.W.2d 903, 911-12 (N.D. 2004) (“This Court has expressly 
declined to adopt the doctrine of reasonable expectations.”); Sterling Merch. Co. v. Hartford 
Ins. Co., 506 N.E.2d 1192, 1197 (Ohio App. 1986) (“[T]he reasonable expectation doctrine 
requires a court to rewrite an insurance contract which does not meet popular expectations.  
Such rewriting is done regardless of the bargain entered into by the parties to the contract.  
Such judicial activism has not been adopted in Ohio by its courts.”); Max True Plastering 
Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 912 P.2d 861, 870 (Okl. 1996) (“Oklahoma law mandates that 
we join the majority of jurisdictions which have considered application of the doctrine and 
apply it to cases in which policy language is ambiguous and to situations where, although 
clear, the policy contains exclusions masked by technical or obscure language or hidden 
exclusions.”); BP Am., Inc. v. State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 148 P.3d 832, 839 (Okl. 
2005); Morgan v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 400 P.2d 223, 225 (Or. 1965); Donegal Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Baumhammers, 893 A.2d 797, 819 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (insured may not complain 
that reasonable expectations frustrated where policy limitations are clear and unambiguous); 
JEP Mgmt., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 4170, 2006 WL 2372961, at *3 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 8, 
2006) (“The reasonable expectations doctrine does not apply to unambiguous policy 
language.  The Supreme court has identified only two applications for the doctrine of 
reasonable expectations: protecting non-commercial insured from policy terms which are 
not readily apparent; and protecting non-commercial insured from deception by insurance 
agents.”); Ex Parte: United States Auto. Ass’n, 614 S.E.2d 652, 654 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005) 
(“The doctrine of reasonable expectations, which is essentially that the objectively 
reasonable expectations of insurde as to coverage will be honored even though a careful 
review of the terms of the policy would have shown otherwise, has been rejected in South 
Carolina.”); Culhane v. W. Nat. Mut. Ins. Co., 704 N.W.2d 287, 292 (S.D. 2005) ("[T]his 
Court has repeatedly declined to adopt [the reasonable expectations] doctrine;” “The 
doctrine of reasonable expectations simply does not apply to policy language [where it is 
unambiguous].”); Vandeventer v. All Am. Life & Cas. Co., 101 S.W.3d 703, 710 n.8 (Tex. 
App. 2003) (“Texas law does not recognize the ‘Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations’ of 
the insured as a ba sis to disregard unambiguous policy provisions.”); Smith v. Rio Grand 
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expectations doctrine”; but it is clear from the language and facts of the 
cases that it is not the doctrine explicated by Judge Keeton.  Other 
jurisdictions, while not explicitly rejecting the doctrine, define it such that 
it is limited to situations where the policy is ambiguous.26  A number of 
                                                                                                                          
Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 227 S.W.2d 579, 582 (Tex. App. 1950); Allen v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. 
Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 805 (Utah 1992) (court rejects doctrine of reasonable expectations; 
citing cases which “show our unwillingness to alter fundamentally the terms of insurance 
policies in the absence of legislative direction” and “consequent uneasiness of a majority of 
this court with the notion of a reasonable expectations doctrine.”); Findlay v. United Pac. 
Ins. Co., 917 P.2d 116, 121 (Wash. 1996) (“The ‘reasonable expectation’ doctrine has never 
been adopted in Washington.”); Rowland v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 512 P.2d 1129, 
1131 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973); O’Donnell v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Wyo., 76 P.3d 308, 
315 (Wyo. 2003) (rules of construction such as doctrine of reasonable expectations 
inapplicable where contract terms are clear and unambiguous); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. 
Co. v. Albany County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 763 P.2d 1255, 1263 (Wyo. 1988) (doctrine of 
reasonable expectations does not apply where policy is unambiguous); See, e.g., Walter H. 
Crosky, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in California: A Judge’s View, 5 CONN. 
INS. L.J. 451, 457 (1998) (use of objectively reasonable expectations of insured to resolve 
ambiguities). 
26. See Hoang v. Assurance Co. of Am., 149 P.3d 798, 802 (Colo. 2007) (invoking 
the reasonable expectations doctrine but measuring the insured’s expectations against those 
of a careful reader of the policy); Brown v. Ind. Ins. Co., 184 S.W.3d 528, 540 (Ky. 2005) 
(“Th[e] principle [of reasonable expectations] pertains to alleged ambiguities within the 
policy.  The gist of the doctrine is that the insured is entitled to all the coverage he may 
reasonably expect to be provided under the policy.  Only an unequivocally conspicuous, 
plain and clear manifestation of the company’s intention to exclude coverage will defeat that 
expectation.”); In Re St. Louis Encephalitis Outbreak in Ouachita Parish, 939 So.2d 563, 
568 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (“Ambiguity will be resolved by ascertaining how a reasonable 
insurance policy purchaser would construe the clause at the time the insurance contract was 
entered.  The court should construe the policy ‘to fulfill the reasonable expectations of the 
parties in the light of the customs and usages of the industry.’  In insurance parlance, this is 
labeled the reasonable expectations doctrine.”); Wellcome v. Home Ins. Co., 849 P.2d 190, 
194 (Mont. 1993) (“Expectations which are contrary to a clear exclusion from coverage are 
not ‘objectively reasonable.’”).  See also Hamilton v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 465 
F.Supp.2d 1060, 1067 (D. Mont. 2006) (“‘[T]he reasonable expectations doctrine is 
inapplicable where   . . . the terms of the insurance policy clearly demonstrate an intent to 
exclude coverage’ because expectations that are contrary to a clear exclusion are not 
objectively reasonable.”); Aguigar v. Generali Assicurazioi Ins. Co., 715 N.E.2d 1046, 
1048-49 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) (“Massachusetts cases have smiled upon, even if not yet 
wholly embraced, the process of analyzing a provision of an insurance contract in light of 
the reasonable expectation of the insurance buyer.” But note that “When reasonable 
expectations analysis comes into play, it is more likely to do so when the task is to interpret 
an ambiguous provision rather than an unambiguous one.”); Kertz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co, No. ED 88839, 2007 WL 1976787, at *5 (Mo. Ct. App. July 10, 2007) (“The 
doctrine of reasonable expectations guarantees that the ‘objectively reasonable expectations 
of applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be 
honored even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those 
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jurisdictions, have neither   explicitly rejected or adopted the doctrine,27 
while in others there is no dispositive discussion of the issue.28  In short, the 
devolution of the doctrine of reasonable expectations exemplifies the 
increasing judicial reliance on standard contract in insurance cases.     
 
B. BAD FAITH ACTIONS 
 
Another measure of the courts’ reversion to standard contract 
principles in insurance cases is the increasingly common classification of 
the action for bad faith as a contract action.  
While the cause of action, in both third-party and first-party cases, 
originally sounded in tort,29 many courts now classify the action as 
contract-based.30  A significant number of recent decisions state that 
contract rather than tort provides the theoretical basis for bad faith breach 
in first-party31 as well as third-party32 actions.  
                                                                                                                          
expectations.’  However, the ‘doctrine or reasonable expectations is not in strict accordance 
with traditional principles of contract interpretation.’ Therefore, ‘application of the objective 
reasonable expectation doctrine . . . depends on the presence of an ambiguity in the policy 
language.’”); Alea London Ltd. v. Bono-Soltysiak Enters., 16 S.W.3d 403, 415 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2006) (“The ‘objective reasonable expectations of adherents and beneficiaries to 
insurance contracts will be honored even though a thorough study of policy provisions 
would have negated these expectations.’  However, the reasonable expectations rule cannot 
be used to construe unambiguous policy terms.”).  
27. See Todd v. Dow Chem. Co., 760 F.2d 192, 196 (8th Cir. 1985) (“[W]e regard the 
doctrine of reasonable expectations, as applied in this context, with some skepticism.  The 
effect of such a theory is to place a gloss over the doctrine of estoppel, which would allow 
recovery without showing prejudice or detrimental reliance.  We find no clear support for 
such a theory in the caselaw of Arkansas.”), Chandler v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa., 833 
F.Supp. 735, 738 n. 8 (E.D. Ark. 1993) (questioning whether doctrine of reasonable 
expectations applied in Arkansas); Firemen’s Ins. Co. of Wash., D.C. v. Kline & Son 
Cement Repair, Inc., 474 F.Supp.2d 779, 798 (E.D. Va. 2007) (“Virginia has never 
explicitly adopted the ‘reasonable expectations’ doctrine.”). 
28. Maine, Maryland, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, 
Vermont, and Wisconsin. 
29. See, e.g., Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 179 (Cal. 1967) (permitting an 
award of damages for mental suffering where insurer breached duty to settle).   
30. See ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW Law §25G, (3rd ed. 
2002). The classification may be inconsequential in some instances, since contract remedies, 
flexibly applied, can afford full compensation in many cases.  For example, in the third-
party context, contract damages would cover foreseeable consequences of an insurer’s 
unjustified refusal to defend its policyholder, including the entry of a judgment in excess of 
policy limits. Id. 
31. See, e.g., Coleman Dupont Homsey v.Vigilant Ins. Co., 496 F. Supp.2d 433, 437 
(D. Del. 2007); HHC Assoc. v. Assur. Co. of America, 256 F.Supp.2d 505, 508 (E.D. Va. 
 
2008] FREEDOM OF CONTRACT IN INSURANCE 119 
 
Consistent with a contract-based  approach, a number of courts have 
limited the first-party action to situations in which there is actually 
coverage under the policy, even where the claim depends on the insurer’s 
failure to conduct a timely investigation of the claim.33  This limitation 
presumably derives from the view of the action as one sounding in contract 
rather than tort:  even if the insurer’s conduct is negligent, reckless, 
intentional, or even malicious, there is no basis for complaint if there is no 
coverage and correspondingly no breach of contract.   The view extends in 
some cases to third-party actions.  The California Supreme Court found 
                                                                                                                          
2003); Pickett v. Lloyd’s, 621 A.2d 445, 452 (N.J. 1993); Bhattacharyya v. Quincy Mut. 
Fire Ins. Co., 799 N.Y.S.2d 158 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 15, 2004); Zenor v. Standard Ins. Co., 
No. Civ. 01-1226-FR, 2002 WL 31466503, at *1 (D. Or. Apr. 3, 2002). See also Kakule v. 
Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No. Civ. A.06-4995, 2007 WL 1810667, at *5 (E.D. Pa. 2007) 
(predicting that Pennsylvania courts would extend rationale of third-party cases, holding 
action sounded in contract, to first-party cases); University Medical Assoc. v. 
Unumprovident Corp., 335 F.Supp.2d 702, 711-12 (S.C. 2004) (recognizing that the first 
party action for bad faith sounds in tort, but limiting damages to contract damages); 
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 798 n.8 (Utah 1991).  Contra Gov't 
Employees Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 176 F.Supp.2d 1005, 1033 (D. Haw. 2001); Stephens v. Safeco 
Ins. Co. of America, 852 P.2d 565, 567 (Mont. 1993); Wathor v. Mut. Assurance. Adm’rs, 
Inc., 87 P.3d 559, 564 n.1 (Okla. 2004) (action sounds in tort, notwithstanding that it also 
constitutes breach of contract). 
32. See, e.g., New England Ins. Co. v. Healthcare Underwriters Mut. Ins. Co., 352 
F.3d 599, 606 (2d Cir. 2003); Hartz v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 269 F.3d 474, 476 (4th Cir. 
2001); Ross v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., No. 06-0811-CV-W-FJG,  2007 WL 
1774443, at *3 (W.D. Mo. June 18, 2007) (bad faith action for breach of duty to defend 
sounds in contract, while action for breach of duty to settle sounds in tort); Fireman’s Fund 
Ins. Co. v. CTIA, 480 F. Supp. 2d 7, 11 (D. D.C. Jan. 5, 2007); Naumes, Inc. v. Chubb 
Custom Ins. Co., Civil No. 05-1327, 2007 WL 54782, at *6 (D. Or. 2007); Geo M. Martin 
Co. v. Royal Ins. Co. of America, Civil No. 04-2725 (PJS/JJG), 2006 WL 3804379 at, *4 
(D. Minn. 2006); Essex Builders Group, Inc. v. Amerisure Ins. Co., 485 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 
1305 (M.D. Fla. 2006); Anderson v. Va. Sur. Co., Inc., 985 F. Supp. 182, 185 (D. Me. 
1998); Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 839 So.2d 614, 616 (Ala. 
2002); Collins v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc., 880 A.2d 106, 119 (Conn. 2005); Aves v. 
Shah, 906 P.2d 642, 648 (Kan. 1995); Birth Center v. St. Paul Co. Inc., 787 A.2d 376, 391 
(Pa. 2001) (Nigro, J., dissenting). Contra, Microsoft Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. C01-1815C, 
2003 WL 24330081, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Feb 13, 2003); Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 
176 F.Supp.2d 1005, 1033 n.35 (D. Haw. 2001); Daugherty v. Allstate Ins. Co., 55 P.3d 
224, 226 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002); Canal Indemn. Co. v. Greene, 593 S.E.2d 41, 46 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2003); Schal Bovis, Inc. v. Casualty Ins. Co., 732 N.E.2d 1082, 1092 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1999).  
33 State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Slade, 747 So. 2d 293, 317 (Ala. 1999); Waller v. 
Truck Ins. Exch., Inc. 900 P.2d 619, 639 (Cal. 1995); Robinson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 45 P.3d 829, 834 (Idaho 2002) (plaintiff in bad faith case must establish coverage 
even if claim based on unreasonable delay); Richardson v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 984 P.2d 
917, 923 (Or. App. 1999). 
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that there was no action for bad faith breach of the duty to defend in a 
third-party case where there was no potential for coverage under the policy: 
it is clear that if there is no potential for coverage, and hence, no duty to 
defend under the terms of the policy, there can be no action for breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because the covenant is 
based on the contractual relationship between the insured and the insurer.34  
 
C. CONSTRUING AMBIGUITIES AGAINST THE INSURER      
 
Even the hardiest of the specialized insurance rules, the ambiguity 
doctrine, has shifted, with courts moving away from automatic construction 
in favor of the policyholder to reliance on standard contract rules.35  The 
normal analytic sequence in contract interpretation requires the court first 
to assess the clarity of the contract language.   If the language is clear, it is 
enforced;36 if it is ambiguous, the fact-finder determines the parties’ 
intentions37 through the review of extrinsic or parol evidence.38  If the 
ambiguity remains, the contract is construed against the drafter.39  Contra 
proferentem is thus a rule of last resort, applicable only after other means 
of determining the parties’ intent have failed.  The insurance version of the 
rule differs radically.  Once the court finds an ambiguity, the interpretation 
favoring the policyholder prevails, without reference to the parties’ intent 
and without examination of extrinsic evidence.40  Thus, in the context of 
                                                                                                                
34. Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch., Inc., 900 P.2d 619, 639 (Cal. 1995). 
35. See Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous 
Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105, 1107-1108 (2006); Scott G. Johnson, Resolving 
Ambiguities in Insurance Policy Language: The Contra Proferentem Doctrine and Use of 
Extrinsic Evidence, 33 WTR. BRIEF 33, 34 (2004); Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of 
Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95 MICH. L. REV. 531, 537 (1997); David S. Miller, 
Insurance as Contract: The Argument for Abandoning the Ambiguity Doctrine, 88 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1849, 1850-1859 (1988), for discussions of the doctrine. 
36. See generally 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE 
LAW OF CONTRACTS §32.3 (4th ed. 1999); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §201 cmt. 
(a), §202 (2005).  
37. See generally 11 WILLISTON, supra note 36, §32:2. 
38. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§202-03 (2005); UCC §1-
205(4) (2000); 11 WILLISTON, supra note 36, §49:19; 5-24 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§24.9, 
24.10 (2007). Such evidence includes circumstances existing at the formation of the 
contract, the parties’ purposes, the parties’ course of performance or course of dealing, and 
trade usages.  
39. See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, §206; CORBIN, supra note 38, §24.27 
(2007); WILLISTON, supra note 38, §32:12 (4th ed. 2006).    
40. See, e.g., Daburlos v. Commercial Ins. Co. of Am., 521 F.2d 18, 26 (3d Cir. 1975) 
(applying Pennsylvania law, noting that courts may receive extrinsic evidence where 
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insurance, contra proferentem is applied  as a primary rule of construction 
without resort to ordinary interpretive rules.41  In recent years, 
commentators have advocated for adherence to usual contract rules,42 and 
courts have increasingly applied those rules.43  A striking example comes 
                                                                                                                          
contract ambiguous, but distinguishing insurance contracts. “However, if the contract is an 
insurance contract, the ambiguity must be resolved against the insurer.  There is no need in 
an insurance case to take that extrinsic evidence.”). Little v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 649 F. 
Supp. 1460, 1466 (W.D. Pa. 1986) (no reliance on extrinsic evidence in interpreting 
insurance policy because Pennsylvania law provides clear rule of construction requiring 
resolution of ambiguities against insurer); Beale v. Am. Nat’l Lawyers Ins. Reciprocal, 843 
A.2d 78, 87-88 (Md. Ct. App. 2004) (distinguishing majority rule, strict construction against 
insurance company, with Maryland rule construing against drafter only if no extrinsic or 
parol evidence available or such evidence does not resolve ambiguity); Cheney v. Bell Nat. 
Life Ins. Co. 556 A.2d 1135, 1138 (Md. Ct. App. 1989) (distinguishing majority strict 
construction rule against insurance company with Maryland rule construing against drafter 
only if no extrinsic or parol evidence available or such evidence does not resolve 
ambiguity); Andres v. Am. Std. Ins. Co. of Wisconsin, 134 P.3d 1061, 1063 (Or. App. 2006) 
(comparing judicial task in contract interpretation, which requires resolution of contract 
ambiguity through resort to extrinsic evidence to determine parties’ intent, and interpretation 
of insurance policies, which involves examination of policy for ambiguity and resolution 
against insurer). Although they appear to apply the strict insurance law version of contra 
proferentem, many courts have not explicitly discussed the differences between standard 
contract interpretation and insurance law in the interpretation and construction of policies.  
Many cases acknowledge the distinction between contract and insurance versions of contra 
proferentem. See SI Mgt. L.P. v. Wininger, 707 A.2d 37,43 (Del. 1998) (where standard 
form contract ambiguous, rule of construction against drafter is determinative). See also 
ALLAN WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES, §603 (3d ed. 1995) (under strict rule, 
“once an ambiguity is discovered, courts may not look first to extrinsic evidence in order to 
eliminate the ambiguity; they may, instead, automatically resolve the ambiguity against the 
insurer.”). 
41. Andres, 134 P.3d. at 1063. The application of either approach will yield the same 
result in many instances, since there may be minimal or no extrinsic evidence bearing on the 
resolution of the ambiguity.  Because insurance contracts consist of industry-drafted and 
statutorily-mandated provisions, they are not typically subject to the sort of negotiation 
which produces useful extrinsic evidence. However, the difference in the approaches may be 
dispositive in other situations, such as cases involving an agent’s representations.   
42. See generally WINDT, supra note 40, §603 (noting  that automatic resolution of 
ambiguity against insurer  results in the creation of policy coverage contrary to parties’ 
intent and arguing that rule should be abandoned in favor of ordinary rule); Johnson, supra 
note 35, at 33 (arguing that presumption of coverage arising from ambiguity no longer 
universally followed); 1 BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON 
INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES at 9-11(13th ed. 2006) (doctrine of ambiguities should only 
be applied "as a last resort," and should not arise "unless it is first demonstrated that: (a) the 
policy is ambiguous; and (b) the ambiguity may not be resolved by resort to extrinsic 
evidence of intent"). 
43. See, e.g., St. Paul Travelers Cos., Inc. v. Corn Island Shipyard, Inc., 495 F.3d 376, 
383 (7th Cir. 2007) (applying New York law); Willing v. Cmty. Ass’n Underwriters of Am., 
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from a recent decision by a divided Michigan Supreme Court.44  The 
majority of the Court held that ordinary contract rules governed an 
insurance dispute, such that contra proferentem applies only if the parties’ 
intent cannot be discerned through use of conventional rules of 
interpretation, including examination of relevant extrinsic evidence.  The 
dissenters disagreed, arguing that contra proferentem in the insurance 
context is a primary rule of construction, not a rule of last resort, and that 
extrinsic evidence is not admissible to clarify ambiguity in the contract.45 
The dissenters stated:  “[T]his Court has consistently applied the rule of 
construing against the drafter as its primary, indeed sole, aid to 
construction.”46  
 
III. FREEDOM OF CONTRACT  
  
The principle of freedom of contract rests variously on respect for 
individual rights and autonomy or on the instrumentalist view that 
individual choice furthers an efficient market, maximizing individual and 
social utility.   Freedom of contract entails at least three related conceptions 
of freedom.47  The first is a positive conception involving the liberty of 
                                                                                                                          
Inc., No. C06-1357RSL, 2007 WL 1991038, at *4 (W.D. Wash. July 5, 2007); Pierce 
Assoc., Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury, 437 F. Supp. 2d 16, 20-21 (D. D.C. 2006) (applying New 
York law and finding summary judgment improper where policy language ambiguous and 
extrinsic evidence available);  Sloan v. Hartford Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 433 F. Supp. 2d 
1037, 1048 (D. N.D. 2006) (if ERISA plan deemed ambiguous, extrinsic evidence may be 
considered; “any ambiguities should be construed against drafter only as a last step.”); 
McNeilab, Inc. v. North River Ins. Co., 645 F. Supp. 525, 544 (D. N.J. 1986) (calling 
Daburlos, supra note 40, into question); Rich Maid Kitchens, Inc. v. Pa. Lumbermens Mut. 
Ins. Co., 641 F. Supp. 297, 306, 308 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (rejecting Daburlos, supra note 40, 
where ambiguity arises because no meeting of minds); State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. 
Ark. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, No. 06-1480, 2007 WL 1707358 (Ark.  June 14, 2007); Collier 
v. MD-Individual Practice Ass'n, Inc., 607 A.2d 537, 539 (Md. Ct. App 1992); Bird v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 165 P.3d 343, 347 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007). See generally 2 COUCH 
ON INS. §22:22 (3rd ed. 2006). 
44. Klapp v. United Ins. Group Agency, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 447, 456 (Mich. 2003).  
45. Id. at 460. 
46. Id. at 485. 
47. Several books and articles treat the conceptual underpinnings of freedom of 
contract; all of these inform the discussion here.  P.S. ATIYAH, ET AL, THE RISE AND FALL OF 
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 1-3 (1979); MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF 
CONTRACT 78-79 (1993); THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (F. H. Buckley, 
ed.,1999); Mark Pettit, Jr., Freedom, Freedom of Contract, and the “Rise and Fall”, 79 B.U. 
L. Rev. 263, 282-85 (1999); Robert Braucher, Freedom of Contract and Second 
Restatement, 78 Yale L.J. 598, 616 (1969).   
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individuals to make their own choices.  In contract, this is the freedom to 
identify a possible exchange, to bargain for terms, and to enter an 
agreement based on mutual assent.  The second is a negative conception, 
consisting of freedom from governmental constraints or interference while 
engaging in these acts.  Finally, freedom of contract entails the ability of 
individuals to access the power of government to enforce their agreements. 
In each of these aspects, freedom of contract has always embodied 
fictions.48   The idea of freedom to assent, for example, is undercut by the 
use of an objective test relying on conduct rather than actual intent,49 by the 
increasingly common use of standard form contracts (like insurance 
policies) to which there is often no meaningful agreement,50 and by social 
and economic conditions which may constrain an individual’s autonomous 
choice.  Similarly, although freedom from government interference may 
have been the norm at some point in the 19th century, the steady 
encroachment of legislative restrictions has circumscribed that freedom as 
well.51 And courts have always had the means of avoiding strict 
enforcement of the terms of a contract through equity.52    
In the context of insurance, there is even greater reason to question the 
notion of freedom of contract as a first principle.  An examination of 
insurance transactions demonstrates that there is limited freedom involved.  
The next two sections focus on freedom of contract as protection of the 
ability to make individual choices and as involving the absence of 
government interference.  The first demonstrates that policyholders (with 
the possible exception of some large commercial policyholders) have little 
or no bargaining power and exercise no meaningful choice about policy 
terms; the second demonstrates that insurance companies are subject to 
extensive regulation of policy terms, conditions, and rates by state 
legislatures and regulatory bodies.   
                                                                                                                
48. See P.S. ATIYAH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT, 9-13 (5th ed. 
1995). 
49. See REST. 2D CONTRACTS, §2 Comment b, 16 (2d ed 2005) (the phrase 
“manifestation of intention” adopts an external or objective standard for interpreting 
conduct; distinguished from undisclosed intention). 
50. See REST. 2D CONTRACTS, §211 Standardized Agreements, Comment b (2d ed 
2005) (noting that consumers who agree to standard forms do not read or understand the 
terms, instead trusting in the good faith of the drafter and accepting the tacit representation 
that like terms are routinely accepted by others similarly situated).   
51. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW, 532-63 (2d ed. 
1985). 
52. See P.S. ATIYAH, supra note 47, 404-05 (noting that even in the classical period, 
English judges utilized equity and other methods to accomplish substantive justice). 
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Together, these sections demonstrate that the routine judicial invocation of 
the principle of freedom of contract in insurance cases is a fundamental 
error.       
 
A. FREEDOM OF CONTRACT FROM THE POLICYHOLDER’S 
PERSPECTIVE: STANDARD FORMS AND ADHESION  
 
Insurance policies are typically standard forms.  Standardization is 
critical because the insurance industry pools claims data to predict future 
losses and price policies accordingly; accuracy in this important endeavor 
requires that insurance companies offer uniform coverage.53  Property and 
casualty insurers rely on the Insurance Services Office (ISO), which 
collects information from property/casualty companies and makes the 
resulting database available to help companies in pricing insurance.  The 
ISO also offers widely-used standard commercial and personal policies 
(including automobile insurance, various types of property insurance, 
workers compensation insurance, and liability policies of various types).54  
Standardization of insurance policies is crucial to the collection of actuarial 
data, but it also functions, as do all types of standardized contracts, to 
reduce costs.      
From the consumer’s perspective, standardization means that the 
insurance industry controls the content of the policy and that there is no 
negotiation over terms.  Insurance policies are thus adhesion contracts,55 
standard forms drafted by the insurer, offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, 
with the prospective policyholder at a complete disadvantage in terms of 
bargaining power.   As one noted author observes,  insurance policies are 
                                                                                                                
53. See generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 31-36 
(4th ed. 2005). 
54. See generally Insurance Serv. Office, http://www.iso.com (last visited Nov. 2, 
2007. Life and health insurance are not generally written on standard forms, primarily 
because data regarding the insured events (particularly mortality) is more reliable and 
available.  However, there is a great deal of uniformity in these types of policies as well, 
partly due to statutory requirements.  See infra text accompanying notes. 
55. In fact, insurance policies were the first type of contract to which the term 
“adhesion contract” was applied.  See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 295, 312 (2d ed. 
1990).  For general discussions of adhesion contracts, see Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of 
Adhesion–Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 641-45 
(1943); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. 
REV. 1173, 1284 (1983).  For a specific discussion of the concept in the context of 
insurance, see James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of 
Interpretation?: Text versus Context, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 995, 1001-02 (1992).  
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actually “super-adhesion” contracts, since, in some lines of insurance, all 
insurance companies provide identical coverage on the same take-it-or-
leave-it basis.56  The consumer’s only freely-made choice is the choice to 
purchase insurance.   
Insurance policies also satisfy another basic characteristic associated 
with adhesion contracts, specifically disparity of information.57  Insurance 
companies have far greater information and expertise than do 
policyholders; insurance consumers, even sophisticated consumers, find it 
extraordinarily difficult to penetrate the language of insurance policy 
forms.58  Most policyholders do not attempt to read their policies.59    
Even the decision to obtain insurance is not a freely-made choice in 
many instances.   State legislatures require the purchase of insurance in 
some instances, most notably automobile insurance.  Forty-seven states and 
the District of Columbia require automobile liability insurance covering 
bodily injury and property damage in specified amounts.60  Some also 
require uninsured motorists insurance and personal injury protection.61  
Once the consumer chooses to engage in the activity of owning and driving 
an automobile, insurance is required.  Workers’ compensation insurance is 
another form of required insurance.62  
 
                                                                                                                
56. Abraham, supra note 35 at 534. 
57. But see Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1177, 1180 (1983) (an influential study which does not include this 
aspect in its seven-factor definition of adhesion contract.  Rakoff recognizes that lack of 
consumer understanding is a “normal concomitant” of the use of form contracts but argues 
that it is not an essential feature).   
58. See id. at 1179-80 (this characteristic is part of the popular conception of adhesion 
contracts but is not, according to some commentators, essential).   
59. Even second and third year law students, who might be expected to be more 
careful than the average consumer, and more capable of reading and understanding complex 
contracts, typically admit that they have never read their automobile, health, or property 
insurance policies.   
60. WEST 50 STATE SURVEYS, INSURANCE – MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE, FINANCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY AND REQUIRED MINIMUMS (West 2006); See generally 
http://www.iii.org/individuals/auto/stateautolaws/. 
61. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 708, 721 (David 
Shapiro ed. The Foundation Press 1995); See also ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING 
INSURANCE LAW 996-98 (Matthew Bender 3d ed. 2002); See generally WEST 50 STATE 
SURVEYS, INSURANCE – UNINSURED/ UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE (West 2006); See 
generally ALAN WIDISS, UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE 22,36 
(Anderson Publishing 2d ed. 1985).     
62. COUCH ON INS. §§ 1:36, 133:2, 133:4; 133:6 (Thomson/West 3d ed. 2005). 
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B. FREEDOM OF CONTRACT FROM THE INSURER’S 
PERSPECTIVE:  REGULATION OF POLICY FORMS, 
RATES, AND OTHER MATTERS  
 
 State insurance codes are extensive.  The codes prohibit certain 
provisions and make others mandatory, and authorize insurance 
commissioners to exercise significant control over insurance policy forms, 
rates, and other matters.  Freedom of contract is thus significantly limited 
for companies as well for policyholders.  These limitations obviously do 
not preclude invocation of the principle of freedom of contract in policy 
interpretation.  However, the scope and extent  of regulatory control over 
the content of insurance policies strongly suggests that freedom of contract 
is not an appropriate analytical starting point.        
 
1. Rate Regulation 
 
All states authorize rate regulation in some form, charging insurance 
commissioners with ensuring that insurance rates are not excessive, 
inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory.63  Statutes prescribe various 
methods by which commissioners exercise this responsibility.  The most 
common approach is monitoring rates through rate filings and approval, 
either prior approval, under which the commissioner must approve rates 
before they may be used, or file and use, under which rates become 
effective when filed but may be disapproved by the commissioner within a 
specified period.64   
A number of states have deregulated rates.  Even those states, however, 
afford insurance commissioners significant residual authority by requiring 
insurance commissioners to monitor competition and to regulate rates in its 
absence.  The NAIC Model Rating Law, for example, provides, like all rate 
regulation statutes, that “rates shall not be excessive, inadequate or unfairly  
discriminatory” but also specifies that a rate in a competitive market is 
                                                                                                                
63. See, e.g., NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 375-1 CREDITOR-
PLACED INSURANCE ACT (2007); 430-1 HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION MODEL ACT 
(2007); 626-1 FINANCIAL GUARANTY INSURANCE MODEL ACT (2007); 710-1 MASS 
MARKETING OF PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE MODEL REGULATION (2006); 775-1 
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY MODEL RATING LAW (FILE AND USE VERSION) (2007); 780-1 
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY MODEL RATING LAW (PRIOR APPROVAL VERSION) (this is the 
language used by various NAIC Model Acts and it appears in most state codes).   
64.  See, e.g., NAIC MODEL LAWS at 780-1; See generally WEST 50 STATE STATUTORY 
SURVEYS, FILING REQUIREMENTS–RATES AND RATING PLANS, supra note 60. 
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deemed not excessive, and creates a presumption that the insurance market 
is competitive.65 The commissioner may, after hearings, rule that the 
market is not competitive and regulate rates for excessiveness in the 
ordinary way.  Such ruling expires no later than one year after issue.   In a 
competitive market, rates must be filed but are effective unless the 
commissioner finds after a hearing that the insurer’s financial condition 
requires rate supervision or that rating practices are unfairly 
discriminatory.66  In a noncompetitive market, rates become effective only 
after the commissioner has an opportunity to review and disapprove rates if 
they do not meet the requirements of the Act, typically within 15 to 90 
days.67  A number of states have adopted provisions similar to those in the 
NAIC Model.68  Some states include  provisions directing the insurance 
commissioner to assess the reasonableness of the coverage or benefits in 
relation to the premium charged, for all policies69 or for specific types of 
insurance, usually health insurance.70  
 
2. Policy Forms 
 
The laws of every state require regulatory review and approval of 
insurance policies  prior to their use.71  Statutes typically provide that 
                                                                                                                
65. NAIC MODEL LAWS, at 775-5 § 4 (there are no presumptions under the Model 
Law relating to the commissioner’s assessment of adequacy and unfair discrimination); Id. 
§§ 5A.(2) 5A.(3) 6.D (a number of states have adopted provisions similar to those in the 
NAIC Model).    
66. Id. at § 6C. 
67. Id. at § 6D. 
68. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-67-208 (2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-
686, 688 (West 1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18 § 2604 (1999); MO. REV. STAT. § 287.960 
(West 2005); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-16-1021 (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 412:15 
(LexisNexis 2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. §59A-17-6; OKLA. STAT ANN. tit. 36 § 985(West 
2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8 § 4685; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 26-14-103 (2007).   
69. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 687B.130 (LexisNexis 2003); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59A-1-
14 (LexisNexis 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-51-95 (2001); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-9 
(LexisNexis 2006). 
70. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-110 (2004);  CAL. INS. CODE § 779.9; 18 (West 2005); 
DEL. CODE  ANN. tit. 18, § 2713 (1999); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/155.57 (West 1993); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.14-130 (West 2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §48.18.110 (West 
1999). 
71. See WEST 50 STATE SURVEYS, supra note 60 (West ed. 2006); See also NAIC 
MODEL LAWS, supra note 63 (2007) (providing a listing of the states and references to filing 
requirements and approvals). Because of significant variations in state insurance codes and 
administrative regulations, generalizations are difficult.  Some states impose a generally-
applicable requirement of approval; others vary depending on the type of insurance.    
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regulators must disapprove a policy form that violates the insurance code; 
has titles or headings which are misleading; or is substantially illegible.72  
A number of state statutes further require disapproval of a policy form 
where it contains inconsistent, ambiguous, or misleading clauses, or 
exceptions and conditions that deceptively affect the risk purportedly 
assumed.73 Others mandate disapproval of any policy that contains 
provisions which are unjust, unfair, or inequitable, or contrary to public 
policy.74 
States also regulate the format and appearance of insurance policies, 
typically specifying the size of the type and requiring a table of contents or 
index.  The statutes also require spacing and formatting to aid 
comprehension.75  Many states impose “readability” standards.76  Some of 
                                                                                                                
72. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-14-9 (2006); ALASKA STAT. § 21.42.130 (2006); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1111 (2006);  ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-110 (2004); DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 18, § 2713 (2006); FLA. STAT. § 624.4412 (2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-10 (2002); 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-1813 (2007); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/155.57 (2007); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 304.14-130 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:621 (2007); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 24A, § 2413 (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 500.2236 (2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 
33-1-502 (2006); NEV. REV. STAT. § 687B.130 (2005); N.M. STAT. § 59A-18-14 (2006); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §3911.01.1 (LexisNexis 2007); OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3611 (2007); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-11-21 (2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3542 (2006); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 38.2-316 (2007); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 811 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE § 
48.18.110 (2007); W. VA. CODE § 33-6-9 (2007); WIS. STAT. § 631.20 (2006); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 26-15-111 (2007).  Most but not all of these statutes contain each of these three 
provisions.  Other states (as well as some of those cited) have similar provisions applicable 
only to specific lines of insurance.    
73.  See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 21.42.130 (2006); CAL. INS. CODE § 779.9 (West 
2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2713 (2006); FLA.STAT. ANN. § 627.411 (West 2007); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 33-24-10 (2002); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-1813(2) (2007); 215 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 5/155.57 (2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.14-130(1)(b) (West 2006); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 22:621(3) (2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24A, § 2413(1)(B) (2006); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 500.2236 (2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-1-502 (2006); NEV. REV. STAT. § 
687B.130(2) (2005); N.M. STAT. § 59A-18-14(A)(2) (2006); OKL. STAT. tit. 36 § 
3611(A)(2) (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-11-21(2) (2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 
3542(2) (2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-316 (2007); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 811(3) (2007); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 48.18.110(1)(c) (2007); W. VA. CODE § 33-6-9(b) (2007); WIS. STAT. § 
631.20 (2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 26-15-111(B) (2007).  Other states (as well as some of 
those cited) have similar types of provisions applicable only to specific lines of insurance. 
74. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-14-9 (2006); CAL. INS. CODE § 779.9 (West 2007); FLA. 
STAT. § 624.4412 (2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-10 (2002); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-1813 
(2007); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/155.57 (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-51-95 (2007); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 3911.01.1 (LexisNexis 2007).   
75.  See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-80-206(a) (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-297 
(2007); FLA. STAT. § 627.4145 (2007) (requiring use of titles and headings in bold, 
prohibiting “unnecessarily long, complicated, or obscure words, sentences, paragraphs, or 
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these readability statutes require calculations involving syllable, word, and 
sentence counts, often specifying a particular maximum score on the Flesch 
Readability test (typically between 40-50;  passages with scores of 90-100 
are easily understandable by average 5th graders and passages with scores 
of 0-30 can be best understood by college graduates.77).  
 
3. Mandated Content 
 
States control the content of insurance policies in significant and 
substantial ways.  Many jurisdictions mandate the inclusion of various 
                                                                                                                          
constructions”); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 120-2-42-.04 (2007); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10-104 
(2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2441 (2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 
2B (West 2007); MINN. STAT. § 72C.05(2) (2007); MINN. STAT. § 72C.01-.13 (2007); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 33-15-325 (2006); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-3405 (2004); NEV. REV. STAT. § 
687B.126 (2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 420-H:5 (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:17-21 
(West 2007); N.M. STAT. § 59A-19-4 (2006); N.Y. INS. LAW § 3102 (2007); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 58-38-20 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-33-30 (2007) (life insurance); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 26.1-36-14 (2007) (accident and health insurance); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
3902.04 (LexisNexis 2007); OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3645 (2007) (life, accident and health 
insurance); OR. REV. STAT. § 743.106 (2005); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-61-30 (2006); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 58-11A-6 (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-1605 (2006) (life and health 
insurance); TX. CODE ANN. § 1201.101 (2007) (accident and health insurance); WIS. STAT. § 
631.22 (2006).   See generally John A. Glenn, Annotation, Validity and Construction of 
Statutes Relating to Style or Prominence with which Provisions must be Printed in 
Insurance Policy, 36 A.L.R.3d 464 (1971).   
76. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1110.01 (2006); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-61-
115(b)(5) (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-297 (2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2740 
(2006) (automobile insurance); D.C. CODE § 31-4725 (life insurance); FLA. STAT. §§ 
626.9641(1)(f), 627.4145 (2007); GA. CODE  ANN. § 33-3-25 (2002); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 
120-2-42-.04(g) (2007); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10-104 (2006); IND. CODE § 27-1-26-5 
(2006); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.14-440l (West 2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 
2441 (2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 2B (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 500.2236(3) 
(2007); MINN. STAT. § 72C.09-10 (2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-15-325 (2006); NEB. 
REV. STAT. § 44-3405 (2004); NEV. REV. STAT. § 687B.126 (2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
420-H:5 (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:17-21 (West 2007); N.M. STAT. § 59A-19-4 (2006); 
N.Y. INS. LAW § 3102 (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-38-25 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-
33-30 (2007) (life insurance); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-36-14 (2007) (accident and health 
insurance); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3902.04 (LexisNexis 2007); OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3645 
(2007) (life, accident, and health insurance); Or. Rev. Stat. § 743.106 (2005); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 38-61-30 (2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-11A-3 (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-
7-1605 (2006) (life and health insurance); TX. CODE ANN. § 1201.101 (2007); WIS. STAT. § 
631.22 (2006).  See generally, Insurance Policies and Premiums: Readability of Insurance 
Policies, West’s 50 State Regulatory Surveys (2007). 
77. This article has a Flesch readability score of approximately 18.5, as determined by 
Microsoft Word. 
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types of provisions in insurance policies.  Some of these requirements are 
substantive, mandating various types of coverages or specific provisions; 
others deal with procedural issues, for example, by limiting an insurer’s 
power to cancel the policy.  There are a vast number of such requirements 
in every jurisdiction.  
One of the best-known examples is the 1943 New York Standard Fire 
Insurance Policy,78 which is used pursuant to statute in nearly every state 
(and is incorporated into standard homeowner’s policies).79  These statutes 
specify the form of the policy and the language which must be used.  They 
require loss payment provisions; provisions relating to fraud and 
concealment by the policyholder; exclusions for certain types of property 
(for example, bills, currency, deeds, and money) and specified perils 
(including enemy attack, invasion, insurrection, civil war, neglect of the 
insured to use reasonable means to preserve property at and after loss, and 
theft); various conditions; cancellation provisions; a standard mortgage 
clause; other insurance provisions; notice and claim provisions; and 
valuation provisions, among others.80   
All states have some form of compulsory automobile liability 
insurance.81  The statutes require policy limits in at least a specified 
minimum amount,82 and typically mandate other provisions as well, such as 
notice and cancellation provisions.83  Many states require omnibus 
coverage, that is,  coverage for permissive users of the insured vehicle.84 
Uninsured motorists coverage is required in most states,85 and various 
provisions are statutorily-mandated, including a basic coverage 
agreement;86 policyholder’s right to reject the coverage;87 limitations on 
stacking;88 permitted exclusions;89 and subrogation rights.90 
                                                                                                                
78. N.Y. INS. LAW § 3404 (McKinney 2007).   
79.  See 1-2 APPLEMAN ON INS. § 2.2.  
80. Id. 
81. See supra text accompanying notes 60-61. 
82. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 33-34-4 (2002).  
83. See, e.g., Id. at § 33-34-3(e).  
84. 12 COUCH ON INS. §170:5; 8 COUCH ON INS. § 111:23. 
85. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
86. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §40-284(a).  
87. See, e.g., Id. §40-284(c). 
88. See, e.g., id. §40-284(d). 
89. See, e.g., id. §40-284(e).  These include exclusions where the insured is occupying 
or struck by an uninsured auto or trailer owned by or provided to the insured for regular use 
or owned by a self-insurer or government entity; where there is no physical contact and no 
reliable evidence of the facts of the accident from a disinterested witness; to the extent that 
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Many states mandate various types of provisions in disability insurance 
policies, including format and readability requirements;91 entire contract 
provisions;92 time limits on certain defenses;93 grace periods;94 
reinstatement;95 notice of claim;96 claim forms;97 proofs of loss;98 time of 
payment of claims;99 payment of claims;100 physical examination and 
autopsy;101 legal actions;102 and change of beneficiary.103  The statutes also 
include many optional provisions; if the policy includes provisions dealing 
with these issues, it must use the statutory language or a substitute 
approved by the commissioner of insurance.104  Even the order of 
provisions is dictated.105 
Many states have statutes requiring that life insurance policies provide 
that the policy is incontestable after a certain number of years, typically one 
                                                                                                                          
workers’ compensation or personal injury protection benefits apply; or when suit is filed 
against the uninsured motorist without notice to the insurer.   
90. See, e.g., id. §40-284(f). 
91. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §27-19-2 (1998); MONT. STAT. §33-15-337 (1979). 
92. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §27-19-4 (1998). 
93. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §27-19-5 (1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §20-1342.02 (2002); 
MICH. CONS. LAW. ANN. 500.3408 (2001). 
94. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §27-19-6 (1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §20-1347 (2002); 
MICH. CONS. LAW. ANN. 500.3410 (2001). 
95. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §27-19-7 (1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §20-1348 (2002); 
MICH. CONS. LAW. ANN. 500.3411 (2001). 
96. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §27-19-8 (1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §20-1349 (2002); 
MICH. CONS. LAW. ANN. 500.3412 (2001). 
97. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §27-19-9 (1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §20-1350 (2002); 
MICH. CONS. LAW. ANN. 500.3413 (2001). 
98. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §27-19-10 (1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §20-1351 (2002); 
MICH. CONS. LAW. ANN. 500.3414 (2001). 
99. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §27-19-11 (1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §20-1352 (2002); 
MICH. CONS. LAW. ANN. 500.3416 (2001). 
100. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §27-19-12 (1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §20-1353 (2002); 
MICH. CONS. LAW. ANN. 500.3418 (2001). 
101. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §27-19-13; ARK. REV. STAT. §20-1354; MICH. CONS. LAW. 
ANN. 500.3420. 
102. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §27-19-14; ARK. REV. STAT. §20-1355; MICH. CONS. LAW. 
ANN. 500.3422. 
103. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §27-19-15; ARK. REV. STAT. §20-1356; MICH. CONS. LAW. 
ANN. 500.3424. 
104. These provisions deal with change of occupation, misstatement of age, other 
insurance with the insurer or other insurers, relations of earnings to insurance, unpaid 
premiums, conformity with state statutes, illegal occupation, and intoxicants and narcotics.  
See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§27-19-16-26. 
105. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §27-19-27. 
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or two, except for nonpayment of premiums.106  Other statutorily-mandated 
provisions concern suicide.  Some states require coverage for suicide which 
occurs after a certain number of years, typically one or two,107 or prohibit 
exclusions for suicide unless the suicide is proven to have been 
contemplated at the time of the application for the policy.108    
There are vast numbers of mandated health insurance provisions and 
coverages.  Some of these are clearly in the public interest, requiring 
minimum standard benefits for individual or group health plans.109  Others 
require specific designated benefits.  Some are common to many 
jurisdictions.  Examples include coverage for newborn and adopted 
children,110 immunizations for dependent children,111 mental health 
treatments,112 and treatment of various forms of substance abuse.113  Others 
                                                                                                                
106. See,e.g.,ARIZ.REV.STAT.§20-1204; CAL.INS. CODE §10113.5; 
COL.REV.STAT.§10-7-102(B); 18 DEL.C.§2908; D.C.ST.§31-4703; WEST’S F.S.A. §627.455; 
GA.CODE ANN. §33-25-3; WEST’S ID. CODE §41-1905; IL.COMP.STAT.ANN. §5/224; IOWA 
CODE ANN. §508.28; LA.STAT.ANN. 22:170; MD. CODE §16-203; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
175 § 132; MICH.COMP. LAWS ANN. 500.4014; MINN.STAT.ANN. §61A.03; MONT. CODE 
ANN. §33-20-105; NEB.REV.STAT. §44-502; N.H.REV.STAT. §408:10; N.J.S.A. 17B:25-4; 
N.M.S.A. §59A-20-5; MCKINNEY’S N.Y.LAW §3203; N.C.GEN.STAT.ANN. §58-51-15; N.D. 
CODE 26.1-33-05; OHIO REV.CODE §3917.06; 36 OKLA.ST.ANN. §4004; O.R.S. §743.168; 
S.C. CODE §38-63-220; S.D. CODE §58-15-10; V.TEX.C.A. §884.354; VA.CODE ANN. §38.2-
3107; REV.CODE WASH. 48.23.050.  See generally 5 COUCH ON INS. §76; see generally 16 
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §49:92 (4th ed.) (noting how unusual such restrictions are in 
contracts generally). 
107. See, e.g. ALA. CODE §27-15-24(a)(2)(e). 
108. See, e.g., MO. ST. §376.620. 
109. CONN.GEN.STAT. ANN. §38A-553; MASS. GEN. LAW ANN. 176M §2; CAL. ANN. 
CODE §1357.08 (for Small Employer Group plans); MO. ST. §376.426.  The mandated 
minimum benefits are extensive and fairly detailed, including coverage for catastrophic 
illness with lifetime maximum benefits, including hospitalization; physician care; diagnosis 
and treatment of mental conditions; prescription drugs; nursing facility care; home health 
services; use of radium or other radioactive materials; oxygen; chemotherapy; anesthetics; 
prosthesis to replace anatomic structure lost during treatment for head and neck tumors; 
diagnostic xrays and lab tests; certain oral surgeries; physical therapy; ambulance transport; 
rehabilitation for alcoholism.  Other provisions limit preexisting condition exclusions or 
require grace periods and provisions relating to incontestability, misstatement of age, notice 
of claim and proof of loss, timing of payments, limitation periods, and cancellation limits 
and requirements. 
110. NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES, 155-1 NEWBORN AND 
ADOPTED CHILDREN COVERAGE MODEL ACT; NEV. REV. STAT. 689A.043. 
111. LA. REV. STAT. §22:215.14; MO. STAT. §376.1215; N.M.STAT.ANN. §59A-22-
34.3. 
112. MO. STAT. §376.1550. S.C.ST. §38-71-290; NEV. REV. STAT. 689A.0455 
113. NEV. REV. STAT. 689A.046 (including inpatient and outpatient treatment); 
CONN.GEN.STAT.ANN. §38A-533 (medical complications of alcoholism); MO. STAT. 
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are idiosyncratic, presumably resulting from the efforts of strong provider 
lobbies or from consumer interest groups centered on particular health care 
needs.   Some of the more unique mandated coverages include costs of low 
protein food products for treatment of inherited metabolic diseases;114 
hearing aids for minor children;115 required drugs and devices for 
contraception;116 scalp hair prostheses for hair loss resulting from alopecia 
areata or alopecia totalis for persons aged eighteen or younger;117 diabetes 
self-management training;118 chiropractic care;119 treatments relating to 
hemophilia,120 smoking cessation,121 Wilm’s tumor,122 attention 
deficit/hyperactivity disorder,123 diabetes,124 osteoporosis,125 cancer,126 and 
temporomandibular joint disease;127 screening and testing for alpha-
fetoprotein IV,128 cytologic129 and human papillomavirus,130 colorectal 
cancer,131 cancer,132 breast cancer,133 human leukocyte antigen,134 and 
                                                                                                                          
§376.779 (same); N.J.ST. 17:48-6a (alcoholism); MO.STAT. §376.811 (chemical dependency 
treatment). 
114. LA. REV. STAT. §22:215.22; MO. STAT. §376.1219; NEV. REV. STAT. 
689A.0423; N.M.STAT.ANN. §59A-22-41.1. 
115. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §22:215.25 (2007).  
116. NEV. REV. STAT. § 689A.0415 (2005); NEV. REV. STAT. § 689A.0417 (2005); 
N.M.STAT.ANN. §59A-22-42 (2006). 
117. MO. ANN. STAT. §376.1222 (2007).  
118. ARK. CODE ANN. §23-79-602 (2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §22:215.21 (B) 
(2007); NEV. REV. STAT. §689A.0427(b) (2005). 
119. MO. ANN. STAT. §376.1230 (2007). 
120. N.J.STAT. ANN. §17:48:6d (2007). 
121. N.M.STAT.ANN. §59A-22-44 (2006). 
122. N.J.STAT. ANN. §17:48:6f (2007). 
123. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §22:215.15 (2007). 
124. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §22:215.21(A) (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. §689A.0427(a) 
(2005); N.M.STAT.ANN. §59A-22-41 (2006). 
125. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §22:215.16 (2007). 
126. N.J. STAT. ANN. §17:48:6k  (2007) (dose-intensive chemotherapy, autologous 
bone marrow transplants and peripheral blood stem cell transplants). 
127. NEV. REV. STAT. 689A.0465 (2005). 
128. N.M.STAT.ANN. §59A-22-45 (2006). 
129. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3923.52; N.M.STAT.ANN. § 59A-22-40. 
130. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-22-40. 
131. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-1202; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:215.12; NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 689A.04042. 
132. MO. ANN. STAT. § 376.1250. 
133. MO. ANN. STAT. § 376.782; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 689A.0405; N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 17:48-6g; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-22-39; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22.215.11; OHIO 
REV. STAT. § 3923.52. 
134. MO. ANN. STAT. § 376.1275. 
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lead;135 routine gynecological care;136 maternity transport;137 and care and 
treatment of loss or impairment of speech or hearing.138  These mandated 
benefits are so pervasive and so costly that a number of state legislatures 
have enacted legislation requiring various impact assessments before such 
proposals are considered.139  
Other statutes mandate procedural protections, for example, requiring 
immediate emergency services140 or prohibiting prior authorization for 
emergency services,141 ensuring a right to a second medical opinion,142 
requiring payment of expenses for qualified interpreter for hearing 
impaired in connection with medical treatment or consultation,143 and 
creating procedures for obtaining non-formulary drugs where the 
formulary’s equivalent has been ineffective or is reasonably expected to 
cause adverse or harmful reactions in the patient.144 
There are also procedural restrictions applicable generally to multiple 
lines of insurance, such as notice requirements;145 contractual limitation 
periods;146 designations of governing law;147 requirements that the 
application must be attached to policy if the insurer raises any defense to 
                                                                                                                 
135. MO. ANN. STAT. § 376.1290; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48-6m. 
136. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:215.17. 
137. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-22-35. 
138. MO. ANN. STAT. § 376-781. 
139. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 624.215; HAW. REV. STAT. § 23-51; KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 40-2248; KY. REV. STAT. § 6.948; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24:603.1; ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 24A, § 2752; MD. CODE ANN., [insurance] § 15-1501; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
3, § 38C; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62J.26; MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-5-93; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
17B:27D-1 et seq.; N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-03-28.  These statutes require that the state 
auditor or other state official or persons or organizations seeking mandated coverage submit 
to a state health care administration and to appropriate legislative committees an assessment 
of social and financial impacts of the proposed mandatory coverage, including consideration 
of factors such as the portion of the population needing the treatment, the availability of 
coverage, public demand for the treatment and for coverage and the interest of collective 
bargaining agents; affect on direct and indirect insurance costs and total health care costs.   
140. GA.CODE ANN. § 33-21-18.1(1). 
141. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-1846. 
142. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 641.51. 
143. LA. STAT. ANN. § 22.215.10. 
144. GA.CODE ANN. § 33-21-18.1(1998). 
145. 13 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INS. § 190:10 (3d ed. 2005). 
146. 16 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INS. § 235:10 (3d ed. 2005). 
147. 2 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INS. § 24:3 (3d ed. 2005 & 
Supp. 2007). 
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coverage in the application;148 free look provisions;149 entire contract 
provisions, providing that policy, including endorsements and attached 
papers, if any, constitute the entire contract of insurance;150 limitations on 
an insurer’s ability to cancel;151 and required grace periods.152 
 
IV. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS AND 
INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE POLICIES  
The implications of this extensive regulation of insurance policies for 
interpretation of the policies have not been fully explored.  Courts often 
approach the task of interpretation of insurance provisions without 
acknowledgment of the legislative and administrative role in the drafting 
and approval of insurance policies.  It might be argued that such 
acknowledgment is unnecessary: both freedom of contract and recognition 
of the regulatory involvement in insurance counsel enforcement of the 
policy language.  But the principle of freedom of contract looks to the 
parties’ intent and proposes to protect and enforce that intent.  
Acknowledgment of legislative and administrative involvement through 
mandated provisions and policy approvals shifts the interpretative focus 
from effectuating the parties’ intent to effectuating regulatory goals.    
Protecting the parties’ bargain is a relatively straightforward and static 
task, requiring judicial interpretation and enforcement of contract language.  
The task of interpreting and enforcing regulator-approved policy provisions 
                                                                                                                 
148. See 3 JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN & ERIC MILLS HOLMES, HOLMES’S APPLEMAN ON 
INSURANCE § 15.1 (2d ed. 1998 & Supp. 2007). 
149. Such provisions require that the policyholder, typically with respect to life 
insurance, Medicare supplement insurance, and long-term care insurance, has a specified 
time to examine and cancel the policy following delivery.  See WESTLAW 50 STATE 
STATUTORY SURVEYS, INSURANCE POLICIES & PREMIUMS, FREE LOOK PROVISIONS (Sept. 
2006).  
150. MODEL LAWS REGULATIONS & GUIDELINES VOL. II, UNIF. INDIVIDUAL 
ACCIDENT & SICKNESS POLICY PROVISION LAW § 3 at 180-2 (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs 
2007); MODEL LAWS REGUALTIONS & GUIDELINES VOL. III, GROUP LIFE INS. DEFINITIONS & 
GROUP LIFE INS. STANDARD PROVISIONS MODEL ACT § 5 at 565-6 (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. 
Comm’rs 2007). 
151. 2 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INS. § 30:13 (3d ed. 2005); 3 
JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN & ERIC MILLS HOLMES, HOLMES’S APPLEMAN ON INS. § 16.10 (2d ed. 
1998 & Supp. 2007);  See WEST 50 STATE STATUTORY SURVEYS, CANCELLATION & 
NONRENEWAL–PERMITTED & PROHIBITED REASONS (September 2006); 17 SAMUEL 
WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 49:130 (4th ed. 
2000 & Supp. 2007).   
152. See generally 16 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE 
LAW OF CONTRACTS § 49:80 (4th ed. 2000). 
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is by contrast much more complex and dynamic, involving questions about 
the scope of judicial and administrative authority and the deference, if any, 
owed by the judiciary to the administrative regulator.  The shape of the 
analysis in a particular case will depend on the structure and provisions of 
individual state insurance codes, administrative procedure acts, and 
regulations, as well as the particulars of the department’s review and 
approval process.  This section will sketch out some preliminary answers to 
these questions, and the last section will provide an example of this 
interpretive regime.  The basic point is clear:  freedom of contract is not an 
appropriate analytical starting point for interpretation of insurance policies.  
Instead, a recognition of the regulatory regimes surrounding insurance 
should inform judicial functioning in insurance cases.     
It is clear that where policy provisions are mandated by statute or 
regulation, concerns about freedom of contract are irrelevant.  Courts must 
interpret such provisions using principles of statutory construction and 
enforce them with the goal of effectuating the legislature’s or regulator’s 
intent.  If a policy lacks a mandated term, courts must read the term into the 
policy.153 
By contrast, the case law dealing with the impact of administrative 
approval of policy forms is sparse.  The most common issue arises when 
the Insurance Department approves a policy in violation of a statute.154  In 
these cases, the courts typically afford no deference to the regulator:155 
statutory interpretation is a judicial function and the courts are not bound to 
accept an administrative interpretation.156  Some cases hold that where the 
                                                                                                                
153. See, e.g., 4 JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN & ERIC MILLS HOLMES, HOLMES’S 
APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE § 22.1, §22.2 (2d ed. 1998 & Supp. 2007).  
154. Such violation may arise because the policy lacks a statutorily-mandated 
provision or because a provision fails to conform to statutory requirements. See cases cited 
infra note 156.    
155. There are exceptions.  See, e.g., State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. St. Louis 
Supermarket #3, Inc., No. 4:04CV1358 TCM, 2006 WL 27292 at *6-*8 (E.D. Mo.  Jan. 5, 
2006). 
156. See, e.g., Peachtree Cas. Ins. Co., Inc. v. Sharpton, 768 So.2d 368, 373 (Ala. 
2000) (stating that the fact that Insurance Department approved policy language did not 
preclude judicial invalidation of that language as contrary to statute); Lindahl v. Howe, 345 
N.W.2d 548, 551 (Iowa 1984) (noting that Commissioner’s approval does not divest courts 
of the duty to give statute its ultimate authoritative interpretation); Mich. Chiropractic 
Council v. Comm’r of Fin. & Ins. Serv., 685 N.W.2d 428, 439 (Mich.App. 2004) (stating 
that the agency’s decision to approve policy was inconsistent with statutory no-fault rules 
and thus reversible by court); Cruz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 614 N.W.2d 689, 694 
(Mich. App. 2000) (noting that approval of an insurance form by the Commissioner of 
Insurance is not conclusive proof that it complies with statute; instead, approval is “only 
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Insurance Department approves provisions contrary to statute, it exceeds its 
authority and its action is invalid.157 
Apart from the cases involving statutory violations, most courts have 
not addressed the effect of regulatory approval on judicial interpretation 
and construction of insurance policies.  Courts generally interpret and 
construe insurance policies without acknowledgment that insurance 
regulators approved the language, often with a resulting focus on the intent 
of the parties and the public policy of protecting freedom of contract.         
The few decisions considering the impact of regulatory approval on the 
judicial role have reached varying conclusions.158 Not surprisingly, 
                                                                                                                          
somewhat persuasive” that form complies with statute); Watson v. United Servs. Auto. 
Ass’n, 566 N.W.2d 683, 692 (Minn. 1997); Volquardson v. Hartford Ins. Co., 647 N.W.2d 
599, 612 (Neb. 2002) (noting that the Director of Insurance had no authority to approve 
policy form which did not provide minimum coverage afforded by statute); Spulak v. Tower 
Ins. Co., Inc., 601 N.W.2d 720, 725 (Neb. 1999) (finding that an exclusion for criminal acts 
by insured or others reduced coverage required by statute and therefore, Director’s approval 
exceeded his authority); Rider Ins. Co. v. First Trenton Cos., 808 A.2d 143, 148 (N.J. Super. 
2002); McMillan v. Allstate Indem. Co., 84 P.3d 65, 70 (N.M. 2003); Johnson v. Lincoln 
Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 590 N.E.2d 761, 764 (Ohio App. 1990); Fleming v. United Servs. Auto. 
Ass’n, 996 P.2d 501, 504 (Or. 2000) (noting that approval by Insurance Commissioner is 
not assurance that approved language is consistent with statute); Brader v. Nationwide Mut. 
Ins. Co., 411 A.2d 516, 517 (Pa. Super. 1979) (finding that if provision approved by 
Commissioner is contrary to law, approval is also invalid since such approval exceeds 
power granted to Commissioner); Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Lyon, 562 N.W.2d 888, 892 
(S.D. 1997); Fleming v. Yi, 982 S.W.2d 868, 871 (Tenn. App. 1998)(stating that insurance 
commissioner’s approval is a factor to be considered, but not conclusive).     
157. See cases cited supra note 156. 
158. The decisions range from no deference to complete deference, as the text 
demonstrates.  This variation in the level of judicial deference to regulatory authority is 
reflected in contexts other than insurance regulation.  Compare McKenzie Check Advance 
of Fla., LLC v. Betts, 928 So.2d 1204, 1215 (Fla. 2006) (holding that a court must defer to 
an agency interpretation as long as the interpretation is consistent with the legislative intent 
and is supported by substantial, competent evidence) with Bd. of Educ. of Town of Hamden 
v. State Bd. of Educ., 898 A.2d 170, 175 (Conn. 2006) (“When a state agency’s 
determination of a question of law has not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny. . . the 
agency is not entitled to special deference. . . .[I]t is for the courts, and not administrative 
agencies, to expound and apply governing principles of law.”)  The Model State 
Administrative Procedure Act, 1961, 1981, and the 2005 Draft, §C5-109, contemplates 
broad judicial review, permitting judicial action where state agency action exceeds the 
authority or violates limits imposed by federal or state constitution, statute, common law, 
and any other source of law binding on the agency, fails to follow prescribed procedure, is 
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.  This scope of review provision is 
substantially similar to the scope of review provisions of the Federal Administrative 
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §706.  But note APA does not apply to suit for damages where the 
agency does not have authority to determine the claim.     
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however, when a court acknowledges the regulatory context, it typically 
affords some level of deference to the regulator, indicating that contract is 
not an appropriate analytical frame.  A few courts have ruled that 
regulatory approval binds the court, precluding judicial consideration of the 
reasonableness of policy provisions.159  In these jurisdictions, regulatory 
approval functions like the principle of freedom of contract, precluding 
judicial analysis and resulting in the enforcement of policy language.  This 
result is an inappropriate abdication of the judiciary’s role in reviewing 
contract language and adjudicating disputes.  The legislative requirement of 
regulatory approval is not a divestiture of ordinary judicial functions to 
interpret insurance policies and adjudicate insurance disputes.160  The 
reality is that the approval process is pro forma in many instances; file and 
use is a common regulatory mechanism.161  The importance of the 
requirement of regulatory approval is not that it eliminates or minimizes 
judicial power, but rather that it focuses judicial efforts away from the 
interpretive paradigm of contract. 
                                                                                                                
159. See, e.g., Rory v. Continental Ins. Co., 703 N.W.2d 23, 35 (Mich. 2005) 
(“Reasonableness of insurance contracts is a matter for the executive, not judicial, branch of 
government....[T]he lower courts were not free to invade the jurisdiction of the 
Commissioner and determine de novo whether Continental’s policy was reasonable.”); 
AMEX Assurance Co. v. Caripides, 179 F.Supp.2d 309, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that 
theInsurance Department’s review and approval of a policy is presumptively valid and 
cannot be challenged as unfair or violative of public policy); McGraw v. Farm Bureau 
General Ins. Co., 731 N.W.2d 805, 808 Mich. Ct. App. 2007). See also Wright v. Kelleher, 
21 Mass. L. Rptr. 686 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2006) (questioning policyholder’s public policy 
argument given approval of the policy language by the Commissioner of Insurance); Allen 
v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1992) (rejecting the 
reasonable expectations doctrine as undercutting executive approval of insurance policies).  
An interesting and, to my knowledge, unique variation of this approach appears in a 
decision of the      Supreme Court, where the court ruled that because the Commissioner was 
required to approve auto policies, the court would not resolve ambiguities in favor of the 
insured.  Gilbert v. Hanover Ins. Co., 624 N.E.2d 621 (Mass App. Ct.1993).  Occasionally 
the legislature specifically answers this question.  See Firestone v. Acuson Corp. Long Term 
Disability Plan, 326 F.Supp.2d 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2004)(holding that California statute 
enumerating requirements for disability policies provided that commissioner’s approval 
created conclusive presumption, as between the insured and the insurer, that the policy 
conformed to the statute, Cal. Ins. Code 10291.5(k)). 
160. The statutes discussed infra at text accompanying notes 162-171support this 
conclusion.  See also Rory v. Continental Ins., 703 N.W.2d 23, 50 (Mich. 2005), (Kelly, J., 
dissenting). 
161. See WESTLAW 50 STATE STATUTORY SUREVEYS, INSURANCE, AGENTS, 
BROKERS, AND PROCEDURES, POLICIES AND APPLICATIONS (September 2006). 
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Other courts have found specifically that regulatory approval is not 
binding on the judiciary.  Under this view, judges owe varying levels of 
deference to the insurance regulator’s approval.162  Courts have ruled 
variously that the insurance regulator’s approval is entitled to no  
deference;163 “some consideration”;164 “great respect”;165 “great weight”;166 
or simply, “deference”.167  The better-reasoned view, as outlined above, is 
that the filing and approval of a policy by the Insurance Commissioner 
does not constitute the type of administrative regulation which justifies 
judicial deference to the decision of the administrative agency.168   
                                                                                                                
162. See generally 1 COUCH ON INS. §2:8. 
163. Maska U.S., Inc. v. Kansa Gen. Ins., 198 F.3d 74, 80, 82 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(indicating that public policy as expressed in statute or common law directive may warrant 
invalidation of approved insurance policy provision); Schneider v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of 
America, 149 F.Supp.2d 169, note 4 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Reichardt v. Life Ins. Co. of North 
America, 485 F.Supp. 56, 57 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Parkway Ins. Co. v. N.J. Neck & Back, 748 
A.2d 1221, 1222 (N.J.Super. Ct. Ap. Div. 1998) (holding that the Commissioner’s authority 
is absolute so long as the rules and regulations are consistent with the statutes and public 
policy); Seligman v. Tucker, 347 N.Y.S.2d 240 (N.Y. 1973) (administrative approval of a 
policy by the Superintendent of Insurance cannot defeat public policy of the state of New 
York).  See also S. Farm Bureau Life Ins. v. Banko, 2006 WL 2935281 (M.D. Fla. 2006) 
(noting that plaintiff could cite no case indicating that regulatory approval of an insurance 
policy form bars suits over policy language).  
164. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Barnard, 156 S.E.2d 148 (1967). 
165. Am. Nat. Ins. v. Ingle, 129 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939). 
166. Lee v. John Deere Ins., 802 N.E.2d 774, 779 (Ill. 2003) (holding that the 
approval of a limitation period by an Insurance Department is not conclusive on courts, but 
is entitled to great weight against contention that such a provision is against public policy); 
Kirk v. Fin. Sec. Life Ins., 389 N.E.2d 144, 148 (Ill. 1978) (holding that the approval of a 90 
day limitations period by the Commissioner is entitled to great weight against contention 
that the provision is against public policy); Kukoleck v. Minnesota Life Ins. Co., 2005 WL 
3447623 (N.D.W.Va. 2005) (holding that the where  West Virginia Code explicitly required 
the commissioner of insurance to disapprove policies not in the public interest, the 
commissioner’s approval is strong evidence that exclusionary language not contrary to 
public policy); Am. Home Assurancev. Stone, 61 F.3d 1321, 1328 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding 
that an Insurance Department’s approval of “Sexual Misconduct” provision is not 
conclusive but is entitled to great weight against challenge on public policy grounds).     
167. Azar v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 68 P.3d 909, 930 (N.M.App. 2003) (holding 
that where statute and regulations do not directly address the issue of modal premium 
charges, courts may make an independent determination that is unconstrained by the prior 
administrative approval of such a policy). 
168. Generette v. Donegal Mut. Ins.., 884 A.2d 266, 280 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005); 
Allwein v. Donegal Mut. Ins., 671 A.2d 744, 753 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (quoting Alan I. 
Widiss, UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE §32.3); Lindahl v. Howe, 
245 N.W.2d 548, 551 (Iowa 1984) (“Assuming the policy was approved . . . we have no 
reason to treat acquiescence in the form of the policy as an adjudication by the 
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In jurisdictions affording some deference, the level of that deference 
may depend on the nature and extent of the approval process.  For example, 
regulatory approval of a policy form without explicitly passing on the issue 
of the form’s compliance with a statutory requirement is entitled to little 
weight.169   The level of deference may also take account of the scope of 
the regulator’s power and obligations.  For example, some state statutes 
require disapproval of a policy form where it contains “an inconsistent, 
ambiguous, or misleading clause, or exception and condition that 
deceptively affects the risk purported to be assumed in the general coverage 
of the contract.”170  It is the function of the courts to interpret and apply 
legislative requirements.   
Where contract is the analytical frame, courts focus on the intent of the 
parties and the value of freedom of contract, and enforcement of the plain 
language of an insurance policy is inescapable.  Where courts focus instead 
the nature of insurance as invested with public policy, through legislative 
and executive controls, even clear policy language need not be enforced if 
it conflicts with regulatory goals.        
In addition to the case law, state statutes provide ample ground for a 
court to examine, interpret, and even to disregard, policy language 
approved by insurance regulators.  Many state insurance codes include 
specific provisions relevant to the issue of the effect of regulatory approval.   
Some codes provide that the insurance commissioner “shall” or “must” 
disapprove a policy form if it contains or incorporates by reference any 
inconsistent, ambiguous, or misleading clause, or exceptions and conditions 
which deceptively affects the risk purported to be assumed in the general 
coverage of the contract.171   
                                                                                                                          
commissioner of the validity of the exclusion.  Such acquiescence could not in any event 
divest the courts of their duty to give the statute it ultimate authoritative interpretation.”), 
overruled by Miller v. Westfield Ins., 606 N.W.2d 301 (Iowa 2000). 
169. Burke v. First UNUM Life Ins., 975 F.Supp. 310, 316 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(holding that correspondence between Insurance Department and insurer reflected no 
consideration of whether the language of the policy’s incontestability clause conformed to 
statutory requirements); Durant v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp., 20 A.d.2d 242, 247-
249, (N.Y. App. 1964) (holding that the lack of an express as opposed to implicit approval 
of policy form was relevant in determining the weight to be given to Superintendent’s view 
of conformity to statutory requirements).      
170. See infra text accompanying note 171. 
171. See, e.g., ALASKA. ST. §21.42.130 (2007);  DEL.CODE ANN, tit 18, §2713 
(1999); FLA.STAT. §627.411 (2005); GA.CODE ANN. §33-24-10 (1998); IDAHO CODE ANN. 
§41-1813(2) (2004); KY.REV.STAT.ANN.§304.14-130(1)(b) (2006); LA.REV.STAT.ANN. 
§22:621(3) (2004); ME.REV.STAT.ANN. 24-A §2413(1)(B) (2006); MONT. CODE ANN. §33-
1-502 (2006); NEV.REV.STAT.§687B.130(2) (2003); N.M LAWS.§59A-18-14 (1978); 
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Similar statutes require disapproval of a form if it contains provisions 
which are unfair, inequitable, or contrary to the state’s public policy.172   
These statutes do not specify who makes the determination of ambiguity or 
unfairness or whose determination prevails.173  The normal exercise of 
judicial power permits a court to determine that policy provisions are 
ambiguous, deceptive, unfair, or contrary to public policy within the 
meaning of the statute and to construe the provisions to avoid statutory 
violations occasioned by an insurance regulator’s approval, accomplishing 
the legislative objective of protecting insurance consumers.  There are 
almost no cases addressing the construction and application of these 
statutes.  However, at least one case recognized that their goal is to protect 
policyholders by permitting courts to extend appropriate coverage where 
the commissioner approved a policy in contravention of the statute’s 
requirements.174  A few similar statutes explicitly assign the determination 
to the insurance regulator, apparently leaving no room for substantive 
judicial evaluation.175    
                                                                                                                          
OKLA.STAT.ANN. tit. 36 §3611(A)(2) (2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §58-11-21(2) (2004); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit.§3542(2) (2001); V.A.CODE ANN. 38.2-316(1950); WASH.REV.CODE 
§48.18.110(1)(c) (1999); W.VA.CODE §33-6-9(b) (2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. §26-15-111(B) 
(2007).  One statute appears to contemplate both judicial review of the commissioner’s 
action, with respect to ambiguous or deceptive clauses,  and unreviewable exercise of the 
commissioner’s discretion, with respect to rates.  Compare WYO. STAT. ANN. §26-15-
111(a)(i) (“The commissioner . . . shall disapprove any form . . . if the form contains . . . any 
inconsistent, ambiguous or misleading clauses, or exceptions and conditions which 
deceptively affect the risk”) with (a)(ii)(“The commissioner . . . shall disapprove any form if 
he finds that the benefits provided in the policy are unreasonable in relation to the premiums 
charged, or the rates or classification are excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory.”).   
172. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §27-14-9(54) (1974) (form contains provisions which are 
“unfair, or inequitable or contrary to the public policy of this state or which would, because 
such provisions are unclear or deceptively worded, encourage misrepresentation”); GA. 
CODE ANN. §33-24-10(5) (1960) (form contains “provisions which are unfair or inequitable 
or contrary to the public policy of this state”); IDAHO CODE ANN.  §41-1813(2) (1961) (form 
contains clause which is “unfairly prejudicial to the policy holder”); (NEV. REV. STAT. 
§687B.130(2) (1971) (form contains “any provision or provisions prejudicial to the interest 
of the insured or policyholder”); W. VA. CODE  §33-6-9(f) (1957) (if coverages provided in 
form “are not sufficiently broad to be in the public interest”).  
173. See WYO STAT. ANN. §§25-15-111(A), (B) (1957), supra note 171.  
174. Excelsior Ins. Co. v. Pomona Park Bar & Package Store, 369 So.2d 938, 941 
(Fla. 1979). See also Strickland v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 242 S.E.2d 148, 151 n.4 (Ga. 1978). 
Some decisions caution that these provisions do not give judges a mandate to rewrite 
insurance policies. American Fidelity Co. v. Mahoney, 174 A.2d 446, 450 (Me. 1961).    
175. HI. REV. STAT. §431:10A-406 (1987) (“the commissioner shall disapprove the 
forms for such insurance if the commissioner finds that they are unjust, inequitable, 
misleading, or deceptive.”) (emphasis added); OR. REV. STAT. §§742.005(3), (4) (1991) (the 
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Judges may also avoid binding effects of the commissioner’s approval 
of problematic policy language by determining that approval exceeded the 
commissioner’s statutorily prescribed authority.  In delineating the 
Insurance Commissioner’s powers, some state statutes provide that the 
Commissioner may not take action which “extends, modifies, or conflicts 
with any law of the state.”176 These statutes typically refer to 
Commissioners’ powers to make rules or regulations.  It is not clear from 
the cases or the statutes whether approval of policy forms constitutes 
rulemaking or adjudication.  The APA defines “rule” to include “the 
approval . . . of services,”177 which may be reasonably interpreted to 
include approval of insurance policy forms for use in a state.178  The new 
Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act provides a broad 
definition of “rule”179and then excludes a number of specific agency 
actions, none of which resemble approval of policy forms by insurance 
regulators.180  At least one case suggests that approval is rulemaking rather 
than adjudication.181  If this view is correct, approval of a policy which 
                                                                                                                          
Director shall disapprove any form “if, in the director’s judgment, its use would be 
prejudicial to the interests of the insurer’s policyholders”,  or “if the director finds it 
contains provisions which are unjust, unfair, or inequitable.”) (emphasis added). See also 
Starr-Gordon v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2006 WL 3218778 (E.D. Cal.2006) (holding that 
policy approved by commissioner is “conclusively presumed to be unambiguous” based on  
CAL.INS. CODE §10291.5 (West 1941), which provides (The commissioner shall not approve 
any disability policy . . . if the commissioner finds that it contains any provision, or has any 
label, description of its contents, title, heading, backing, or other indication of its provisions 
which is unintelligible, uncertain, ambiguous, or abstruse, or likely to mislead a person to 
whom the policy is offered.)  The Alabama statute accomplishes the same result by making 
the decision to approve or disapprove discretionary. ALA. CODE §27-14-9 (1975) (“The 
commissioner may disapprove any form . . . if it contains . . . any inconsistent, ambiguous or 
misleading clauses or exceptions and conditions which deceptively affect the risk purported 
to be assumed in the general coverage of the contract.”) (emphasis added).   
176. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §27-2-17 (1075);  DEL. CODE tit. 18 §311 (1953); 
WYO.STAT. ANN §26-2-110 (1931). Pa. Dental Ass’n v. Commonwealth, 441 A.2d 1379 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982) (action of Department of Insurance in approving comprehensive 
dental plan was not an adjudication). Under that view, the statutes would apply.    
177. Administrative Procedure Act 5 U.S.C. §551(4) (1946). 
178. It is also possible to read the APA such that approval of a policy form would 
constitute an “adjudication.”  Under the APA, “adjudication” means the formulation of an 
“order”, 5 U.S.C § 511(7); “orders” include final dispositions of agencies in matters other 
than rulemaking but including licensing, 5 U.S.C. §551(6); and “license” includes an agency 
approval, 5 U.S.C. §551(8).   
179. Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act §102 (26) (2007).  
180. Id. 
181. Pa. Dental Ass’n, 441 A.2d at 1382 (action of Department of Insurance in 
approving comprehensive dental plan was not an adjudication). 
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conflicts with “any law” is beyond the power of the regulator.  Cases in 
which courts refuse to enforce approved policy language which 
contravenes statutory requirements,182 fall within the scope of such statutes.  
These statutes have a much broader reach, however, given the breadth of 
the language, “any law,” which is typically interpreted to include not only 
statutory and regulatory law, but also decisional law.   If a policy provision 
contravened a judicial ruling, it would be beyond the power of the regulator 
to approve it and within the judiciary’s responsibilities to override any 
approval.  Again, there are no cases construing these statutes.183     
In short, application of contract doctrine to insurance disputes 
minimizes the judicial role in furthering the goals of insurance regulation, 
while recognition that insurance policies are highly regulated documents 
expands that role.   
V. INTERPRETATION:  CONTRACT DOCTRINE AND THE 
REGULATORY PERSPECTIVE COMPARED  
 
This section provides contrasting examples of policy interpretation 
from contract and regulatory perspectives.  The section focuses on the 
problem of innocent co-insureds.  The issue arises when one of the persons 
insured under a homeowners policy engages in an act which voids the 
policy coverage.  Arson is a common example; the question is whether the 
policy is also void with respect to an innocent co-insured, who is often a 
victim of domestic violence.   If so, the innocent co-insured loses not only 
his or her insurance coverage, but as a practical matter, may lose the family 
home.   Where the court’s interpretive frame is contract, the innocent co-
insured loses coverage.  Where the court acknowledges the regulated nature 
of insurance, the result is the opposite. 
Standard homeowners policies typically cover the named insured and a 
resident spouse and relatives who reside in the household or dependent 
persons in care of named insured.184  Policies also typically exclude injury 
or damage which is expected or intended by “an insured,”185 “the 
                                                                                                                
182. See id. 
183. There is some case law holding that an administrative act of approving the form 
of an insurance policy cannot overcome the law settled by state courts.  Seligman v. Tucker, 
347 N.Y.S.2d 240, 243 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973).   
184. See, e.g., INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, INC., HOMEOWNERS 3 SPECIAL FORM, 
DEFINITIONS, B.5. (1999) 
185. Id. 
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insured,”186 ”“any insured person,”187 or “any insured.”188  Other policies 
are more detailed, precluding coverage for “any loss caused intentionally 
by you or a family member, or by a person directed by you or a family 
member to cause a loss.”189   
The contract-based approach to the innocent co-insured problem is 
simple.  The intent of the parties controls, so the court’s objective is to 
determine that intent as manifested by the policy language.  Whether the 
intentional acts of a co-insured will defeat coverage for an innocent co-
insured turns on the exclusionary language used in the policy.  A policy 
excluding losses caused by intentional acts of  “any insured” or “an 
insured” creates a joint obligation among co-insureds and bars coverage for 
both the malefactor and innocent co-insureds.190  Where the policy uses the 
                                                                                                                
186. This is the language of the standard Allstate Insurance policy. Allstate Ins. Co. 
v. Callahan, No. 3:CV-04-2246, 2006 WL 1626651 at *5-6 (M.D.Pa. June 7, 2006) 
187. Id. at * 3.  
188. Id.  
189. Yerardi v. Pac. Indem. Co., 436 F.Supp.2d 223,232 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2006) 
190. Pagett v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co.,  No. 2:05CV00042, 2006 WL 2246428, at *5 
(E.D. Mo. Aug. 4, 2006) (holding that an unambiguous intentional loss exclusion was 
enforceable against an innocent co-insured); N.J. Mfr Ins. Co. v. Carney, No. 3:04-CV-
2465, 2006 WL 2092571 at *3-4 (M.D. Pa. July 26, 2006) (holding that under language “an 
insured” or “any insured”, the intentional act of one insured excludes coverage for the 
innocent co-insured; however, where the husband was the sole owner, the wife’s arson did 
not prevent coverage); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Callaghan, No. 3:CV-04-2246, 2006 WL 
1626651 at *6 (M.D. Pa. June 07, 2006) (holding that the insurer had no duty to defend 
where the plaintiff sued for deviate sexual behavior by her minor son against a child in 
daycare operated by the mother and for negligent supervision by the father; the policy 
excluded injury resulting from intentional or criminal acts of “any insured person”); Bonin 
v. Westport Ins. Corp.,  930 So. 2d 906, 916 (La. 2006) “This policy shall not apply to any 
claim arising out of, attributable to, or directly or indirectly resulting from: any criminal, 
dishonest, malicious or fraudulent act, error, omission or personal injury committed by an 
insured.”); Yerardi , 436 F.Supp.2d at 248 (holding that there is no recovery available if 
either spouse engaged in intentional conduct under an exclusion for loss that was caused 
intentionally by insured or a family member); Stand. Fire Ins. Co. v. Proctor, 286 F.Supp.2d 
567, 573 (D. Md. 2003); McEwin v. Allstate Tex. Lloyds, 118 S.W.3d 811, 815 (Tex. App. 
2003).  The Eastern District of Missouri recently considered and rejected the regulatory 
approach.  State Auto Property and Cas. Ins. Co. v. St. Louis Supermarket #3, Inc., No. 
4:04CV1358, 2006 WL 27292 at *6 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 05, 2006) (upholding a broad exclusion 
when the Director of Insurance approved a policy not in conformance to the required 1943 
Standard Form Insurance Policy of the State of New York under authority of 20 C.S.R. 500-
1.100(1)(B), relying on case law upholding exclusion without considering regulatory issues.  
Case law indicates form consistent with Missouri law; no discussion of whether provision 
“as favorable”);  but seeChilders v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,799 S.W.2d 138, 140 (Mo. 
App. 1990) “Under the law the court must accept the written policy as the expression of the 
agreement made by the parties, and give effect to the intentions of the parties as disclosed 
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words, “the insured”, the obligation is several, and the exclusion applies 
only to the insured who intended the act and caused injury, not an innocent 
co-insured.191  
When a court faced with an innocent co-insured focuses on the nature 
of the policy as a regulated document, the result may change.  Most 
jurisdictions require by statute a standard fire policy.192  The provisions of 
this standard, or substitute provisions affording at least the same level of 
coverage, must appear in commercial and personal property policies.  The 
statutory standard policy does not contain an exclusion for intentional acts, 
so there is no argument that the exclusion conflicts with the standard.193  
However, the standard includes provisions voiding coverage in cases of 
fraud194 and excluding coverage for losses resulting from increased risk195 
or neglect following a loss.196  These and other provisions (dealing with 
cancellation, renewal, and other issues) use the phrase “the insured” rather 
than “an insured” or “any insured.”  Reasoning that the consistent use of 
“the insured” evinces a general legislative intent to apply the limiting 
provisions only to the insured at fault, a number of courts have protected 
                                                                                                                          
by clear and unambiguous language.”);  see also Amick v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 862 
F.2d 704, 706 (8th Cir. 1988) (applying Missouri law and upholding the exclusion as clear 
and unambiguous and approved by the director of insurance). 
191. Osborn v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 632 So.2d 1158, 160 (La. 1994) (holding 
that when the husband intentionally set fire to the house, the wife recovered under a policy 
excluding specified acts by “the insured.”). 
192. New York adopted a standard fire policy in 1943 and mandated its use. N.Y. 
CONSOL. LAW  §3404 (McKinney 2007).  Many other states followed New York’s example 
and enacted the 1943 standard or a similar policy.  10A COUCH ON INS. §149:3 (2007).   
193. This type of case, in which the policy violates a statute, is discussed supra, text 
accompanying notes 154-56.   
194. The New York Standard Fire Policy provides: “This entire policy shall be void 
if, whether before or after a loss, the insured has willfully concealed or misrepresented any 
material fact or circumstance concerning this insurance or the subject thereof, or the interest 
of the insured therein, or in case of any fraud or false swearing by the insured relating 
thereto.” N.Y.  CONSOL. LAWS §3404 (2007) (emphasis added).   
195. The New York Standard Fire Policy provides: “Unless otherwise provided in 
writing added hereto this Company shall not be liable for loss occurring (a) while the hazard 
is increased by any means within the control or knowledge of the insured.” Id. (emphasis 
added).  
196. The New York Standard Fire Policy provides: “This Company shall not be 
liable for loss by fire or other perils insured against in this policy caused, directly or 
indirectly, by: . . . (i) neglect of the insured to use all reasonable means to save and preserve 
the property at and after a loss, or when the propert is endangered by fire in neighboring 
premises.” N Id. (emphasis added).  
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innocent co-insureds in the face of unambiguous language dictating the 
opposite result.197    
The application of other approaches discussed in Section IV to the 
problem of the innocent co-insured would permit the same result.  A policy 
which excludes coverage for an innocent co-insured by using the article 
“an” rather than “the” in the intentional loss exclusion could easily be 
considered misleading or deceptive regarding the risk to be assumed within 
the meaning of various state statutes which require disapproval of a policy 
form in such instances.198 Judicial correction of an insurance 
commissioner’s failure to disapprove such language is permissible.  
Similarly, such an exclusion might be considered unfair, inequitable, or 
contrary to a state’s public policy under state statutes which also mandate 
disapproval under such conditions.199  Again, the statutes permit a court to 
override the commissioner’s decision to approve the language.    
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
 The extensive regulation of insurance policy language, ranging 
from legislatively-mandated provisions to required administrative approval 
                                                                                                                
197. Sager v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 680 N.W.2d 8, 15 (Iowa 2004); Icenhour 
v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 365 F.Supp.2d 743, 751 (S.D.W.Va. 2004) (holding that a West Virginia 
court  would refuse to enforce unambiguous policy language excluding coverage for loss 
“involving intentional or criminal acts of or at the direction of one or more covered 
persons”; Nangle v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Arizona, 73 P.2d 1252, 1258 (Ariz. App. 2003); 
Trinity Univ.l Ins. Co. v. Kirsling, 73 P.3d 102, 107 (Idaho 2003); Volquardson v. Hartford 
Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 647 N.W.2d 599, 607 (Neb. 2002); Lane v. Sec. Mut. Ins. Co., 747 
N.E.2d 1270, 1271 (N.Y. 2001); Watson v. United Serv. Auto Ass’n, 566 N.W.2d 683, 692 
(Minn. 1997).  See also Yerardi v. Pac. Indem. Co., 436 F.Supp.2d 223, 232, 247(Mass. 
Dist. Ct. 2006) (refusing to consider statutory fire insurance policy where Massachusetts had 
not considered the issue);  Spulak v. Tower Ins. Co., Inc., 601 N.W.2d 720, 725 (Neb. 1999) 
(holding that an exclusion was invalid because the director of insurance exceeded his 
authority in approving an exclusion where §44-501 specified a standard policy and 
permitted variation only if the variation was substantially equivalent to the standard). 
Following a decision by the Iowa Supreme Court protecting an innocent co-insured under 
this analysis, Sager , 680 N.W.2d 8, the Iowa legislature revised the statute to read “an 
insured” in provisions dealing with fraud, increased risk, and neglect in protecting property 
after loss.  Iowa Code Ann. §515.138; Acts 2005, ch. 70, S.F. 360 §§19 and 20.The state 
Legislature thereafter amended the language of Iowa Code §515.138 to abrogate the Sager 
decision. 2005 Iowa Acts (Senate File 360 at §§19-21). 
198. See supra text accompanying note 171. The insurance commissioner must 
disapprove a form which is misleading or contains an exception which “deceptively affects 
the risk purported to be assumed”.  
199. See supra text accompanying notes 172-75. 
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of policies, renders the model of private contract and the principle of 
freedom of contract irrelevant in interpretation of insurance policies.   
Courts should approach the construction of insurance policies mindful that 
they are not individually negotiated bargains but highly regulated 
documents; the judicial goal should be ascertaining and effectuating 
regulatory goals, rather than the illusory intent of the parties.     
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BAD FAITH IN ALABAMA’S CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM: 
“TORT HELL” OR REFORMED JURISDICTION?  
 
Kristen LeBlond 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The perception of Alabama in the late 1980s and early 1990s as “tort 
hell” for corporate defendants has left many insurance companies reluctant 
to write business and thereby take on litigation exposure in the state.1  
Since that time period meaningful and significant changes have taken 
place.  The combination of a dramatic shift in the composition of the 
Alabama Supreme Court, punitive damage reform, tort reform and the 
evolution of the bad faith cause of action has produced an environment 
vastly different from that of the late 1980s and early 1990s.  This note 
examines Alabama’s transition from tort hell to a jurisdiction where 
plaintiffs carry a heavy burden in asserting bad faith and where punitive 
damages are regularly and significantly reduced on appeal. 
 
II. ALABAMA AS TORT HELL 
 
Alabama’s reputation as “tort hell on a monumental level”2 developed 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s as juries began to routinely return verdicts 
characterized by large punitive damage awards,3 often for conduct that fell 
“far short of the kinds of ‘reprehensible’ behavior that had been required 
for punitive damages in the past.” 4  A study done in the 1990s revealed 
that, in general, multi-million dollar punitive damage verdicts were 
                                                                                                                
1. Nathan C. Prater, Comment, Punitive Damages in Alabama: A Proposal for 
Reform, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 1005, 1016 (1995-1996); Linda Himelstein, Jackpots from 
Alabama Juries, BUS. WK., Nov. 28, 1994, at 83; Jerry Underwood, Big-Money Verdicts 
Scare State Farm Bypasses State for New Site, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Dec. 6, 1995, at 6D. 
2. Chad E. Stewart, Comment, Damage Caps in Alabama’s Civil Justice System: An 
Uncivil War Within the State, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 201, 213 (1998-1999). 
3. George L. Priest, Punitive Damages Reform: The Case of Alabama, 56 LA. L. 
REV. 825, 826-27 (1996). 
4. Michael DeBow, The Road Back from “Tort Hell”: The Alabama Supreme Court, 
1994-2004, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY FOR LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY WHITE PAPERS, at 3-4 
(Oct. 15, 2004), http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20070325_alabama2004.pdf. 
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extremely rare.5  However, that rule did not hold true for Alabama where 
between 1991 and 1994 there were 60 punitive damage verdicts equal to or 
greater than $1 million.6  Individual verdicts reached magnitudes of $25 
million, $33.5 million, $45 million and $65 million.7  A study conducted by 
George Priest, a professor of law and economics at Yale Law School,8 
indicated that Alabama juries awarded over $767 million in punitive 
damages between 1989 and 1996 and that civil awards in Alabama 
increased by 400% from 1985 to 1994.9  Priest commented that Alabama’s 
punitive damage awards were “unparalleled in the history of American 
jurisprudence.”10  
The refusal of the appellate courts to interfere with these verdicts also 
facilitated the unusual trend.  Between the years 1987 and 1994 the 
Alabama Supreme Court affirmed $53.2 million in punitive damage 
awards.11  According to Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, a law firm that studied 
the punitive damages issue on behalf of an insurance company, the amount 
of punitive damages upheld in Alabama for those years was three times the 
amount upheld by its three neighboring states combined (Georgia, 
Mississippi and Tennessee).12  These excessive punitive damage verdicts 
during the 1980s and early 1990s would soon be charged with having 
deleterious consequences to Alabama’s populace, and especially to its 
business community.  
 
III.   IMPACT  OF TORT HELL ON BUSINESS IN ALABAMA 
 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the largest criticism of punitive 
damage law in Alabama was that it was driving businesses to leave the 
state.13  During the 1994 gubernatorial election, the spokesman for 
gubernatorial candidate Fob James, stated that, “Alabama has gained a very 
unfortunate reputation as being a place where you can get sued out of 
business.”14  The result of the business community’s fear and anxiety over 
                                                                                                                
5. Priest, supra note 3, at 827. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Yale Law School Faculty Biographies, 
http://www.law.yale.edu/faculty/GPriest.htm (last visited Nov. 15,, 2007). 
9. Stewart, supra note 2, at 213-14. 
10. Prater, supra note 1, at 1016. 
11. Priest, supra note 3, at 829. 
12. Himelstein, supra note 1, at 84. 
13. Prater, supra note 1, at 1016. 
14. Id. 
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large punitive damage verdicts was particularly felt by Alabama’s 
insurance industry.  In the early 1990s, as many as ten insurance companies 
announced plans to no longer write new business in Alabama, eliminate 
plans to invest further in the state, or cease operating in Alabama 
altogether.15  One example occurred in 1995 when State Farm, an insurance 
company, was considering Birmingham as a site for its life and health 
insurance operations.16  A spokeswoman for the insurer cited the state’s 
“unfriendly reputation for big-money verdicts against insurers” as one of 
the main reasons why the company ultimately decided to forego a location 
in Birmingham.17  The insurance industry was dealt such a blow from 
Alabama’s runaway juries that even the state’s insurance regulatory arm 
spoke up.  By late 1994, Alabama insurance regulators spoke out against 
the disproportionate verdicts and their impact on business at the post trial 
proceedings of as many as 13 cases.18 
The large punitive damage verdicts were not the only reason why 
insurers and other corporate defendants were fleeing Alabama.  The impact 
that these verdicts had on the cost of settlement also impacted the bottom 
line for these corporations.  As citizens repeatedly witnessed multi-million 
dollar punitive damage verdicts, they became more comfortable granting 
such awards when on sitting on juries themselves.19  These awards in turn 
drove up the cost a corporate defendant would have to pay to settle a case.20  
If a plaintiff anticipated a large punitive damage award they would be less 
likely to settle their case for a lower sum.  As a result, legal costs began to 
eat into profits and Alabama became a less and less attractive jurisdiction 
in which to do business. 
 
IV. THE TORT OF BAD FAITH & ITS ORIGINS IN ALABAMA 
 
A. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TORT OF BAD FAITH 
 
One reason why Alabama’s civil justice system and its position on 
punitive damages impacted the insurance industry so greatly was because 
of the tort of bad faith.  The insurance business revolves around the 
insurance contract and as a result many lawsuits brought against insurance 
                                                                                                                
15. Id.; Himelstein, supra note 1, at 83.   
16. Underwood, supra note 1, at 6D.  
17. Id. 
18. Himelstein, supra note 1, at 84. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
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companies are based on the tenets of contract law.  However, the amount 
one can recover from a contract-based cause of action is not comparable to 
that which is recoverable in tort.21  This is because punitive damages are 
not recoverable for breach of contract or other contract-based actions.22   
Thus, the tort of bad faith became an important avenue through which a 
plaintiff could seek punitive damages in a lawsuit against an insurance 
company.23   
Historically, the tort of bad faith originated from liability insurance and 
the insurer’s duty to defend its insured.24  In the early 1900s courts began to 
hold insurers liable when they “unreasonably” refused to settle a lawsuit 
within the policy limits.25  The rationale behind the imposition of liability 
in this context was that the insurer controlled the litigation on behalf of its 
insured and could pursue its own interests by refusing a settlement offer 
within the policy limits in hopes of being found not liable at trial.26  This 
left the insured “at the mercy” of the insurance company because if the trial 
resulted in damages greater than the policy limit the insured would be 
responsible for the excess.27  The courts reacted by imposing a duty on the 
insurer to acknowledge its insured’s interests when faced with the 
opportunity for settlement.28  If the insurer breached that duty by 
unreasonably refusing to settle within the policy limits it would be liable 
for any excess judgment that resulted.29   
The above concept was then imported into the first party insurance 
context in the California case of Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Company.30  
In Gruenberg the California Supreme Court identified a similar duty not to 
unreasonably withhold benefits due under an insurance policy in the first 
party context.31  The court held that breach of this duty would give rise to a 
                                                                                                                
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981). 
22. Id.  
23. It should be noted that the Alabama Supreme Court has ruled that “the tort of bad 
faith is only available in the insurance context” thereby making insurance companies the 
sole defendants in bad faith actions.  See Stephen D. Heninger & Nicholas W. Woodfield, A 
Practitioner’s Guide to Alabama’s Tort of Bad Faith, 57 ALA. LAW. 277, 282 (1996).  
24. John H. Bauman, Insurance Law Annual: Emotional Distress Damages and the 
Tort of Insurance Bad Faith, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 717, 733 (1998). 
25. Id. at 734. 
26. Id. at 734-35. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 735. 
29. Id. 
30. 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973). 
31. Id. at 1037. 
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tort action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.32  
Many other courts followed the California Supreme Court’s lead in 
imposing tort liability for bad faith in the first party insurance context.33  
One of these courts was the Alabama Supreme Court. 
 
B. THE BEGINNINGS OF BAD FAITH IN ALABAMA 
The Alabama Supreme Court adopted the first party bad faith cause of 
action in 1981 in Chavers v. National Security Fire and Casualty 
Company.34  In doing so, the court adopted the following standard of proof 
which the plaintiff must meet to recover on a claim for bad faith: 
 
[A]n actionable tort arises for an insurer’s intentional refusal to 
settle a direct claim where there is either ‘(1) no lawful basis for 
the refusal coupled with actual knowledge of that fact or (2) 
intentional failure to determine whether or not there was any 
lawful basis for such refusal.’35  
  
Shortly thereafter, in Gulf Atlantic Life Insurance Co. v. Barnes,36 the court 
clarified the two tier test for bad faith which it articulated in Chavers.  As 
to the first tier of the test, the court defined “no lawful basis” to mean 
lacking “a legitimate or arguable reason for failing to pay the claim.”37  The 
court further noted that, “when the claim is not fairly debatable, refusal to 
pay will be bad faith” and that “bad faith…is not simply bad judgment or 
negligence.  It imports a dishonest purpose and means breach of known 
duty…through some motive of self interest or ill will.”38  As to the second 
tier the court indicated that the critical question before the jury was 
“whether a claim was properly investigated and whether the results of the 
investigation were subjected to a cognitive evaluation and review.”39  The 
court also stated that “reckless indifference to facts or to proof submitted 
by the insured” on the part of the insurer would establish the inference 
needed to meet the second tier of the test.40 
                                                                                                                
32. Id. 
33. Bauman, supra note 24, at 741. 
34. 405 So.2d 1, 6 (Ala. 1981). 
35. Id. at 7. 
36. 405 So.2d 916 (Ala. 1981). 
37. Id. at 924. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
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The following year, in National Security Fire and Casualty Co. v. 
Bowen, the Alabama Supreme Court defined the elements of a prima facie 
bad faith case.41  Under Bowen the plaintiff had the burden of proving the 
following: 
 
(a) an insurance contract between the parties and a breach 
thereof by the defendant; 
(b) an intentional refusal to pay the insured’s claim; 
(c) the absence of any reasonably legitimate or arguable 
reason for that refusal (the absence of a debatable reason); 
(d) the insurer’s actual knowledge of the absence of any 
legitimate or arguable reason; 
(e) if the intentional failure to determine the existence of a 
lawful basis is relied upon, the plaintiff must prove the 
insurer’s intentional failure to determine whether there is 
a legitimate or arguable reason to refuse to pay the 
claim.42 
 
Plaintiff’s burden in bad faith cases was subsequently characterized as 
“heavy.”43  Yet under this heavy burden plaintiffs were able to capitalize on 
the new cause of action to the tune of millions of dollars in punitive 
damages.  In Nationwide Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Clay the plaintiff 
brought suit for bad faith failure to pay an insurance claim under his 
disability insurance policy and was awarded $1.25 million in damages on 
the bad faith count.44  On appeal the Alabama Supreme Court upheld the 
award stating that the actions of Nationwide constituted the type of 
behavior that the bad faith cause of action was intended to eliminate.45  The 
court conceded that the award was large, but concluded it was not the result 
of jury bias or prejudice, and accordingly, must stand.46 
A similar verdict was upheld in United American Insurance Co. v. 
Brumley.47  In Brumley the plaintiff asserted claims of breach of contract 
                                                                                                                
41. 417 So.2d 179, 183 (Ala. 1982). 
42. Id. 
43. Nat’l Sav. Life Ins. Co. v. Dutton, 419 So.2d 1357, 1362 (Ala. 1982). 
44. 469 So.2d 533, 534, 541 (Ala. 1985).  It should be noted that the same jury only 
awarded $46,165 on the breach of contract claim.  Id. at 541. 
45. Id. at 546. 
46. Id. 
47. 542 So.2d 1231, 1239 (Ala. 1989). 
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and bad faith failure to pay benefits under his Medicare Supplement 
policy.48  The jury returned a verdict of $5,000 in compensatory damages 
and $1 million in punitive damages which was upheld on appeal by the 
Alabama Supreme Court.49   
Similarly, in United Services Automobile Ass’n v. Wade the insurer 
brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment regarding its liability under the 
plaintiff’s homeowner’s policy.50  The plaintiffs counterclaimed seeking to 
recover under the policy for the loss of their house and the personal 
property contained therein, as well as punitive damages for USAA’s bad 
faith failure to pay.51  The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiffs and 
awarded $166,795 plus interest on the contract claim and $3.5 million in 
damages on the bad faith claim.52  On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court 
deemed the punitive damages excessive, but only reduced the award by $1 
million, leaving a total of $2.5 million in punitive damages to be paid by 
the defendant.53   
The substantial punitive damage awards levied against insurers in these 
early bad faith cases are exemplary of how this newly established cause of 
action provided plaintiffs with a vehicle for capitalizing on Alabama’s pro-
punitive damage climate in the first party insurance context. 
 
V. DEVELOPMENTS IN ALABAMA’S CIVIL JUSTICE 
CLIMATE 
 
Several developments have occurred in Alabama since the “tort hell” of 
the late 1980s and early 1990s that led to a change in Alabama’s civil 
justice climate.  The combination of a dramatic change in the Alabama 
Supreme Court bench, efforts at tort reform, punitive damage reform and 
subsequent developments in the law of bad faith has contributed 
significantly to a less hostile legal climate for insurance companies. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                
48. Id. at 1233-34. 
49. Id. at 1235, 1239. 
50. 544 So.2d 906, 907 (Ala. 1989). 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 907-08. 
53. Id. at 917. 
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A. THE ALABAMA SUPREME COURT 
 
From 1989 to 1994, the Alabama Supreme Court was led by Chief 
Justice “Sonny” Hornsby.54  The “Hornsby Court,” as it was called, was 
largely identified with the hostile litigation climate towards corporate 
defendants that existed during Hornsby’s tenure.55  This was likely due not 
only to the upsurge of large punitive damage verdicts awarded during those 
years, but also to the court’s dismantling of early attempts at tort reform.56  
In 1987 the Alabama Legislature passed a tort reform package that included 
among its provisions a cap on punitive damages.57  Since 1987 the 
Alabama Supreme Court has struck down most of the provisions of the 
1987 Tort Reform Legislation,58 with the punitive damage caps being 
declared unconstitutional by the Hornsby Court.59   
The entirely Democratic bench of the Alabama Supreme Court began 
to change in 1994.60  In that year supporters of civil justice reform, 
including members of the defense bar and representatives of Alabama’s 
business community, contributed to and campaigned for Republican Perry 
Hooper Sr. in the election for the Supreme Court’s chief justice.61  One of 
the major issues of the 1994 chief justice election was tort reform.62  
During that election incumbent Sonny Hornsby was depicted as part of the 
problem of litigation abuse in Alabama.63  By contrast Perry Hooper 
communicated that he was in favor of tort reform and punitive damage caps 
in particular.64  Perry Hooper was sworn in as the new chief justice of the 
Alabama Supreme Court in 1995.65 
                                                                                                                
54. Alabama Department of Archives and History - Supreme Court Justice 
Biographies, http://www.archives.state.al.us/judicial/hornsby.html (last visited Nov. 15, 
2007); DeBow, supra note 4, at 2.  
55. DeBow, supra note 4, at 1-2.  
56. Id. at 4. 
57. Prater, supra note 1, at 1025-26. 
58. Id. at 1026. 
59. Henderson ex. rel. Hartsfield v. Ala. Power Co., 627 So.2d 878, 893-94 (Ala. 
1993); Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass’n, 592 So.2d 156, 173 (Ala. 1991); DeBow, supra 
note 4, at 4. 
60. DeBow, supra note 4, at 1, 2. 
61. Prater, supra note 1, at 1029. 
62. Id. at 1029-30. 
63. Id. at 1030. 
64. Stewart, supra note 2, at 228. 
65. DeBow, supra note 4, at 3. 
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In the election of 1996 another Republican, Harold See Jr., was added 
to the Alabama Supreme Court bench.66  Harold See was known as an 
“outspoken critic” of the Hornsby Court,67 as well as a supporter of the 
business community and tort reform.68  After the 1998 elections a 
Republican majority presided over the Alabama Supreme Court for the 
very first time since its establishment in 1820.69  In 2000 an additional four 
Republicans were added to the bench and in 2004 the governor appointed 
another, Drayton Nabers Jr., to succeed the former Chief Justice, Roy 
Moore, when he was removed from office.70  Drayton Nabers is the former 
chief executive officer of Protective Life Corporation, a financial services 
company, and a former chairman of the American Council of Life 
Insurers.71  Coming into the elections of 2007 the Alabama Supreme Court 
bench remained entirely Republican with Drayton Nabers serving as Chief 
Justice.72 
The new conservative composition of the court and the pro-business 
background of its chief justice illustrate the dramatic change that has taken 
place in the judicial environment in Alabama since 1989.  It is this new 
court that is poised to re-evaluate various legal issues of great concern to 
the business community, such as the constitutionality of punitive damage 
caps and excessive punitive damage awards. 
 
B. TORT REFORM – PUNITIVE DAMAGE CAPS 
 
In the mid-1980s a growing trend of tort reform swept through 42 
states.73  In 1987, the Alabama Legislature joined the majority of states and 
enacted a tort reform package, chief among its provisions a set of 
                                                                                                                
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Stewart, supra note 2, at 228. 
69. A History of the Alabama Judicial System, Alabama Judicial System Online,  
http://www.judicial.state.al.us/documents/judicial_history.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2007); 
DeBow, supra note 4, at 3. 
70. DeBow, supra note 4, at 3. 
71. Alabama Judicial System Online - Supreme Court Justice Biographies, 
http://www.judicial.state.al.us/supreme.cfm?Member=118 (last visited Nov. 15, 2007). 
72. Alabama Judicial System Online - Members of the Alabama Supreme Court, 
http://www.judicial.state.al.us/supreme.cfm, last visited (Jan. 10, 2007); DeBow, supra note 
4, at 2. 
73. George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE 
L.J. 1521, 1587 (1987). 
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legislatively imposed punitive damage caps.74  The 1987 punitive damage 
caps imposed a limit of $250,000 on all forms of punitive damages unless 
the damages were premised on one of the following: 
 
(1) A pattern or practice of intentional wrongful conduct, even 
though the damage or injury was inflicted only on the 
plaintiff; or 
(2) Conduct involving actual malice other than fraud or bad faith 
not a part of a pattern or practice; or 
(3) Libel, slander or defamation.75 
 
It did not take long for the Alabama courts, known for taking a pro-
punitive damages stance, to address the punitive damages provisions of the 
tort reform package.76  In Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass’n the Alabama 
Supreme Court held that Alabama Code Section 6-5-544(b), which limited 
the amount of non-economic damages recoverable in a medical malpractice 
case to $400,000, violated the right to a trial by jury guaranteed by the 
Alabama Constitution.77  The court stated that courts should not interfere 
with the damages awarded by a jury unless the jury’s assessment is “flawed 
by bias, passion, prejudice, corruption, or other improper motive.”78  The 
court further explained that the jury’s determination of damages is integral 
to the right to trial by jury as provided by the Alabama Constitution and 
that because Section 6-5-544(b) “caps the jury’s verdict automatically and 
absolutely” it impinges on the jury’s function and in doing so violates the 
right provided in the Alabama Constitution.79 
Less than two years later, the Hornsby Court addressed the 
constitutionality of Alabama Code Section 6-11-21 which capped punitive 
damages at $250,000 unless premised on one of the three varying situations 
noted earlier.  In Henderson ex. rel. Hartsfield v. Alabama Power Co. the 
Alabama Supreme Court ruled that Section 6-11-21 also violated the right 
to trial by jury as provided in the Alabama Constitution.80  The court 
explained that Moore was controlling precedent and because the limitations 
                                                                                                                
74. Stewart, supra note 2, at 201. 
75. ALA. CODE § 6-11-21 (LexisNexis 1997). 
76. Henderson ex. rel. Hartsfield v. Ala. Power Co., 627 So.2d 878, 885-86 (Ala. 
1993); Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass’n, 592 So.2d 156, 164 (Ala. 1991). 
77. 592 So.2d at 164. 
78. Id. at 161. 
79. Id. at 161, 164. 
80. 627 So.2d at 893-94. 
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imposed by Section 6-11-21, like those of Section 6-5-544(b), rendered the 
jury’s function meaningless they also were unconstitutional as violative of 
the right to trial by jury.81  Through Moore and Henderson, the Alabama 
Supreme Court authoritatively stated that legislatively imposed punitive 
damage caps violated the right to trial by jury and that the only means by 
which to impose them was through a constitutional amendment.82  
However, despite unmistakable precedent the Alabama Legislature 
continued its efforts to institute punitive damage caps.  After several 
unsuccessful attempts in 1996 and 1997,83 in 1999 both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate passed legislation to limit punitive damages 
by votes of 98-0 and 33-2 respectively.84  The new legislation capped 
punitive damages at three times the compensatory damages or $500,000, 
whichever is greater.85  The outcome of the new legislation would 
inevitably come before the high court again.  However, optimists 
speculated that the court that struck down previous damage caps was not 
the one that would address the new legislation and therefore, the outcome 
would likely be different this time.86   
The Alabama Supreme Court has yet to address whether Henderson 
was correctly decided in the civil context, but has questioned its 
soundness.87  In the case of Oliver v. Towns the court stated: 
 
Given the post-Henderson developments in the concept of due 
process law and the forceful rationale of the dissents in Henderson 
we question whether Henderson remains good law…However we 
decline to address this issue before the trial court rules on the 
                                                                                                                
81. Id. at 885-86. 
82. Id. at 893. 
83. Stewart, supra note 2, at 216-19. 
84. David White, Punitive Damages Cap OK’d, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, June 2, 1999, at 
1A. It should be noted that the Business Counsel of Alabama, a political group representing 
over 5,000 Alabama businesses, “spearheaded” the repeated legislative attempts at 
instituting punitive damage caps.  Stewart, supra note 2, at 215-16. 
85. ALA. CODE § 6-11-21 (LexisNexis 2005). 
86. Stewart, supra note 2, at 227-28. 
87. Oliver v. Towns, 738 So.2d 798, 804 n.7 (Ala. 1999).  It is important to note that 
in Ex Parte Apicella, the court held, in the context of a criminal case, that Henderson was 
wrongly decided to the extent it held that the Alabama Constitution “restricted the 
Legislature from removing from the jury the unbridled right to punish.” 809 So.2d 865, 873-
74 (Ala. 2001). 
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applicability of §6-11-21 to the punitive damages award in this 
case.88 
 
The court also avoided addressing the issue of Henderson in 2004 in Alfa 
Life Insurance Co. v. Jackson.89  The court specifically noted that it did not 
need to address the issue of whether Henderson was correctly decided 
because the damage caps contained in Alabama Code Section 6-11-21 did 
not apply to the case.90   
From the perspective of an insurance company, or any corporate 
defendant, legislatively imposed punitive damage caps are a step in the 
right direction.  However, such restrictions have engendered significant 
tension between the Alabama Legislature and the judiciary since the initial 
decimation of the 1987 Tort Reform Package.91  Despite the earlier caps 
being ruled unconstitutional a new set of caps is on the books and it is 
possible that the new conservative Alabama Supreme Court, if given the 
opportunity, will uphold them this time around. 
 
C. PUNITIVE DAMAGE REFORM 
 
Alabama has been described by its own legislators as “the worst state 
in America for punitive damages.”92  Accordingly, it is not surprising that 
many of the large awards imposed on corporate defendants in Alabama are 
appealed.  Therefore, it is critical to the defendant that the appellate courts 
of the state have a framework in place that allows them to effectively 
review the punitive awards for excessiveness.  In the 1980s the Alabama 
Supreme Court issued two opinions that assisted in establishing this 
framework.93   
In Hammond v. City of Gadsden the Alabama Supreme Court reached 
two conclusions regarding the review of punitive damages.  The first 
holding was that trial courts must state, on the record, the reasons for 
interference or non-interference with the jury verdict when the issue is the 
excessiveness of the award.94  The rationale behind the court’s finding was 
                                                                                                                
88. Oliver, 738 So.2d at 804 n.7 (citations omitted). 
89. No. 1001854 & 1002002, 2004 Ala. LEXIS 118 (Ala. May 7, 2004). 
90. Id. at *35. 
91. Stewart, supra note 2, at 203-04, 216-220; DeBow, supra note 4, at 4. 
92. Stewart, supra note 2, at 215. 
93. Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.2d 218 (Ala. 1989); Hammond v. City of 
Gadsden, 493 So.2d 1374 (Ala. 1986). 
94. Hammond, 493 So.2d at 1379. 
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that appellate courts were increasingly being called upon to review the 
excessiveness of punitive damage awards and the fact that trial courts often 
did not articulate their reasons for interfering or not interfering with such 
awards put the appellate courts at a distinct disadvantage as inevitably 
numerous aspects of the trial were not included in the record.95  This 
holding arguably benefited those defendants appealing punitive damage 
verdicts as it gave the appellate courts a more complete understanding of 
the trial court’s logic, or lack thereof. 
The second holding of Hammond was that certain factors should be 
considered by appellate courts when reviewing punitive damage awards for 
excessiveness.96  These factors included the culpability of the defendant’s 
conduct, the desirability of discouraging similar conduct by others, the 
impact upon the parties, and the impact on innocent third parties.97  These 
four factors were the beginning of a larger list of factors that would be 
compiled over time and would be used by the Alabama Supreme Court to 
evaluate the excessiveness of punitive damage awards. 
In Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby the Alabama Supreme Court expanded the 
list of factors for consideration in punitive damage appeals to seven.98  The 
factors as described by the court are the following: 
 
(1) Punitive damages should bear a reasonable relationship to the 
harm that is likely to occur from the defendant’s conduct as 
well as to the harm that actually has occurred.  If the actual or 
likely harm is slight, the damages should be relatively small.  
If grievous, the damages should be much greater. 
(2) The degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct 
should be considered.  The duration of this conduct, the 
degree of the defendant’s awareness of any hazard which his 
conduct has caused or is likely to cause, and any concealment 
or ‘cover up’ of that hazard, and the existence and frequency 
of similar past conduct should all be relevant in determining 
this degree of reprehensibility. 
(3) If the wrongful conduct was profitable to the defendant, the 
punitive damages should remove the profit and should be in 
excess of the profit, so that the defendant recognizes a loss. 
                                                                                                                
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. 539 So.2d 218, 223-24. 
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(4) The financial position of the defendant would be relevant. 
(5) All the costs of litigation should be included so as to 
encourage plaintiffs to bring wrongdoers to trial. 
(6) If criminal sanctions have been imposed on the defendant for 
his conduct, this should be taken into account in mitigation of 
the punitive damages award. 
(7) If there have been other civil actions against the same 
defendant, based on the same conduct, this should taken into 
account in mitigation of the punitive damages award.99 
 
This new list of factors, called the “Hammond-Green Oil” factors, was the 
basis on which today’s more complicated review process for excessiveness 
of punitive damages was built.  
Despite initial approval from the United States Supreme Court,100 
Alabama’s method of reviewing punitive damages was dealt a heavy blow 
in 1996.  In BMW of North America v. Gore the United States Supreme 
Court reviewed an Alabama case on the issue of excessiveness of punitive 
damages and ruled that the punitive damages awarded against the 
defendant were so excessive as to violate the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.101  The Court held that “[e]lementary notions of 
fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person 
receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to 
punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may 
impose.”102  The Court then provided three “guideposts” to use in 
                                                                                                                
99. Id. 
100. In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, the United States Supreme Court 
reviewed the Hammond-Green Oil factors and determined that this method of “postverdict 
review ensures that punitive damages awards are not grossly out of proportion to the 
severity of the offense and have some understandable relationship to compensatory 
damages” and that the standards are a “sufficiently definite and meaningful constraint on the 
discretion of Alabama factfinders in awarding punitive damages.”  499 U.S. 1, 22 (1991). 
101. 517 U.S. 559, 562, 585-86 (1996).  The jury verdict in this case was $4,000 
compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive damages.  Id. at 565.  The trial court 
denied BMW’s post trial motion and stated the award was not excessive.  Id. at 566.  The 
Alabama Supreme Court remitted the punitive damage award to $2 million based on 
findings that the jury incorrectly calculated punitive damages by taking into account the 
amount of similar incidents in other states.  Id. at 567.  It should be noted that the $2 million 
punitive damage awarded survived a Hammond-Green Oil analysis by the Alabama 
Supreme Court.  BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 646 So.2d 619, 624-29 (Ala. 1994). 
102. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996). 
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evaluating whether a defendant was given the required fair notice.103  The 
first guidepost was the “degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s 
conduct.”104  The Court did not give specifics as to what level of 
reprehensibility dictated a larger award of punitive damages, but did make 
several observations as to what types of conduct were considered more 
reprehensible than others.105  For example, violent crimes were considered 
more serious than non-violent crimes and “trickery and deceit” was 
considered more reprehensible than negligence.106  The second BMW 
guidepost was the ratio of the punitive damage award to the “actual harm 
inflicted on the plaintiff.”107  Again, the Court declined to draw a bright line 
standard stating it would be impossible to draw a line that appropriately fit 
all cases, but it did state that the ratio in this case, 500:1, was 
“breathtaking” and warranted additional review.108  The final BMW 
“guidepost” was the civil or criminal penalties available to punish similar 
conduct.109  The Court noted that the Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices 
Act would impose a fine of $2,000 for similar conduct and accordingly, did 
not give BMW fair notice that it may be subjecting itself to a multi-million 
judgment.110  After considering the three guideposts together the Court 
concluded that the $2 million punitive damage award was excessive and 
unconstitutional and remanded the case to the Alabama Supreme Court.111  
On remand, the Alabama Supreme Court remitted the punitive damages to 
$50,000 and stated that when reviewing punitive damage awards 
challenged as excessive Alabama courts should apply the Hammond-Green 
Oil factors as well as the BMW guideposts and make their determinations 
on a case-by-case basis.112 
                                                                                                                
103. Id. at 574-75. 
104. Id. at 575. 
105. Id. at 575-77. 
106. Id. at 575-76.  Two additional observations made by the Court were that repeated 
conduct was more reprehensible than one instance of misconduct and that causing financial 
injury to a financially disadvantaged individual would warrant a higher award.  Id. at 576-
77. 
107. Id. at 580. 
108. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582-83 (1996).  The Court noted that it 
was possible to have a case where a particularly deplorable act generated a small amount of 
compensatory damages, but supported a large punitive award.  Id. at 582. 
109. Id. at 583. 
110. Id. at 584. 
111. Id. at 585-86. 
112. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 701 So.2d 507, 515 (Ala. 1997).  The Alabama 
Supreme Court indicated in its interpretation that the first two of the BMW guideposts were 
already included in the Hammond-Green Oil factors.  Id. at 511. 
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In the aftermath of the BMW decision, the United States Supreme Court 
remanded four additional cases to the Alabama Supreme Court for review 
under BMW.113  In each case the punitive damages award was substantially 
reduced after being reviewed in light of the BMW guideposts and the 
Hammond-Green Oil factors.114  In addition, after BMW the bad faith cases 
that reached the Alabama Supreme Court, illustrated a new understanding 
on the part of Alabama juries and courts that excessive punitive damage 
awards would no longer be tolerated unless they could survive a demanding 
review.115    
This new legal framework used to review potentially excessive 
punitive damage awards in Alabama is another development that makes the 
litigation climate of Alabama less intimidating to corporate defendants as 
                                                                                                                
113. Id. at 519 (Houston, J., concurring).  The cases were: Life Ins. Co. of Ga. v. 
Johnson, 519 U.S. 923 (1996); Ford Motor Co. v. Sperau, 517 U.S. 1217 (1996); Union Sec. 
Life Ins. Co. v. Crocker, 517 U.S. 1230 (1996); Am. Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v. Williamson 
517 U.S. 1231 (1996). 
114. In Life Insurance Co. of Georgia v. Johnson, the jury awarded punitive damages 
in the amount of $15 million which was reduced by the trial judge to $12.5 million and was 
reduced again by the Alabama Supreme Court to $5 million.  701 So.2d 524, 526 (Ala. 
1997).  On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the Alabama Supreme Court 
reduced the award again to $3 million.  Id.  In Ford Motor Co. v. Sperau, the jury awarded 
$6 million in punitive damages which was upheld by the trial court and the Alabama 
Supreme Court.  708 So.2d 111, 114-15 (Ala. 1997).  On remand from the United States 
Supreme Court, the Alabama Supreme Court reduced the punitive damage award to 
$1,792,000.  Id. at 115.  In Union Security Life Insurance Co. v. Crocker, the jury granted a 
verdict of $5 million which was subsequently reduced to $2 million by the trial court and 
then upheld by the Alabama Supreme Court.  667 So.2d 688, 690, 695 (Ala. 1995).  On 
remand from the United States Supreme Court, the Alabama Supreme Court reduced the 
award to $1 million.  709 So.2d 1118, 1123 (Ala. 1997).  In American Pioneer Life 
Insurance Co v. Williamson, the jury awarded punitive damages in the amount of $3 million 
which was reduced by the Alabama Supreme Court to $2 million.  704 So.2d 1361, 1361-62 
(Ala. 1997).  On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the Alabama Supreme 
Court further reduced the punitive award to $750,000.  Id. at 1362. 
115. The initial jury verdicts in the post BMW bad faith cases were substantially lower 
than earlier bad faith cases and the punitive damages were regularly remitted on appeal.  
Compare Nat’l Ins. Ass’n v. Sockwell, 829 So.2d 111 (Ala. 2002); Acceptance Ins. Co. v. 
Brown, 832 So.2d 1 (Ala. 2001); Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 792 So.2d 1069 
(Ala. 2000); Alfa Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 738 So.2d 815 (Ala. 1999); Employees’ 
Benefit Ass’n v. Grissett, 732 So.2d 968 (Ala. 1998); Loyal Am. Ins. Co. v. Mattiace, 679 
So.2d 229 (Ala. 1996), with Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. Stephens Enter., 641 So.2d 780 (Ala. 
1994); Thomas v. Principal Fin. Group, 566 So.2d 735 (Ala. 1990); Intercontinental Life 
Ins. Co. v. Lindblom, 571 So.2d 1092 (Ala. 1990); United Serv. Auto. Ass’n v. Wade, 544 
So.2d 906 (Ala. 1989); United Am. Ins. Co. v. Brumley, 542 So.2d 1231 (Ala. 1989); Aetna 
Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 505 So.2d 1050 (Ala. 1987); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Clay, 469 
So.2d 533 (Ala. 1985). 
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they can be assured that excessive awards will be subjected to thorough and 
exacting review on appeal. 
 
D. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF FIRST PARTY BAD FAITH 
 
Alabama has become a less hostile environment for insurers, not only 
due to the three factors previously discussed, but also due to several 
developments in the law of first party bad faith.   The bad faith cause of 
action has developed over time to provide heightened protection to insureds 
while simultaneously ensuring that not every refusal to pay an insurance 
claim will land an insurance company in court. 
In Alabama a plaintiff can prove bad faith by one of two approaches; 
by establishing the elements of an ordinary/normal case or those of an 
extraordinary/abnormal case.116  Under the normal case of bad faith failure 
to pay an insurance claim the plaintiff has a heavy burden of proof and 
must establish:  
(1) The existence of an insurance contract; 
(2) An intentional refusal to pay the claim; and 
(3) The absence of any lawful basis for the refusal and the 
insurer’s knowledge of that fact or the insurer’s intentional 
failure to determine whether there is any lawful basis for its 
refusal.117 
 
The plaintiff has to show more than simple nonpayment on the part of the 
insurance company.118 The plaintiff has to show the insurer refused to pay 
without a reasonable ground for disputing the claim.119  In the normal case, 
in order for the bad faith claim to stand, the plaintiff must also be entitled 
to a directed verdict on his breach of contract claim.120  If evidence is 
produced which creates a factual issue as to the contract claim, the bad 
faith claim must be dismissed.121 
A different standard is applied to certain cases that qualify as 
“extraordinary” or abnormal.122  This is because of policy concerns 
                                                                                                                
116. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Slade, 747 So.2d 293, 306 (Ala. 1999); Grissett, 
732 So.2d at 976. 
117. Brown, 832 So.2d at 16. 
118. Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Bowen, 417 So.2d 179, 183 (Ala. 1982). 
119. Id. 
120. Nat’l Sav. Life Ins. Co. v. Dutton, 419 So.2d 1357, 1362 (Ala. 1982). 
121. Id. 
122. Brown, 832 So.2d at 16. 
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regarding the insured’s right to prompt and thorough claim evaluation and 
payment.123  Under the abnormal case of bad faith failure to investigate an 
insurance claim the plaintiff must prove: 
(1) that the insurer failed to properly investigate the claim or to 
subject the results of the investigation to a cognitive 
evaluation and review; and 
(2) that the insurer breached the contract for insurance coverage 
with the insured when it refused to pay the insured’s claim.124 
 
Abnormal or “extraordinary” cases have largely been restricted to 
situations where the plaintiff is able to produce substantial evidence 
demonstrating the insurer acted in one of the following four ways: 
(3) Intentionally or recklessly failed to investigate the plaintiff’s 
claim; 
(4) Intentionally or recklessly failed to properly subject the 
plaintiff’s claim to a cognitive evaluation or review;  
(5) Created its own debatable reason for denying the plaintiff’s 
claim; or 
(6) Relied on an ambiguous portion of the policy as a lawful basis 
to deny the plaintiff’s claim.125 
 
In all bad faith cases the plaintiff must be able to show he was entitled to 
benefits under the insurance policy in question.126 
The development of these two distinct forms of bad faith illustrates the 
differing policy concerns that the Alabama Supreme Court was grappling 
with when molding the bad faith cause of action.  On one hand, the court 
saw the need to preserve the ability of insurance companies to effectively 
review claims and refuse payment on those that were invalid.127  It did not 
intend, nor would it tolerate, plaintiff’s abuse of this cause of action to sue 
insurance companies for every denial of a claim.  Justice Shores, writing 
for the court, discussed this concern in Affiliated FM Insurance Co. v. 
Stephens Enterprises when he stated: 
 
                                                                                                                
123. Id. 
124. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Slade, 747 So.2d 293, 318 (Ala. 1999). 
125. Id. at 306-07. 
126. Acceptance Ins. Co. v. Brown, 832 So.2d 1, 16 (Ala. 2001). 
127. Thomas v. Principal Fin. Group, 566 So.2d 735, 742 (Ala. 1990). 
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The recognition of the tort of bad faith does not, as Affiliated 
asserts, give a unilateral right to plaintiffs to pursue a claim for 
punitive damages against an insurer for an alleged breach of 
contract.  The burden of proof in a bad faith case is such that 
sufficient protection is afforded to defendants in these cases.128 
 
The heavy burden of proof placed on plaintiffs in the normal bad faith case 
functioned to preserve the insurers’ right to debate questionable claims. 
However, the court was also concerned with enforcing the right of the 
insured to have his claim adequately evaluated and paid in a timely 
fashion.129  Accordingly, the court established a different standard for the 
abnormal case of bad faith failure to investigate.130  The court noted in 
these abnormal cases that the plaintiff was not required to be entitled to a 
directed verdict on the contract claim because it was too great of a burden 
and would often allow the insurer to avoid liability for bad faith where it 
may be properly imposed.131  For example, in Jones v. Alabama Farm 
Bureau Mutual Casualty Co. the plaintiff insureds had a homeowner’s 
policy that covered damage caused directly by lightening, but did not cover 
damage indirectly caused by power surges.132  The insurer and the plaintiffs 
disagreed as to the cause of the damage.133  The adjuster for the insurance 
company claimed that the plaintiff told him the damage was caused by a 
tree that had fallen onto a power line and made his decision to deny the 
claim based on that alleged conversation.134  The plaintiff denied stating the 
tree was the cause of the damage.135  The insurer made the argument that 
because there was a difference between the two accounts of the 
conversation the plaintiff was not entitled to a directed verdict on the 
contract claim and therefore, the bad faith claim could not stand.136  The 
                                                                                                                
128. 641 So.2d 780, 784 (Ala. 1994). 
129. Thomas, 566 So.2d at 742-43. 
130. Id. at 743. 
131. Jones v. Ala. Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Co., 507 So.2d 396, 401 (Ala. 1986) 
(“Precluding a plaintiff’s bad faith action by application of the ‘directed verdict on the 
contract claim’ test when the disputed factual issue arises solely from a contradicted oral 
conversation between the insurer and the insured or a third person puts too onerous a burden 
on the plaintiff.”); Cont’l Assurance Co. v. Kountz, 461 So.2d 802, 806 (Ala. 1984) (“in an 
extraordinary case like this the directed verdict standard is inapplicable.”).  
132. 507 So.2d 396, 397 (Ala. 1986). 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. at 400. 
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Alabama Supreme Court held that this case was not the normal or ordinary 
bad faith case and that the directed verdict standard was not applicable.137  
In support of its holding the court reasoned that: 
 
Although the plaintiff's burden of proof in a bad faith action is 
great, it should not be insurmountable. Precluding a plaintiff's bad 
faith action by application of the "directed verdict on the contract 
claim" test when the disputed factual issue arises solely from a 
contradicted oral conversation between the insurer and the insured 
or a third person puts too onerous a burden on the plaintiff. 
Moreover, it would frustrate the purpose of the bad faith action by 
allowing an insurer simply to misrepresent the content of an oral 
conversation to avoid liability.138 
 
Therefore, the courts have allowed a less burdensome standard to prevail in 
abnormal cases of bad faith failure to investigate.  This lesser standard 
functions to hold insurance companies to a higher standard of claims 
investigation. 
Despite the fact that plaintiffs have two means by which to establish 
bad faith, it is clear that the courts were concerned about the impact the 
cause of action would have on an insurer’s ability to deny invalid claims.  
Accordingly the court saddled the plaintiff with a high burden of proof in 
normal bad faith failure to pay situations.  Additional protection is provided 
for insurers by the imposition of the directed verdict standard in the normal 
case.  Therefore, the bad faith cause of action in the normal bad faith case 
does not pose as much of a threat to an insurer as it could have had the law 
developed in a different way. 
It may appear as though the abnormal case of bad faith failure to 
investigate would continue to pose a large risk to insurance companies in 
Alabama.  In many respects the abnormal case is more of a problem for 
insurers in that the burden placed on the plaintiff is less arduous.  However, 
the Alabama Supreme Court has, through a number of cases, clearly laid 
out some of the issues with which insurers need to be concerned under the 
abnormal bad faith cause of action. 139  Well advised insurers are able to 
                                                                                                                
137. Id. at 400-01. 
138. Jones v. Ala. Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Co., 507 So.2d 396, 401 (Ala. 1986). 
139. See White v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 953 So.2d 340 (Ala. 2006); State Farm 
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Slade, 747 So.2d 293 (Ala. 1999); United Serv. Auto. Ass’n v. Wade, 
544 So.2d 906 (Ala. 1989); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Clay, 525 So.2d 1339 (Ala. 1987); 
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internalize these issues and modify their claims handling processes 
accordingly.  One of these issues involves the information an insurer has 
before it when the claims decision is made.  The only information that will 
be taken into account by the court in determining whether the insurer was 
justified in denying the claim is that which was before the insurer at the 
time the claims decision was made.140  In court an insurance company 
cannot rely on information discovered after the denial to justify its 
decision.141  Knowing this, an insurer would be well advised to incorporate 
standards of information gathering into its claims handling manuals and 
provide training on the importance of gathering all relevant information 
prior to adjudicating the claim. 
Another issue brought to the attention of insurance companies by the 
court addresses ambiguous policy provisions.  An insurer cannot claim it 
had a justifiable basis for denying the claim and point to ambiguity in its 
own policy as that basis.142  This rule dovetails with the contra proferentem 
principle of insurance law which states that when interpreting documents 
ambiguity is construed against the drafter.143  As this principle is a general 
tenet of insurance law all insurance companies should be aware that 
reliance on ambiguity in their policies will not win the day for them in a 
courtroom. 
One final example of an issue to which the court has spoken in terms of 
the abnormal case of bad faith is that of “reckless indifference to facts or 
proof submitted by the insured.”144  In Gulf Atlantic Life Insurance Co. v. 
Barnes the court stated, “knowledge or reckless disregard of the lack of a 
legitimate or reasonable basis may be inferred or imputed to an insurance 
company when there is a reckless indifference to facts or to proof 
submitted by the insured.”145  The question remained, what did that mean 
for insurance companies?  The court has since provided examples of what 
constitutes such reckless indifference.  In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. 
Lavoie, the insurance company made its claim denial based on an 
incomplete medical file (the file was missing the patient’s progress notes 
                                                                                                                          
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 505 So.2d 1050 (Ala. 1987); Chavers v. Nat’l Sec. Fire & 
Cas. Co., 405 So.2d 1 (Ala. 1981). 
140. Lavoie, 505 So.2d at 1053. 
141. Id. 
142. White, 953 So.2d at 349.. 
143. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 352 (8th ed. 2004). 
144. Gulf Atl. Life Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 405 So.2d 916, 924 (Ala. 1981). 
145. Id. 
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and nurses’ notes from her hospitalization).146  The insurer’s witnesses 
admitted documentation like that missing from the file in question was “of 
critical importance” in the review of a claimant’s medical file.147  The 
Alabama Supreme Court ruled that because the insurer denied the claim 
while missing critical sections of the claimant’s medical file a jury could 
find they acted with “reckless indifference to facts or proof.”148  Additional 
guidance was provided by the Alabama Supreme Court in United Services 
Automobile Ass’n v. Wade.149  In that case, the claimants were denied 
coverage under their homeowner’s policy based on grounds of arson.150  
The court ruled that the record established the investigation conducted by 
the insurer was incomplete and therefore the insurer’s reliance on that 
incomplete investigation constituted “reckless indifference to the facts.”151  
Some of the problems with the investigation included the following: (1) the 
insurer’s investigator did not examine the house’s electrical system to rule 
out electrical issues as the cause of the fire; (2) the insurer’s investigator 
did not move debris from the entire basement floor to determine whether a 
trail left by flammable liquid was actually a trail or present throughout the 
basement; (3) the insurer’s investigator did not ask the insureds if 
flammable liquids were routinely kept in their basement; (4) the insurer 
was aware of a second investigator’s opinion that the fire started in a 
different area of the house from which the insurer’s investigator stated the 
fire started; (5) the insurer was aware that the fire marshal did not suspect 
the insureds of arson; and (6) the insurer relied largely on statements made 
by the insured’s ex-wife as to his involvement in other fires when there was 
clearly ill feelings present between the two.152  By examining the court’s 
clear and detailed explanations of the problems involved in claims 
investigations, such as those articulated in the two cases discussed above, 
an insurer can educate itself and its claims handling departments on the 
types of issues that will put the insurer at risk for suits based on a claim of 
bad faith failure to investigate.  By doing so, the insurer can insulate itself 
against the more intimidating form of first party bad faith in Alabama.   
 
 
                                                                                                                
146. 505 So.2d 1050, 1051 (Ala. 1987). 
147. Id. at 1053. 
148. Id.  
149. 544 So.2d 906 (Ala. 1989). 
150. Id. at 907-08. 
151. Id. at 913-14. 
152. Id. at 914-15. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The changes that have taken place within Alabama’s civil justice 
system over the past 25 years have been remarkable.  These changes have 
made the jurisdiction one in which insurance companies should no longer 
be fearful to write business. 
Despite the fact that the bad faith cause of action is alive and well in 
Alabama, it has been shaped into an even handed cause of action that 
requires a heavy burden of plaintiffs and cannot be used as an unlimited 
vehicle for obtaining punitive damages against insurance companies.  This 
ensures that bad faith cases brought by plaintiffs today meet a certain 
standard of validity and protects insurers from being saddled with 
unjustified lawsuits.   For those bad faith claims that are successfully 
asserted, the magnitude of punitive damages is controlled through a system 
of exacting appellate punitive damage review which has been increasingly 
utilized to substantially remit large awards.  The existence of such appellate 
review affects a plaintiff’s ability and desire to bring a bad faith cause of 
action as it is more difficult to prove and less profitable than it once was.  
In addition, punitive damage caps, though previously ruled 
unconstitutional, are back on the books and the newly conservative 
Supreme Court bench has openly questioned whether holding such caps 
unconstitutional remains good law. 
The Legislature, the courts and the pro-business interests in Alabama 
have worked hard to create meaningful change in its civil justice system.  
In response to this change the insurance industry should take another look 
at Alabama and reconsider whether it is more dangerous than profitable to 
insure its citizens. 
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It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a 
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a 
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments 
without risk to the rest of the country. 1 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Spiraling health care costs provide Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (“Wal-Mart”) 
with a convenient excuse not to offer affordable health care coverage for 
their employees; forcing many of the working poor to turn to Medicaid. 
One state tried, and failed, to put Wal-Mart’s benefit-shifting to an end. On 
November 30, 2006, attorneys for the State of Maryland argued before the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals to preserve the Fair Share Health Care 
Fund Act (“the Fair Share Act” or “the Act”).2 The Act would help 
legislatures force Wal-Mart to pay its fair share of health care costs and 
stop overburdening states. The Act drew national attention amid mounting 
                                                                                                                
1. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311(1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
2. Matthew Dolan & Andrew A. Green, Wal-Mart Bill Debated. As Appeals Court 
Hears Case, Md. Politicians Look to Other Ways to Expand Health Care, THE BALTIMORE 
SUN, Dec. 1, 2006.  
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pressure for Wal-Mart to provide better employee benefits.3 The Act 
required that companies with more than 10,000 workers devote at least 
eight percent of their payroll to employee health care costs.4 If employers 
failed to meet the eight percent requirement, they had to pay Maryland the 
difference. The express purpose of the legislation was to support “the 
operations of the [Medicaid] Program.”5  
The Fair Share Act survived a veto from Maryland governor Robert L. 
Ehrlich and was set to take effect on January 1, 2007.6 However, it was 
struck down in RILA v. Maryland7 on the grounds that the federal 
Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”),8 which 
demands national uniformity in employer benefits regulation, preempted 
it.9  
This paper will explore the fight for the Fair Share Act, ERISA 
preemption jurisprudence, and how legislatures may draft successful 
legislation to stop big box retailers from over burdening states. Part II 
provides background information on the factors that contributed to the 
drafting of Maryland’s Fair Share Act, including Wal-Mart’s health care 
policies and the high costs of Medicaid. Part III discusses RILA v. Fielder, 
the case that found that Maryland’s Fair Share Act was preempted by 
ERISA. Part IV discusses ERISA’s history and how it has become a major 
barrier to local legislative innovation. Part V discusses the mistakes that 
Maryland’s Fair Share Act made. Part VI discusses one successful Fair 
Share Act. Part VII explains how legislatures may draft successful Fair 
Share Acts and avoid the mishaps of the Maryland Fair Share Act.  
 
II. WAL-MART’S HEALTH CARE POLICIES 
A. CYNTHIA’S STORY 
 
Cynthia Murray desperately needed the Fair Share Act. She is one of 
17,000 Wal-Mart employees that work in Maryland.10 She was partially 
                                                                                                                
3. Id.  
4. Id. 
5. Fair Share Health Care Fund, MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §15-142(c) (2006).  
6. Id. 
7. 435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 484 (D. Md. 2006). 
8. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq (1974). 
9. Id. 
10. Mary Otto, For One Clerk, Fight for Wal-Mart Bill Is Personal, WASH. POST, Jan. 
12 2006, at B05.  
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disabled in a car accident, but she cannot afford the health care necessary to 
rehabilitate her injuries.11 Despite her five-year tenure with the company, 
her wages cannot cover the high cost of Wal-Mart health insurance.12 In the 
wake of Maryland Governor Ehrlich’s veto of the Act, she wrote a letter to 
Maryland legislatures urging them to override his veto. She said: 
 
Big business and special interests want to kill Fair Share Health 
Care, but I can tell you, personally, workers like me need this 
bill. We can’t afford health care and this bill would go a long 
way to make Wal-Mart spend a minimum amount of money to 
provide health care for its workers.13  
 
Cynthia Murray’s story is not unique. There are many more Wal-Mart 
associates whose story will not ever be heard. They too are drowning in 
health care costs.  
B. WAL-MART’S HEALTH CARE BENEFITS 
 
Wal-Mart intentionally evaded their responsibilities to their employees 
by shifting health care costs to state and federal governments. A 2005 
internal memo14 sent by Susan Chambers, then Wal-Mart’s Executive Vice 
President of Risk Management and Benefits Administration,15 exposed the 
grim realities of Wal-Mart’s inadequate health care coverage. 16  The 
                                                                                                                
11. Cynthia Murray, Open Letter to the Maryland State Legislature from a Current 
Wal-Mart Associate, WAL-MART WORKERS OF AMERICA, Jan. 11, 2006, 
http://www.wakeupwalmart.com/wwa/fair-share.html. 
12. Id.  
13. Id.  
14. See Steven Greenhouse & Michael Barbaro, Wal-Mart Memo Suggests Ways to 
Cut Employee Benefit Costs, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2005) (“A draft memo to Wal-Mart’s 
board was obtained from Wal-Mart Watch, a nonprofit group, allied with labor unions, that 
asserts that Wal-Mart’s pay and benefits are too low. Tracy Sefl, a spokeswoman for Wal-
Mart Watch, said someone mailed the document anonymously to her group last month. 
When asked about the memo, Wal-Mart officials made available an updated copy that 
actually went to the board.”).  
15. Susan Chambers has since been promoted to Executive Vice President of People 
Division.  
16. Susan Chambers, Reviewing and Revising Wal-Mart’s Benefits Strategy, 
Supplemental Benefits Documentation, BOARD OF DIRECTORS RETREAT FY06, WAL-MART 
STORES, INC., available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/26/business/26walmart.ready.html?ex=1287979200&en=
e9a0f5d466bb026e&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss.  
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memo, which was sent to the Board of Directors, revealed that most Wal-
Mart associates spent eight percent of their income on health care, nearly 
twice the national average.17 In 2004, thirty-eight percent of enrolled Wal-
Mart associates spent more than sixteen percent of their earnings18 on 
health care.19  
The high cost of health care compels significant portions of Wal-Mart’s 
workforce to seek health insurance from public assistance programs.20 Five 
percent of Wal-Mart associates are on Medicaid, or 1.2 million people.21 
Forty-six percent of Wal-Mart associates’ children are either on Medicaid 
or uninsured.22 These startling figures are not lost on Wal-Mart employees. 
Wal-Mart associates rank health insurance as the most important benefit 
that their employer offers, yet it is also the one benefit that they are most 
disappointed with.23  
C. WAL-MART DUMPS UNINSURED EMPLOYEES IN PUBLICLY 
FUNDED PROGRAMS  
 
Wal-Mart refuses to release a state by state report of the number of 
their employees covered by Medicaid.24 However, according to an 
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(“AFL-CIO”) report, Wal-Mart ranks high on the list of companies shifting 
employees into state programs for the uninsured in nineteen out of the 
twenty-three states surveyed.25  This is especially troubling considering that 
“Medicaid is the fasted growing expense for most states, accounting for 
sixteen percent of state budgets.”26 At the National Governors Association 
                                                                                                                
17. Id. at 7. 
18. See Greenhouse & Barbaro, supra note 14, at 2 (“Full time Wal-Mart 
employees…earn on average around $17,500 a year.”). 
19. Id.  
20. Id. at 8.  
21. Id.  
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 6.  
24. Otto, supra note 10, at B05. (“[Maryland Speaker of the House, Michael e. Busch] 
could not provide figures for how many of Maryland’s Wal-Mart workers are on Medicaid, 
and the AFL-CIO sued unsuccessfully to get that information.”) 
25. AFL-CIO REPORT, THE WAL-MART TAX: SHIFTING HEALTH-CARE COSTS TO 
TAXPAYERS 1 (2006), 
www.aflcio.org/corporatewatch/walmart/upload/walmartreport_031406.pdf (Quantifies the 
impact of Wal-Mart’s refusal to provide affordable employee health care insurance on 
publicly funded state health care programs in twenty-three states). 
26. Id. 
178 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:1 
 
 
meeting held in Washington, DC, in February 2005, Medicaid was 
identified as the number one problem facing state governments.27 Medicaid 
accounts for twenty-two percent of total state spending and has become the 
second largest item in most state budgets after elementary and secondary 
education.28 Maryland’s Department of Budget and Management reported 
that “Maryland’s Medicaid and Children’s Health Program spending has 
increased by $1.25 billon since 2003.29  Due to Medicaid’s continued 
growth, it is expected to absorb funding from other vital state funded 
programs. Over the next five years, Medicaid costs are expected to rise 
eight percent annually, while general fund revenues are forecast to grow at 
only five percent. 30   
The burden on states is only getting worse. During 2006, the federal 
government required states to pay an additional $527 million for 
Medicaid.31 Federal Medicaid spending also jumped by more than fifty 
percent between 2000 and 2004.32  
Wal-Mart also pays lower premiums than the national average. Most 
national employers paid eighty-four percent of premiums for individual 
coverage and seventy-three percent of premiums for family coverage in 
2003.33 Sixty-six percent of employees at national companies receive health 
benefits; only forty-one to forty-six percent of Wal-Mart employees enjoy 
the same.34  
                                                                                                                
27. James P. Baker, Can Maryland Make Wal-Mart Pay or Play?, 19 BENEFITS L.J. 
84, 84-101 (2006) (discussing the affects of the Fair Share Act). 
28. Id.  
29. MARYLAND DEPT. OF BUDGET & MANAGEMENT, MARYLAND FY 2007 BUDGET 
HIGHLIGHTS, 34-35 (2007), available at 
www.dbm.maryland.gov/dbm_taxonomy/budget/publications/budget_highlights/fy07_budg
ethighlights.pdf. 
30. ISSUE PAPERS, 2006 LEGISLATIVE SESSION, PRESENTATION TO THE MARYLAND 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY, DEPARTMENT OF LEGISLATIVE SERVICES OFFICE OF POLICY ANALYSIS, 
ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND 113-117 (Dec. 2005), 
mlis.state.md.us/Other/IssuePapers/2006/Issue%20Papers%202006%20Legislative%20Sess
ion.pdf .  
31. FEDERAL FUNDS INFORMATION FOR STATES, ISSUE BRIEF 04-41: FY 2006 FMAPs, 
September 28, 2004.  
32. Id.  
33. Everyday Low Wages: The Hidden Price We All Pay for Wal-Mart: Hearing 
Before the Comm. on Education and the Workforce, 108th Cong., 2d sess., (Feb. 2004). 
http://www.agribusinessaccountability.org/pdfs/285_The%20Hidden%20Price%20We%20P
ay%20for%20Wal-Mart.pdf 
34. Id. at 1.  
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Wal-Mart’s relentless lobbying has helped it evade state laws 
mandating minimum health care expenditures. In Maryland alone, the 
company hired twelve top lobbyists to combat the Fair Share Act,35 
including the highest paid lobbyists in the state.36 “‘They’ve hired the 
largest cadre of lobbyists in recent history in Annapolis to try to influence 
this legislation,’” said Maryland House Speaker Michael E. Busch. ‘It 
really comes down to whether the legislature is going to succumb to the 
money and the special interests.’”  
Wal-Mart is willing to spend money on legislatures to avoid spending 
money on health-care. It made a $10,000 “donation” to the Legislative 
Black Caucus of Maryland to help pay for one of the organization’s 
conferences. 37 The company admitted that the donation was a lobbying 
effort designed to inform lawmakers about the bill.38 It also “contributed at 
least $4,000 to Governor Ehrlich’s re-election campaign, prior to his veto 
of the Fair Share Act. 39  
D. THE MARYLAND FAIR SHARE ACT  
 
      Fourteen percent of Maryland residents, including over nine percent 
children, have no health insurance of any kind.40 By 2004, providing 
uninsured care cost Maryland more than half a billion dollars annually.41 In 
reaction to these growing costs, a coalition of citizens’ groups, including 
civic organizations, religious congregations, labor and business leaders, 
public foundations, and medical organizations created the Maryland 
                                                                                                                
35. John Wagner, Wal-Mart Girds for Battle on Md. Bill, THE WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 
2005, at A01. 
36. Id. (“Among the new recruits were Joseph A. Schwartz III and J. William Pitcher, 
both among the ten highest-paid lobbyists in Annapolis last year, receiving more than 
$500,000 each from clients.”) 
37. Id.   
38. Id. (Spokesman Nate Hurst said that “There are several legislators out there who 
have requested that [Wal-Mart] continue to educate them.”) 
39. Michael Barbaro, Maryland Sets a Health Cost for Wal-Mart, N.Y.TIMES, Jan. 13, 
2006.  
40. Susan Sangree et al., Brief Amicus Curiae of The Maryland Citizens’ Health 
Initiative Education Fund, Inc., in support of Secretary Fielder’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and in Opposition to the Retail Industry Leader’s Association’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment, 13.  
41. Health Services Cost Review Commission, Maryland Hospital Community Benefit 
Report 2005-Final Report, available at 
http://www.hscrc.state.md.us/financial_data_reports/documents/CommunityBenefits/2004%
20Report.pdf. 
180 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:1 
 
 
Citizens’ Health Initiative Education Fund, Inc. (the “Initiative”)42. The 
organization’s goal was to research economically feasible, politically viable 
solutions to address Maryland’s health care dilemma.43 
The Fair Share Act was conceived and drafted by the Initiative in order 
to secure a source of funding for state Medicaid. 44  The Fair Share Act 
sought to lessen the burden some companies impose on other employers, 
taxpayers, and the State treasury when they fail to pay their fair share of 
health care costs.45 The Act addressed the issue by more equitably 
distributing the cost of funding state Medicaid.46 Large employers, like big 
box retailers, are better able to afford a payroll tax to support health care 
for low-income residents than small employers.47 Numerous Maryland 
businesses were eager for change. A large group of business, many of 
which provide sufficient health care coverage for their employees, told 
legislators that they were tired of subsidizing large corporations that did not 
pay their fair share of health care benefits.48  
Between 1999 and 2002, the Initiative led studies on Maryland’s 
private and public health care infrastructure, compared different methods of 
addressing heath care issues, and worked with local business and labor 
leaders, government officials, and constituents while drafting the Fair Share 
Act.49 The final product was a representation of the wants and needs of the 
Maryland community and a weapon to combat health care disparities.  
On January 12, 2006, the Maryland General Assembly enacted the Fair 
Share Act.50 Maryland was the first state to pass such legislation.51 The Act 
applied to non-governmental employers of 10,000 or more employees.52 
                                                                                                                
42. The Maryland Citizens’ Health Initiative Education Fund, Inc. (“the Initiative”), 
was incorporated on March 15, 1999, and was recognized by IRS as exempt under Section 
501(c)(3) of the Tax Code on August 14, 1999. The primary purpose of the Initiative is “To 
educate the public with respect to the need for universal health coverage,” and “to engage in 
voter education, and to attempt to influence passage of legislation in the public interest, 
through all legitimate means, to secure universal health benefits or health insurance 
coverage for all the residents of Maryland. See Article of Incorporation Third, §§ A. and B. 
43. Sangree, supra note 40, at 17. 
44. Id. at 22.  
45. Id.  
46. Id.  
47. Id. at 25. 
48. Id.  
49. Id. at 19.  
50. Labor and employment Title 8.5. Health Care Payroll Assessment, MD. CODE 
ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §  8.5-103(a)(1) (2006).  
51. Baker, supra note 27, at 85. 
52. See §  8.5-102.  
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Maryland’s Fair Share Act was set to establish a Fair Share Health Care 
Fund that would subject large employers to health care payroll assessments 
to help support the state’s Medicaid program.53 It required for-profit 
employers that failed to spend up to eight percent of total wages on 
employee health insurance costs, to pay the Secretary “an amount equal to 
the difference.”54 Covered employers would have to report their health care 
expenditures to determine whether or not they satisfied the requirements 
and pay the tax if there was a shortfall. 55   
There were only four non-governmental employers of 10,000 or more 
people in Maryland: Johns Hopkins University (“Johns Hopkins”), the 
Northrop Grumman Corporation (“Northrop Grumman”), Giant Food Inc. 
(“Giant Food”), and Wal-Mart.56 Johns Hopkins is a non-profit institution 
that met the lower 6 percent standard the legislature set for such 
institutions. Northrop Grumman successfully lobbied for a provision in the 
Act that permitted employers to exclude, for purposes of calculating the 
percentage of payroll spent on health care, compensation paid to its 
employees above the median household income in Maryland.57 This 
exclusion permitted Northrop Grumman to meet the requirement. Giant 
Food, which actively lobbied for enactment of the legislation, consistently 
spent more than eight percent of its total wages on employee health 
insurance costs. Gregory Goggans, Wal-Mart’s Director of United States 
Benefits Design, stated that “Wal-Mart has never [since July 2003] made 
contributions to the health care plans offered to its Maryland employees 
that were equal to or greater than eight percent of the ‘total compensation’ 
(as that term is defined in the Act) paid to Maryland employees.”58 Thus, in 
practice, the Fair Share Act only affected Wal-Mart because the other 
covered employers “already provided [health] benefits that cost them more 
than 8 percent of payroll.”59  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                
53. Baker, supra note 27, at 84. 
54. See §  8.5-104(b). 
55. Sangree, supra note 40, at 23. 
56. See RILA v. Fielder, 435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 485 (D. Md. 2006). 
57. See. § 8.5-103(b). 
58. Goggans Decl. P 3, RILA Mot. for Summ. J. ex. D.  
59. Edward A. Zelinsky, Maryland’s “Wal-Mart”Act: Policy and Preemption, 28 
CARDOZO L. REV. 847, 849 (quoting Joanne Wojcik, “Wal-Mart Bill” Spurs Coverage 
Mandates, Bus. Ins., Jan. 23, 2006, at 1.) 
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III. RILA V. FIELDER 
 
The Retail Industry Leaders Association (“RILA”), a trade association 
of which Wal-Mart is a member, brought an action for declaratory and 
injunctive relief against James Fielder, Jr. (“Fielder”), as Maryland 
Secretary of Labor. RILA sought a declaration that the Fair Share Act was 
preempted by ERISA and that the Act violated the Equal Protection Clause 
of the U.S. Constitution.60  
The Court determined that RILA had standing to litigate Wal-Mart’s 
interest because (1) Wal-Mart was an RILA member; (2) Wal-Mart was 
affected by the Act’s spending requirement, (3) RILA was opposed to 
health care mandates on its retail members, and (4) Wal-Mart’s direct 
participation in the action was not required.  
The Court found for RILA, holding that the Fair Share Act had referred 
to an ERISA plan; thus had a “connection with” the plan and as such was 
preempted.61 A state statute has a “reference to” ERISA where it “acts 
immediately and exclusively upon ERISA plans” or “where the existence 
of ERISA plans is essential to the law’s operation.”62  
The Fair Share Act was scheduled to become effective January 1, 2007, 
however by July 19, 2006, federal district Judge Frederick Motz struck it 
down.63 In his opinion, Motz wrote:  
 
The Act imposes legally cognizable injury upon Wal-Mart by 
requiring it to make a report to the Secretary about the amount of its 
payroll and health care contributions and by requiring it to track 
and allocate benefits for its Maryland employees in a manner 
different from that in which it tracks and allocates benefits for its 
employees in other States. 64 
 
Motz agreed that the Maryland law was preempted by ERISA, but held that 
under existing law RILA’s equal protection challenge was unavailing.65 
The Supreme Court made it clear that “equal protection is not a license for 
courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices.”66  
                                                                                                                
60. See RILA, 435 F. Supp. at 484. 
61. Id. at 494. 
62. Id. 
63. Id.at 481.  
64. Id. at 488. 
65. RILA, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 500. 
66. Id.  
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On appeal, Assistant Maryland Attorney General Steven Sullivan 
argued that “Wal-Mart, like any other employer, had an option under the 
new law to pay a tax to the state, estimated at $6 million a year, in lieu of 
additional health care payments for employees.”67 The fact that Wal-Mart 
had an alternative meant the Maryland statute would not conflict with 
federal law.68 Attorneys for the RILA countered that there was no real 
choice, because no rational employer would choose to pay Maryland a tax 
rather than spend more on health care for its own employees.69 “That’s 
really a Hobson's choice,” said the RILA’s attorney William J. Kilberg, 
stating that Wal-Mart’s only viable option would be to increase health care 
spending.70  
Judge Paul V. Niemeyer, head of the panel, expressed skepticism that 
the Maryland law did not violate federal legislation protecting employers 
from a nationwide patchwork of local laws on health care benefits. 71 Judge 
M. Blane Michael, asked Wal-Mart’s lawyer why the state should be 
stopped from making Wal-Mart pay for a part of its employees’ trips to the 
emergency room instead of foisting those costs onto Maryland taxpayers.72 
 
IV. ERISA  
A. THE PURPOSE OF ERISA 
 
In 1963, the Studebaker Automotive plant closed its doors forever, 
leaving over ten thousand employees unemployed and unable to receive 
pension plan benefits. 73 Studebaker terminated the pension plan for hourly 
workers and defaulted on its obligations to the remaining workers because 
the pension plan had not been adequately funded.74 “The plight of 
Studebaker employees quickly emerged as a symbol of the need for 
pension reform.”75  
                                                                                                                
67.  Dolan & Green, supra note 2, at 1. 
68. Id.  
69. Id.  
70. Id.  
71. Id.  
72. Id.  
73. James A. Wooten, The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business: The 
Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 683 (2001) 
(discussing the connection between the plant closing and the enactment of ERISA). 
74. Id. at 684. 
75. Id. at 683.   
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Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 to protect citizens from the 
unexpected loss of promised benefits, like the Studebaker employees 
suffered. ERISA was intended to guarantee that “American working men 
and women receive private pension plan benefits which they have been led 
to believe would be theirs upon retirement from working lives.”76 The Act 
was drafted to mandate protective measures, and prescribe minimum 
standards for promised benefits.77 Congress’s goal was to prescribe 
legislative remedies for the various deficiencies existing in private pension 
plan systems.78   
B. THE ERISA PREEMPTION 
 
ERISA § 514(a) preempts any and all State laws that relate to any 
employee benefit plan” covered by ERISA.79 “State law” is defined as “all 
laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of 
law, of any State.”80 A state law “relates to” an employee benefit plan if it 
has either a “connection with” or a “reference to” such a plan.81 The 
preemption clause states that “[ERISA] shall supersede any and all State 
laws insofar as they relate to any employee benefit plan.”82  These benefits 
include health care.83  State reforms have often come into conflict with 
ERISA because they relate, directly or indirectly, to employee benefits and 
conflict with the federal law.84  States cannot mandate that employers pay 
for health insurance, directly tax benefit plans, or require reports on cost or 
use of the plans from employers.85  ERISA only allows states to “regulate 
the business of insurance.”86   
ERISA’s preemption provision is intended to promote uniformity 
among the states. It ensures that plans and plan sponsors will be subject to a 
uniform body of benefits law. Congress’s goal was to minimize the 
                                                                                                                
76. PUB. L. NO. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974).  
77. Id.  
78. Id.  
79. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). 
80. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1). 
81. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983). 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
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administrative and financial burden of complying with conflicting 
directives among states, thereby maximizing the efficiency of the plans.87  
Since enactment, ERISA has confounded both state regulators and the 
courts concerning the appropriate extent of its preemption of state law.88 
“Questions of the extent of federal preemption under ERISA necessarily 
implicate larger issues concerning the proper relationship between state and 
federal law.”89 Where Congress explicitly states that the law is preempted, 
courts must still examine the statute’s structure and history to determine the 
precise boundaries of the preempted field. 90 The result is that preemption 
decisions have an ad hoc quality. 
 Congress anticipated that ERISA may be litigious and would require 
clarification. Senator Javits, a principal drafter of ERISA, proposed a 
Congressional Pension Task Force that would study and evaluate the 
preemption in connection with state authorities and report its findings to 
Congress.91 If the task force determined that the preemption policy was 
problematic at either the State or Federal level, appropriate modifications 
would be made.92  
The patchwork of Court interpretations of § 514(a) undermines the 
section’s application as a general rule.93 Courts must balance ERISA, 
Supreme Court interpretations, and the specific facts of the case at bar to 
determine ERISA challenges. This is the only method of analysis until 
Congress decides to assist the courts by amending the language of this 
confusing section. 
C. THE SUPREME COURT’S TREATMENT OF THE ERISA 
PREEMPTION 
 
Following the Supreme Court’s first ERISA preemption decision in 
Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.,94  it has handed down an average of 
                                                                                                                
87. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990). 
88. Stephen F. Befort & Christopher J. Kopka, The Sound of Silence: The Libertarian 
Ethos of ERISA Preemption, 52 FLA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2000).  
89. James D. Hutchinson & David M. Ifshin, Federal Preemption of State Law Under 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 23 (1978). 
90. Id. at 36. 
91. 120 Cong. Rec. 29,942 (1974), reprinted in III Legislative History, supra note 1, 
at 4771. 
92. Id.  
93. See Jay Conison, ERISA and The Language of Preemption, 72 WASH. U. L. Q. 
619, 668 (1994).  
94. 451 U.S. 504 (1981). 
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one opinion on the subject per year.95 The flux of litigation is an 
inadvertent consequence of § 514(a)’s broad language. 96 That provision is 
framed as a general standard, however it can only attain definiteness 
through the case decision process.97 ERISA demands the very litigation 
over “the validity of state action” that it supposedly was designed to 
avoid.98 While there have been numerous Supreme Court preemption cases, 
three illustrate where the court has been and where they are heading in 
ERISA preemption rulings.  
D. SHAW 
 
In Shaw v. Delta Airlines,99 the Supreme Court held that New York’s 
Disability Benefits Law (“NYDBL”) was preempted because it “related to” 
employee benefit plans under § 514(a) of ERISA by connecting with or 
referring to such plans.100 NYDBL required employers to pay sick-leave 
benefits to employees unable to work because of pregnancy or other non-
occupational disabilities. § 514(a) pre-empts “any and all State laws insofar 
as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan” covered 
by ERISA.101  
Shaw offers a two-pronged preemption test. The first prong preempts 
state laws that make reference to ERISA plans or that single out ERISA 
plans.102 The second prong is the “relate to” test. It preempts state laws that 
have a sufficient connection with ERISA plans, even if the statute does not 
                                                                                                                
95. See Conison, supra note 93 at 620 (“The cases following Alessi that deal with 
preemption are: Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 
(1983); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. 
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987); 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987); Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. 
Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987); Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825 
(1988); Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107 (1989); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 
356 (1990); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990); District of Columbia v. 
Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 113 S. Ct. 580 (1992); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. 
v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 114 S. Ct. 517 (1993)”). 
96. Id. at 621.  
97. Id.  
98. Id.  
99. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).  
100. Id. at 88. 
101. Id. at 91-92.  
102. See, e.g., Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon 498 U.S. 133 (1990); Pilot Life Ins. 
Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987).  
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expressly refer to ERISA plans.103 A state law that “relates to” ERISA 
plans is preempted even if the law is consistent with ERISA’s policies and 
substantive requirements.104 Employing this definition, the Court found that 
a law which prohibits employers from structuring their employee benefit 
plans in a manner that requires employers to pay employees specific 
benefits, clearly “relate to” benefit plans.105 “We must give effect to this 
plain language unless there is good reason to believe Congress intended the 
language to have some more restrictive meaning.”106 Shaw demonstrates 
that state laws attempting to regulate the terms of ERISA plan benefits are 
preempted because, under the Shaw test, such laws have a “connection” to 
ERISA plans. 
Under Shaw and its progeny, the Supreme Court preempted a host of 
state laws under § 514(a) on the grounds that such state laws had “a 
connection with or reference to” ERISA-governed pension or welfare 
plans.107 “Under this expansive approach to § 514(a) and its ‘relate to’ 
terminology, ERISA preemption was nearly automatic whenever a state 
law touched an ERISA-regulated plan.”108 
E. MACKEY 
 
 Shaw and its progeny had an impressive run, however the Supreme 
Court has subsequently narrowed the broad scope of § 514(a). In Mackey v. 
Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc.,109 the Court found that a state law 
did not “relate to” an ERISA plan, thus overcoming preemption under the 
second prong of the Shaw test. In Mackey, a creditor of several ERISA plan 
beneficiaries sought to garnish money that an ERISA plan owed to those 
beneficiaries. 110 Two Georgia statutes were implicated.111 The first statute 
was preempted because it expressly referred to and solely applied to 
ERISA plans.112 However, Georgia’s general garnishment statute, which 
allowed ERISA funds to be garnished, was found not to be preempted.113 
                                                                                                                
103. See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98.  
104. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985).  
105. Id.  
106. Id. 
107. See Zelinsky, supra note 59, at 851.  
108. Id.  
109. 486 U.S. 825, 829 (1988) 
110. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 831-32.  
111. Id.  
112. Id.  
113. Id.  
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The Court reasoned that ‘the garnishment statute was merely a procedural 
mechanism for enforcing judgments and found that Congress did not intend 
to forbid such mechanisms.’”114 The Court held that “state-law methods for 
collecting money judgments must, as a general matter, remain undisturbed 
by ERISA .”115 The Court reasoned that because the ERISA plans 
ultimately owed the same amount of money whether they paid it to the 
beneficiaries or to the beneficiaries’ creditors, Georgia’s garnishment 
statute did not have a sufficient connection with ERISA plans for the 
purposes of preemption under the second prong of the Shaw test.116  
F. TRAVELERS 
 
The Supreme Court further delineated the boundaries encompassed by 
the phrase “relate to” in New York Blue Cross Plans v. Travelers Insurance 
Co. Before its decision in Travelers the Supreme Court had defined “relates 
to” as a “connection with or reference to ERISA plans.” In Travelers, the 
Court reversed and remanded because the provisions for surcharges did not 
relate to employee benefit plans within the meaning of the preemption 
provision and accordingly suffered no preemption. While § 514(a) provides 
that ERISA “shall supersede any and all state laws insofar as they . . . relate 
to any employee benefit plan” covered by the statute, the preemption does 
not apply to “any law of any State which regulates insurance.”117 
“Travelers and its progeny represent an important effort by the Court to 
reform the overly-expansive Shaw-based approach to ERISA 
preemption.”118  
The Court in Travelers reasoned that “if a law authorizing an indirect 
source of economic cost is not [subject to] preemp[tion], it should follow 
that a law operating as an indirect source of . . . economic influence on 
administrative decisions . . . should not [be enough] to trigger preemption 
either.”119  
 
                                                                                                                
114. Id. at 831-32.  
115. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 834. 
116. Id.  
117. § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A). (This exception for insurance 
regulation is itself limited, however, by the provision that an employee welfare benefit plan 
may not “be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer . . . or to be engaged in the 
business of insurance”); See also, § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B).  
118. See Zelinsky, supra note 59, at 867. 
119. Id.  
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G. THE SUPREME COURT’S GENERAL ERISA PREEMPTION 
APPROACH 
 
The Supreme Court will consider the following factors in any 
preemption analysis under § 514(a). First, courts ask whether the state law 
makes reference to a covered employee benefit plan by (a) directly 
referring to an ERISA covered plan or (b) relying on the existence of 
ERISA plans to take effect.120 Second, courts ask whether the state law has 
a “connection with” a covered employee benefit plan by (a) belonging to a 
field not typically regulated by the state and intended to be field-preempted 
by ERISA,121 (b) affecting the structure or administration of employee 
benefit plans covered by ERISA,122 (c) providing alternative enforcement 
mechanisms to ERISA plans,123 or (d) offering no means by which the 
effects of the state law on ERISA benefit plans are optional or avoidable.124 
 
V. WHERE MARYLAND’S FAIR SHARE ACT WENT WRONG 
 
The primary errors that the Maryland Fair Share Act made were that it 
(1) relates to an ERISA covered plan and (2) it targets Wal-Mart. Future 
Fair Share Acts must have a broader application and cannot refer to ERISA 
plans if they want to survive.  
A. THE FAIR SHARE ACT RELATES TO AN ERISA COVERED PLAN 
 
According to the Initiative, which drafted the Act, “as a tax on payroll, 
the Fair Share Act neither explicitly mentions ERISA, nor requires the 
existence of an ERISA plan for its operation.”125 Even under the more 
relaxed preemption standards announced in Travelers, the Fair Share Act 
unacceptably coerces covered employers to provide a certain amount of 
                                                                                                                
120. Maureen McOwen, Through the Eye of the Needle: How the New York City 
Health Care Security Act Will Escape ERISA Preemption, 40 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 
37, 59 (2006); See also, Mackey 486 U.S. at 828-29. 
121. See Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., 519 
U.S. 316, 325 (1997).  
122. See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 657-58. 
123. See Id. at 658; Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 144-45. 
124. See, e.g., Burgio & Campofelice, Inc. v. N.Y.S. Dep’t of Labor, 107 F.3d 1000, 
1009 (2d Cir. 1997). 
125. Sangree, supra note 40, at 5. 
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health care coverage and regulate how employers report on the process.126 
Any regulation of ERISA covered plans is expressly preempted. 
The Fair Share Act is targeted specifically at employer-provided 
medical plans, not at a broad class of health care consumers or providers. 
127 The Act is much more than an “indirect economic influence.”128  The 
evident purpose of the Act is “a direct, focused financial impact on the 
covered employer and its ERISA-regulated medical plan, i.e., to force an 
increase in medical outlays to an eight percent minimum of payroll.”129 
Fair Share Acts cannot regulate ERISA covered plans in anyway. 
Maryland’s Act does just that. Legislatures must carefully draft their Fair 
Share Acts so that they do not have any bearing on how plan administrators 
run their health care plans.  
B. THE FAIR SHARE ACT DIRECTLY TARGETS WAL-MART 
 
The Initiative claims that the Fair Share Act “applies equally to every 
employer with 10,000 or more employees without restriction.”130 However 
the other covered employers either already satisfy the plan’s eight percent 
health care spending requirement or they have been afforded special 
loopholes. John’s Hopkins only had to make six percent contributions to 
health care because it was a non-profit. Northrop Grumman successfully 
lobbied for a provision in the Act that permits employers to exclude, for 
purposes of calculating the percentage of payroll spent on health care, 
compensation paid to its employees above the median household income in 
Maryland.131  
Successful Fair Share Acts must be generally applicable if they have 
any hopes of surviving. Maryland’s Fair Share Act is a thinly veiled attack 
on Wal-Mart. Legislatures will never be able to ensure that Wal-Mart pays 
adequate health care benefits, if they draft legislation that appears to target 
just Wal-Mart. The best way to attack big box health care disparities is to 
enact Fair Share Acts that apply to large businesses uniformly.   
 
 
 
                                                                                                                
126. Id. at 866. 
127. See Zelinsky, supra note 59, at 863. 
128. Id.  
129. Id.  
130. Sangree, supra note 40, at 23. 
131. See RILA, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 485 (quoting § 8.5-103(b)). 
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VI.  LOCAL INNOVATION—FAIR SHARE ACTS IN OTHER 
STATES 
 
Since the death of the Clinton Administration’s Health Security Act of 
1993 (“HSA”),132 there has been a gross lack of Congressional dialogue on 
health care reform. 133 In the wake of HSA’s demise, Congress has failed to 
consider other system-wide reforms. 134 “A decade of incremental change 
has left the United States with large numbers of uninsured, increasing costs, 
questions about quality, and dissatisfaction with managed care.”135 
Congress’s silence has compelled states and localities to begin discussions 
themselves.136 The Fair Share Act was one such initiative bore from these 
discussions. The Act was a significant test case that served as a catalyst for 
similar bills in more than thirty states.137 Twenty-three such bills have 
already been defeated by legislators, and none has been passed into law.138  
The 2005 resurgence of state interest in Fair Share Acts is attributable 
to meager state budgets,139 booming Medicaid costs, and growing numbers 
of uninsured workers. States are desperate to guarantee worker health 
benefits without dipping into their dwindling coffers. Across the country, 
these initiatives comprise a national effort to push local policy innovation 
despite Federal policy stagnation. Even though there have been many failed 
attempts, local legislators are still at the forefront of providing health care 
solutions for Americans.  
 
A. STATE HEALTH CARE LEGISLATION  
 
Few Fair Share Acts have survived ERISA preemption challenges 
because they are never able to mount the many hurdles of § 514. The first 
hurdle under § 514 is to determine whether the particular state law “relates 
                                                                                                                
132. Proposed Legislation: The Health Security Act of 1993. Washington, DC: US 
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to” ERISA plans.140 The Act will survive if it does not relate or falls under 
another exemption category.141 The four protected categories are banking, 
securities, insurance, and general criminal laws.142 The Act will also fail if 
it is “connected with” an ERISA plan.  
The “relate to” and “connected with” standards as applied under Shaw, 
Mackey, and Travelers will often defeat tradition Fair Share Acts, however 
New York City’s modified Fair Share Act exhibit the positive results from 
such legislation and offer a model for other states. The New York City 
Health Care Security Act (“HCSA”) is an exemplary piece of legislation 
that States would be wise to model themselves after because it conquers the 
hurdles of ERISA preemption. Both Acts successfully ensure that 
employers carry the burden of their employees’ health care needs.  
New York City legislators developed their own version of the Fair 
Share Act, which may be the most effective legislation to date. HCSA took 
effect in July 2006.143 HCSA applies to “grocery employers” that (1) 
operate one or more retail stores in New York City with at least 50 
employees at any one store, or (2) contain 12,500 square feet of retail space 
devoted to groceries, such as a “big box” retail store.144    
HSCA further stipulates that such employers must meet the required 
health care expenditure for its employees. Employers are not required to 
demonstrate minimum expenditure per employee.  “Instead, the employer’s 
total health care expenditure is calculated as the sum of all health care 
expenditures made on behalf of employees or the public.”145 Employers 
calculate their “‘required health care expenditure’ by multiplying the 
‘prevailing health care expenditure rate’ by the total number of hours 
worked by their employees.”146 The “prevailing health care expenditure 
rate” is “set by the administering agency, based on collective bargaining 
agreements in the industry.”147 Further, employers never have to contribute 
any funds towards an ERISA benefit plan.148  
“Health care expenditures” include contributions to health savings 
accounts, reimbursements to employees and their families, and 
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contributions to local public hospitals and community health care clinics.149 
The proportion of the employer’s contribution to each, qualified health care 
expenditure vehicle is unimportant as long as the employer’s total 
contributions equal the “required health care expenditure” specified under 
HCSA.150 
An employer who fails to make the required health care expenditures 
during the fiscal year is liable for a civil penalty equal to the amount of the 
shortfall.151 If the offending employer fails to pay the difference within 
ninety days, they will be fined an additional $500 per day until the 
employer meets the required health care expenditure.152 Unlike other 
traditional “pay or play” legislation, fines for non-compliance can exceed 
the original health care burdens.153 The civil penalties are deposited into 
New York City’s general treasury, as opposed to investments into a public 
health care fund, like other “pay or play” legislation.154 
The New York City HCSA is perfectly suited to survive an ERISA 
challenge under Shaw and Travelers. The Act never refers to ERISA 
covered plans, nor relies on ERISA plans to be effective. The Act does not 
require employers to provide certain specific types of benefits. The Act is 
generally applicable. The Act does not have a connection with, or reference 
to, covered employee benefit plans within the meaning of the preemption 
provision of ERISA § 514(a). Most importantly, the Act never dictates how 
employers administer their ERISA covered plans.  
The Shaw Court’s strict interpretation of § 514(a), preempts “‘any and 
all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee 
benefit plan covered by ERISA.”155 A law “relates to” an employee benefit 
plan, if it has a “connection with” or reference to such a plan.156 While the 
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Supreme Court has since moved away from this severe, two prong 
approach, HCSA would still survive it. The language of the Act is careful 
never to directly or indirectly refer to ERISA covered plans; however this 
measure is not mere semantic trickery. HCSA legitimately avoids “relating 
to” or “connecting with” ERISA plans because it never mandates how 
covered plans are to be run. Instead it remains within its legislative sphere 
of authority; health regulation.     
Under Travelers, ERISA pre-empted state laws that mandated 
employee benefit structures or their administration.157 The New York City 
HCSA requires only that covered employers meet a health expenditure 
minimum. Employers are free to meet these requirements in numerous 
ways. While HCSA does require that covered employers report their health 
expenditures, it is to an administering agency, not the City.  
Unlike most Fair Share Acts, the New York City HCSA provides 
covered employers with a plethora of ways to meet the required health care 
expenditure without creating or contributing to health benefit plans covered 
by ERISA.158 Covered employers can also comply by funding ERISA 
benefit plans for its employees, however “because this connection is 
optional or ancillary to the operation of the local law, the courts should find 
that the laws do not have a ‘connection with’ ERISA plans for the purpose 
of § 514(a).”159 
Covered ERISA employee benefit plans are those “established or 
maintained by an employer or by an employee organization.”160 As noted 
above, health care expenditures include contributions to health savings 
accounts, reimbursements to employees and their families, and 
contributions to local public hospitals and community health care clinics.  
The term “health savings account” means “a trust created or organized in 
the United States as a health savings account exclusively for the purpose of 
paying the qualified medical expenses of the account beneficiary.”161 
Notably, there is no requirement that such accounts are maintained or run 
by employers. Reimbursements to employees and to their families can only 
be made for “incurred health care expenses where such recipients had no 
entitlement to have expenses reimbursed under any plan, fund or program 
maintained by such employer.”162 Contributions to local hospitals and 
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community health care clinics cannot include “payments made directly or 
indirectly for worker’s compensation, Medicare benefits, or any other 
health care costs, taxes or assessments that such employer is required to 
pay pursuant to any federal, state or local law.”163 HCSA specifically bars 
any payment type that would relate to an ERISA covered plan.  None of 
HCSA three alternative forms of health care contributions are “established 
or maintained by an employer.” Thus none of the options qualify as an 
ERISA covered plan. 
HSCA also avoids challenges to whether it is a fee in tax clothing 
by imposing a civil fine instead fees like traditional Fair Share Acts.164 The 
law avoids the pitfalls of Fair Share Acts by carefully tailoring itself to both 
ERISA exemption and ERISA jurisprudence. HSCA ensures that covered 
employers spend a minimum amount on health care equal to the rates set by 
an industry administering agency and imposes civil fines on violating 
employers equal to the amount of the shortfall.165 This careful structuring 
shows that HSCA is cognizant of the mistakes of its predecessors while 
still maintaining the failed Fair Share Act’s ultimate goal; more health care 
coverage for employees.   
 
VII. HOW TO DRAFT SUCCESSFUL HEALTH CARE 
LEGISLATION 
A. FACTORS FOR SUCCESSFUL PAY OR PLAY PLANS  
 
Since Retail Industry Leaders Association v. Maryland, similar bills 
have been struck down across the country. The high failure rate is primarily 
due legislatures’ failure to draft bills that (1) are applicable to a broad class 
of large employers and (2) do not relate to ERISA. For Fair Share Acts to 
succeed ERISA preemptions, they must be broadly applicable. If they 
appear to target Wal-Mart or hinder ERISA regulation, they will never 
survive.  
Legislators should establish health care programs that tax a broad base 
of employers. However, the Act should never regulate or mandate 
employee health care coverage.166Legislators should never expressly refer 
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to ERISA plans.167 State laws are easily invalidated if they refer 
specifically to private-sector, employer covered health plans.168 Further, 
Fair Share Acts must be imposed directly upon employers not on the 
employer-sponsored plan.169 
Fair Share Acts must maintain neutral language regarding whether 
employers offer health coverage or contribute to the health care fund.170 
The legislative objective should be to provide universal coverage. 
Neutrality must be maintained regarding whether an employer pays the tax 
or pays employee health benefits.171 Failure to do so may result in the Act 
being deemed a mandate.  
Fair Share Acts should not impose any standards on qualifications to 
satisfy the health care expenditure, except in the broadest terms. 
“Conditioning the tax credit on meeting certain state qualifications will 
affect ERISA plan benefits and structure and therefore raise preemption 
problems.”172 
B. MODEL FAIR SHARE ACT LEGISLATION—MODELED AFTER 
NEW YORK CITY’S HCSA 
 
(1)  Employers of fifty employees or more shall make required health 
care expenditures on behalf of their employees and or the families 
of their employees each fiscal year.  
(2)  “Health care expenditures” means any amount paid by a covered 
employer to its employees or to another party on behalf of its 
employees and or the families of its employees for the purpose of 
providing health care services or reimbursing the cost of such 
services for its employees including, but not limited to, (i) 
contributions by such employer to a health savings account; (ii) 
reimbursement by such employer to its employees and or the 
families of its employees for incurred health care expenses where 
such recipients had no entitlement to have expenses reimbursed 
under any plan, fund or program maintained by such employer; (iii) 
contributions to a federally qualified hospital or health care facility 
where a majority of the employer’s employees reside or near the 
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employer’s place of business provided that such contributions shall 
not be designated for a particular individual or group of 
individuals; provided that no payment be made directly or 
indirectly for worker’s compensation, Medicare benefits or any 
other health care costs, taxes, or assessments that such employer is 
required to pay pursuant to any federal, state or local law other than 
this section, or any amount deducted from an employee’s wages 
and not reimbursed by such employer.  
(3) An Administering agency shall annually determine the prevailing 
health care expenditure rate for employees; provided that where 
thirty percent or more of covered employees are covered by a valid 
collective bargaining agreement, the prevailing health care 
expenditure rate for such employees shall be equal to the health 
care expenditure rate for full-time employees as provided under 
such collective bargaining agreement.  
(4) Any covered employer found to be in violation of this section by 
failing to make health care expenditures during the fiscal year at 
least equal to the required health care expenditure for such 
employer shall correct such violation within ninety days of such 
determination. The administering agency shall serve notice to 
correct such violation. Failure to correct such violation pursuant to 
this paragraph shall subject a covered employer to a civil penalty of 
not less than five hundred dollars for each day such violation 
continues.  
(5) Any covered employer found to be in violation of this section by 
failing to make health care expenditures during the fiscal year at 
least equal to the required health care expenditure for such 
employer shall be liable for a civil penalty equal to the amount of 
the shortfall.  
(6) The administering agency shall take appropriate action to enforce 
this section, including but not limited to, periodically auditing 
covered employers to monitor compliance with this section.  
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
 
Legislatures across the country are eager to enact Fair Share Acts 
because they know how deadly being uninsured is. The uninsured receive 
less preventive care, are diagnosed at more advanced disease stages, and 
once diagnosed, tend to receive less therapeutic care (drugs and surgical 
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interventions). 173 Uninsured women are more likely to have poor outcomes 
during pregnancy and delivery than are women with insurance, and the 
same is true for uninsured newborns.174 Uninsured children are at higher 
risk for hospitalization for conditions amenable to timely outpatient care 
and for missed diagnoses of serious and even life threatening conditions.175 
Having health insurance would reduce mortality rates for the uninsured by 
ten to fifteen percent.176 
Unfortunately, ERISA greatly impedes local legislatures’ ability to 
draft Acts that will address health care benefit disparities. ERISA’s 
preemption clause intended to minimize employer-sponsored plan’s 
administrative and financial burdens of complying with varying state 
laws.177 In doing so, it has allowed national employers to shift huge health 
care related administrative and financial burdens to states. States cannot 
cover all their uninsured residents without additional revenue sources.178 
The statutory hurdles created by ERISA place restraints on states that 
reflect deep federalism concerns and Congressional ambivalence about 
governmental regulation on the health care market. Local innovation is 
stifled and Congressional apathy is ubiquitous. The only way for states  to 
ensure that big box retailers, like Wal-Mart, pay their fair share of health 
care costs is to walk the maze of ERISA preemption jurisprudence. In 
doing so, legislatures must strike a balance between protecting the 
uninsured and avoiding the pitfalls of ERISA preemption. Modeling 
legislation after New York City’s HCSA will satisfy both goals.  
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